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ABSTRACT

This report describes the results of a seminar whose purpose was to examine sociological theory as an aid in understanding the sources of equity and inequity in American education, the conditions under which inequalities increase and decrease, and the outcomes of policies and strategies designed to enhance educational equity. Educational equity is defined on three levels: equality, justified inequality, and fair process. Classical and contemporary social theories are discussed as well as alternative theoretical perspectives on race and gender equity. Implications for educational policy and practice are set forth. Appendices include bibliographic information, a description of the seminar, and an example of seminar proceedings. (Author/MK)

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SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THEORY

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Introduction

This report describes the results of a project whose purpose was to examine sociological theory as an aid in understanding the sources of equity and inequity in American education, the conditions under which inequities increase and decrease, and the outcomes of policies and strategies designed to enhance educational equity. The discussion which follows is based on a seminar on educational equity, held at Rutgers University during the academic year 1978-79, supplemented by reading and discussion by the principal investigator and the project research associate during the academic year and following summer.

The seminar consisted of ten members of the Rutgers faculty, mostly sociologists, plus several invited guests from in and outside of the University. The regular members met every three or four weeks for a total of ten sessions which alternated between discussion of a variety of materials circulated in advance of each session and presentations by individual seminar members or outside guests. (A more detailed listing of seminar participants and agenda and a sample of the seminar transcripts are given in Appendix A and B.)

In trying to clarify the concept of educational equity, we confronted two sources of difficulty. The first source was the relatively infrequency of the term equity in the social science literature. To date most research on differential individual or subgroup access to educational resources or differential academic performance or success in later life uses the terms equality or educational opportunity (or equality of educational opportunity) rather than equity.[1] This meant that most of the literature which will be

discussed in the following pages had to be partially "translated" to suit the purposes of this project. It also meant that our initial task--a task that we in fact kept returning to throughout the seminar-- was to develop a more or less exhaustive listing or property space of alternative conceptualizations of equity.

A second source of difficulty in reaching a working definition of the central concept of the project is that regardless of the specific terminology used in a particular study, the conceptualization of the term used depends on who is using it and the conditions under which it is formulated and used. To put it another way, while the issues surrounding educational equity have been perceived as problematic since the beginning of our society, the origins of and solutions to the problem are seen differently by different members of our society, and the researcher's perspective is also shaped by the social/historical context within which the problem is being examined. It seemed to us that the effects of perspective and context have not been sufficiently recognized.

Thus before turning to the actual analysis of equity problems by classical and contemporary sociologists, we shall in Chapter 1 focus on what is meant by equity, reporting on the efforts of the seminar group to develop an exhaustive classification of alternative definitions. Chapter 2 will present discussion of the work of some of the major classical sociological theorists which pertains to or has implications for educational equity. Chapter 3 presents a parallel discussion for some contemporary sociological theorists. In Chapter 4 we shall return to the problem of perspective and context, when we examine some differences in interpretation of race and gender inequity problems and their solutions which seem

to be explained by group membership and social/historical context. Finally, in Chapter 5, we shall try to pull together some of the most important themes and arguments introduced in the preceding chapters, and make some observations on their implications for educational policy and practices.

Chapter 1. A Matter of Definition

Because the literature on educational equity per se is so limited and those who have attempted to reach a working definition have had such difficulty (see, for example, the working paper, National Institute of Education, Office of Planning and Program Development, 1978 for a summary of the efforts of NIE staff members to grapple with the problems of definition), we began by studying some of the major references on educational equality or equality of educational opportunity (for example, Coleman, 1968; Gordon, 1974; Miller, 1976; the literature discussed in Bredemeier's working paper prepared for the seminar). It is worth noting at the outset that not all social scientists who do research in this area believe that the task of definition lies primarily with the researcher. For example, although Coleman has written one of the most often-cited papers on the changing conceptualization of equality of educational opportunity, Coleman and his colleagues state in one of the planning memoranda for the Equality of Educational Opportunity Survey that what constitutes equality for policy-making purposes:

> will be an outcome of the interplay of a variety of interests, and will certainly differ from time to time as those interests differ. It should be our role to cast light on the state of inequality defined in the variety of ways which appear reasonable at this time (quoted in Coleman, 1968: 141. We shall return to the issue of shifting "reasonable" ways of defining equity in a later chapter).

Our reading and discussion also led us to believe that using equity as the central term in educational debate and policy making creates some problems that did not arise or were less troublesome when the term equality was used. As Walter Wallace, one of the visitors to the seminar put it, the concept of equity:

> has intrinsic difficulties--difficulties that anybody must have with it, because, as I understand it, the notion of equity is equivalent to the notion of fairness, and that's different from equality. Equality is a pretty clear concept, but equity is always relative to some standard of legitimacy and the standard of legitimacy can be anything. It may be equitable for one person to be a master and another person to be a slave, given a certain definition of legitimacy. So that it doesn't seem to me that there is a clear unambiguous definition of equity which carries within it its own criteria. It always refers to some other criteria which have first to be established . . . as distinct from the concept of equality which I think is a fairly clearly definable term. (Wallace, March 14, 1979 seminar).

In other words, what all definitions of equity share is the notion of legitimacy, though legitimacy may be derived in various ways.[1]

Since we could not find a ready-made definition or definitions of educational equity in the literature, and since we agreed that we were not likely to agree on a single definition, we attempted to create, using a combination of logic and examples from the sociological and public policy research literature, an exhaustive classification of what equity could mean. In formulating our statements of definitional alternatives, we used the following two criteria proposed by one of our members (Zablocki, November 29, 1978, and December 20, 1978 seminars):

> (1) For any distinct and adequately defined equity theory, we should be able to specify a hypothetical state of maximum equity, that is, to say what the maximum equity state attainable under that theory is.
>
> (2) Given (1), we should be able to rank any two situations; that is, for any two situations A and B, we should be able to say unambiguously that A is more equitable than B, A is less equitable than B, or A and B are equally equitable.

While the number and variety of explanations for inequality and strategies for reducing it at first suggested a lengthy and elaborate list of definition types, we ultimately decided that they could all be encompassed

in one of the categories shown in Figure 1. Although the figure does not specify this, it should be kept in mind that equity can be examined at various levels of the social system. That is, it is possible to have equity (or lack of equity): (1) between individuals; (2) between groups of individuals; (3) between groups of groups (i.e., organizations); (4) between groups of organizations (i.e., communities); and (5) between groups of communities (i.e., societies). It is also possible for there to be equity at one or some levels and not at others. Thus an evaluation of any situation or strategy with respect to its implications for equity should include an answer to the question: equity for whom? (March 14, 1979 seminar).

Definition 1. Equity = Equality. The concept of legitimacy incorporated in Definition 1 is that there should be no variance, at whatever level(s) of the system is designated (individual, group, organization, etc.), on a designated dependent variable or variables. For example, under this definition, equity would be considered to be achieved in the following situations: mean standardized achievement scores of Black students = mean standardized test scores of White students; college attendance (or graduation) rates of individuals from high income families = attendance (or graduation) rates of individuals from low income families; proportion of college graduates in a given age cohort in Country A = proportion of college graduates in that age cohort in Country B. Similarly, a community or society in which educational or occupational attainment was unrelated to sex, ethnicity, social class, and other ascribed characteristics would be considered more equitable than a community or society in which educational and occupational attainments were correlated with these independent

FIGURE 1. DEFINITIONS OF EQUITY

Definition 1. EQUITY = EQUALITY. There is no variance on a designated variable(s).

Definition 2. EQUITY = JUSTIFIED INEQUALITY. There may be variance on a dependent variable if it can be explained by:

2a. Combinations of proscriptions or prescriptions (norms, values, goals, attitudes, or behaviors) which are inconsistent or competing, or which outweigh equity concerns.

2b. Luck or chance, i.e., accidents of birth, being in the right (or wrong) place at the right (or wrong) time, etc., which produce differences in ascribed or achieved characteristics of individuals or differences in the relative position of groups which "cannot be helped."

Definition 3. EQUITY = FAIR PROCESS. If the race is fair, the outcome, whatever it is, is equitable. A fair race requires:

3a. Same or equal inputs.

3b. Different or unequal inputs.

variables.

Definition 1 focuses upon the results or outcomes of schooling. It does not really say anything about inputs, and there is nothing in the definition that prohibits unequal inputs for the purpose of achieving equal outcomes. Indeed most social scientists now agree that in societies where the perception and treatment of different subgroups has differed greatly over long periods of time, defining equity as equal outcomes would require, at least temporarily, some kind of unequal treatment(s), whether it be some kind of preferential treatment, such as compensatory education, or some kind of discrimination-in-reverse, such as Jencks' semi-facetious proposal that the years of free schooling provided to children be inversely proportional to their measured ability (Jencks et al., 1972). Definition 1 itself though pertains only to the desired outcome and provides no "instructions" on the process by which this kind of equity is to be achieved--that will be the focus of Definition 3.

Definition 2. Equity = Justified Inequality. Another conception of legitimacy, as formulated in Definition 2, is that there is variance in some kind of educational outcome(s), and that it is either accounted for by some variable or variables (Definition 2a) or it cannot now be accounted for (Definition 2b). Definition 2a, justified inequalities due to inconsistent, competing or "outweighing" combinations of proscriptions or prescriptions (which may be norms, values, attitudes, or behavior) is a broad category covering quite diverse situations, and we considered breaking it down into subcategories.

One kind of justified inequality holds that the amount and/or type of education children receive should be related to their present abilities

or achievements (assuming that these can be accurately assessed) or to their expected futures (for example, one stage in the evolution of the concept of opportunity, as Coleman (1968) formulates it, "assumed that different children would have different occupational futures and that equality of opportunity required providing different curricula for each type of student"). This definition of equity is often identified with the functionalist or meritocratic theoretical perspective. For example, the classic Davis and Moore (1945) analysis of the functional bases of stratification contends that differential rewards are necessary in order to identify and motivate the most "able" individuals to perform the most "important" tasks in society. Interestingly enough, the same basic argument and definition of equity underlies justifications for educational selection from the perspective of communist/collectivist ideology: that is, the selection of some people to get more or more prestigious education and training than others is "justified to the population in terms of the society's need for the most talented, ambitious, and technically qualified men to be guided to positions of leadership and responsibility, and for those less qualified in these respects to be guided to appropriately subordinate positions" (Hopper, 1977: 160). The point is that educational philosophies and systems which bear different political/ideological labels may be based upon similar conceptions of what constitutes educational equity.

Justified educational inequality may also occur when some other societal goal is held, at least temporarily, to have priority over educational equality. For example, the need to control inflation may be seen as so overriding as to justify cutting back training or retraining programs designed to diminish the gap between high and low income families by increasing

employment opportunities for low income people. Or government funded scholarship programs formally open to all high school graduates favor those with well-developed quantitative skills (and thus discriminate against those students who were not able to attend high schools with advanced math and science courses) in order to overcome shortages in scientists, engineers, and other highly skilled technical workers.

Correlations between educational and occupational attainments and such ascribed characteristics as race, sex, age, and class may occur (and be justified) because of inconsistencies between general societal norms proscribing racism, sexism, ageism, classism and other forms of bigotry and specific social policies and behaviors which make differential opportunities and outcomes inevitable. One can thus pay lip service to the norm of "equal pay for equal work" in a society in which everything from the socialization of little girls to the limited availability of maternity leaves and day care prevents all but the most talented and energetic women from getting highly paid positions. A recent analysis of "displaced homemakers" concluded: "Older women, trying to move from dependency to self-sufficiency, are not specifically excluded from government-funded programs; such programs are simply not designed with these women in mind" (Sommers, 1978: 39). Or a societal value system which prescribes equal treatment of all individuals may compete with an ethnocentric "local" or subgroup value system which prescribes differential treatment of outgroup members.

Inconsistent but simultaneously held proscriptions and prescriptions may lead to the double bind situation in which one normative prescription is integrally related to another proscribed or tabooed norm in such a way that by "obeying" one desirable norm one automatically violates the other.

For example, religious freedom and non-discrimination on religious grounds is an important value in societies which prescribe separation of church and state. At the same time, religious subgroups differ in their attitudes and socialization with regard to hard work, achievement, learning, and worldly success (as documented in Weber's comparative studies of major religions, in particular his analysis of the "Protestant ethic"). Thus by allowing religious freedom, it is almost inevitable that some religious subgroups will achieve more than others because of their perspectives with regard to achievement--and yet differential rewards for achievement are not supposed to be correlated with religion. Thus the double bind.

Finally, specific inequalities may be justified if they are perceived or intended as contributing to a lessening of the overall inequality between more and less favored individuals or groups. The Rawlsian theory of justice is based upon this notion, which requires that:

> All social primary goods--liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect--are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored (Rawls, 1971: 303, italics mine).

A major disagreement dividing behavioral scientists concerned with schooling/learning processes is whether the differences among individuals and groups which are meaningfully correlated with educational success are (or can be) clearly understood in a causal sense, and whether these differences are susceptible to manipulation. Definition 2b says that inequalities that are caused by factors which are not understood and/or for which no known remedy currently exists are not inequitable if nothing is "done" to exploit these differences or their consequences--indeed true equity requires not tampering with things, whether to increase or decrease

equality or opportunity.

This definition refers to the important distinction:

> between conceiving of something as a misfortune and conceiving of it as unjust--whether something is seen as inevitable vs. whether it is seen as susceptible to engineering and change. And it seems that one of the ways in which we define issues of equity is not simply equality of outcomes, but whether we think those outcomes are caused by conditions that we can do something about. For example, if certain things are genetically caused, and we don't have the means for genetic engineering, we don't define an unequal outcome as inequitable. . . /Moreover/. . .If you're going to relate these conceptions ultimately to some kind of policy decisions or programs or implementation, a very basic decision is what's remediable and what isn't and why (Johnson, October 11, 1978, and January 24, 1979 seminars).

This is, as we understand it, the heart of the disagreement between Robert Nozick and other philosophers concerned with issues of equity and/or justice, such as John Rawls and David Hawkins. Nozick, whose position is clearly based on Definition 2b, acknowledges that differences in "natural assets" lead to differences in position, possessions, and prestige, but he sees nothing inherently wrong with this. He even questions whether the differences between persons and groups need to be justified. "Why think," he asks, "that we must change, remedy, or compensate for any inequality which can be changed, remedied, or compensated for?" His own conclusions:

> We have found no cogent argument to (help) establish that differences in holdings arising from differences in natural assets should be eliminated or minimized. . . /Moreover,/ in the absence of an argument to the effect that differences in holdings due to differences in natural assets ought to be nullified, it is not clear how anything about the original position can be based upon the (ambiguous) claim that differences in natural assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view (Nozick, 1974: 226-227).

Nozick's solution to the problems arising out of differences in satisfaction and self-esteem resulting from the unequal distribution of social

goods is to move away from a single stratification ladder toward "a diversity of different lists of dimensions and weighting," though he does not provide any concrete suggestions on how such a "diverse society" would be brought about (in particular, how the "lists" of poorly paying, menial positions would come to be as valued as the "lists" of better paying, higher lever positions).[2]

Hawkins, on the other hand, argues that not only is there insufficient evidence of any purely biological gradations or rankings among human individuals, groups, or races "for explaining obvious inequalities among us--inequalities not only with respect to social and economic status but also with respect to what we call ability, talent, achievement" (Hawkins, 1977: 33-34), but that the innate capacities of our species make us all capable, given the appropriate opportunities and training, of becoming talented and competent. Taking music as an example, Hawkins argues that:

> As human beings we are all apt for music in a way different from other species, songbirds included. But that is to say that. . . musicianship characterizes us all, in principle, and is thus independent of our genetic variety. When it comes to the locally important differences among us in this respect, however, we are talking about skills and commitments at a very high level of learning and organization, a level where there <u>are</u> obviously other sources than the genetic for the information of our capacities. There may of course be relevant genetic defects. . . .
>
> What I do not in the least doubt is that in a given milieu, and subject to <u>similar</u> musical inducements and instructions, we will in fact display talents, and develop them, in a very unequal degree. But so likewise, I urge, different kinds of children--different genetically and in human nurture and early choice--become musical along <u>different</u> pathways and yet <u>grow to be equal in merit as musicians</u> (Hawkins, 1977: 73-74, italics mine).

That is, if he does not claim that achievement outcomes will be identical in a just society, Hawkins does claim that they will be "equal in merit,"

a conception based on Definition 1.

In their analysis of the causes and consequences of inequality, Jencks and his associates conclude that luck has as much effect as competence on economic success or lack of it, and that the kinds of luck and on-the-job competence that are related to economic success are only moderately related to family background, schooling, or scores on standardized tests. Among the varieties of luck that affect economic success are:

> chance acquaintances who steer you to one line of work rather than another, the range of jobs that happen to be available in a particular community when you are job hunting, the amount of overtime work in your particular plant, whether bad weather destroys your strawberry crop, whether the new superhighway has an exit near your restaurant, and a hundred other unpredictable accidents. Those who are lucky tend, of course, to impute their success to skill, while those who are inept believe that they are merely unlucky. If one man makes money speculating in real estate while another loses it, the former will credit his success to good judgement while the latter will blame his failure on bad luck. . . . In general, we think luck has far more influence on income than successful people admit (Jencks et al., 1972: 227).

Unlike Nozick, however, Jencks et al. do not agree that unequal chances of the unpredictable, uncontrollable sort legitimate present economic inequalities:

> The fact that we cannot equalize luck or competence does not mean that economic inequality is inevitable. Still less does it imply that we cannot eliminate what has traditionally been defined as poverty. It only implies that we must tackle these problems in a different way. Instead of trying to reduce people's capacity to gain a competitive advantage on one another, we would have to change the rules of the game so as to reduce the rewards of competitive success and the costs of failure. Instead of trying to make everyone equally lucky or equally good at his job, we would have to devise "insurance" systems which neutralize the effects of luck, and income-sharing systems which break the link between vocational success and living standards (Jencks et al., 1972: 8-9).

That is, while Jencks et al., acknowledge the importance of chance

factors in economic outcomes, they do not acknowledge that these outcomes are thus equitable (as would be assumed by Definition 2b) but argue for income redistribution strategies similar to the compensating education strategies mentioned above, which would produce great equality of outcome regardless of individual talent and luck (Definition 1).

Definition 3. Equity = Fair Process. By contrast with Definition 1, which focuses on outcomes, and Definition 2, which focuses on the correlation of outcomes and inputs (which may or may not be explained and "corrected), Definition 3 focuses on process or input. Definition 3 says that if the rules of the educational game (for example, the methods by which educational resources are allocated, or the means by which educational success is determined) are consistent with some prevailing general principle or fiat, then whatever outcomes result are equitable, whether or not there is variance in outcomes, and whether or not the outcomes are correlated with other characteristics of the actors or the situation. As Figure 1 indicates, a further distinction can be made between contests in which all contestants are treated the same and contests in which some types or subgroups of contestants are treated differently from others. Under Definition 3a, the rules of fair process require that the resources or treatments allocated, whether they be tax dollars, modes of instruction, or modes of evaluation, be the same for all children or all schools; under Definition 3b, the rules require that these inputs differ for different kinds of children or schools.

The notion that all children should be exposed to the same curriculum in the same (free) schools up to a given level, which Coleman (1968) feels was the first concept of equal opportunity developed in this country, is

an example of Definition 3a. So is Kenneth Clark's demand that the essential features of the "best" American schools be made available to all American children alike (Clark, 1965 and 1972). One can, of course, argue with the assumptions that the essential features of "good" schools can be identified and that they are the same for all children, but the relevant point here is that both these examples equate educational equity with exposure to a common educational experience.

Definition 3a would also cover school financing methods whose objective was the equal distribution of revenues and resources (e.g., experienced teachers).

Under Definition 3b, by contrast, fair process calls for differential inputs.

> The theory is that groups which have, for generations, been starved of education, skills, and self-respect cannot be expected to compete successfully with those who have consumed an ample supply of these commodities, simply by the introduction of an equal diet of social opportunity. According to this theory, equal opportunity will not produce equal results. Something more is needed (Gilbert and Eaton, 1977: 56).

An obvious example of an equity strategy based on this definition is compensatory education, although Gilbert and Eaton go on to argue that there are at least two models of "compensatory non-impartial social policies." They distinguish between (a) preferential treatment, "whereby affiliation with a group of victims is included as one of the relevant criteria given positive weight in determining the allocation of services, opportunities, and resources," and (b) discrimination-in-reverse, "whereby the allocation of services, opportunities, and resources is based primarily upon group affiliation, to the exclusion or subordination of technically relevant criteria for determining such allocations" (Gilbert and Eaton, 1977: 56-57,

italics mine).

It should be noted that compensatory education may be introduced both horizontally and vertically with respect to the age structure of a society. Introduced horizontally, it would provide differential educational opportunities or experiences for different children in the same age cohort--for example, providing special enriched educational programs for children from severely deprived backgrounds. Vertically, it would extend educational opportunities well into adulthood in order to redress the unequal distribution of educational credentials and opportunities among age strata which in most modern societies have contributed to declining status, wealth, and power after middle age (for discussion of age inequalities in education and strategies for "recurrent" and "lifelong" education, see Parelius, 1975 and 1979; Schuller and Bengtsson, 1977).

A rather different kind of educational reform strategy based on Definition 3 is the school voucher model, which perceives fair process as a system under which parents have more choice and control with respect to their children's education. Under such a system, all parents of school-aged children would be issued vouchers to cover the cost of educating their children at schools, public and private, of their own choice. The voucher system as envisioned by Jencks (1966 and 1970) and by Coons and Sugarman (1978) also has "rules" for the schools participating in such a plan (for example, they must accept all applicants with a valid voucher and cannot charge more than the value of the voucher). All vouchers would be worth the full payment of a child's education, which would exemplify Definition 3a, but some variations of the plan (e.g., Jencks's) would give bonus or compensatory vouchers of somewhat higher cash value to children from low-income

families, to make them attractive to schools and to provide additional resources for their education, which would exemplify Definition 3b.

The problem of boundaries. Classifying theories or strategies by the definition on which they are based is not always easy, because the boundaries between one definition and another are not always sharp and because a given theory or strategy often encompasses more than one definition. For example, how one classifies a justified inequality depends upon what one considers remediable. Recent developments in genetic research and conseling as well as changing perceptions of the handicapped (including recent trends toward deinstitutionalization and mainstreaming) may mean that the boundary between Definitions 2a and 2b should be seen as temporary. The boundary between Definitions 1 and 3 is also difficult to draw, because impetus for change in educational process often comes from a desire to achieve greater equality of outcomes.

Moreover, many policies or strategies combine more than one definition of equity. Thus Gordon's (1974) conceptualization of equal opportunity combines a "universality" requirement which says that all children must reach "baseline" levels of accomplishment in the knowledge and skills needed for "social satisfaction and democratic participation" (Definition 1), with a "uniqueness" requirement which prohibits school systems from constructing "achievement ceilings" which might limit the full development of individual talents beyond the baseline (Definition 2a, inequality justified by differential talents). Gordon reconciles the sometimes conflicting claims of the universality and uniqueness requirements by saying that in any given society the emphasis will vary over time; that is, equity requires a kind of cyclical alternation between emphasis upon uniqueness

(perhaps at a temporary cost to universality) and universality (at a possible cost to uniqueness), without a continuous preference shown to either. Similarly the concept of "separate but equal" schools is a strategy that combines the two subcategories of Definition 3--i.e., schooling which segregates children by race is defined as fair (3b) if equal or identical resources are allocated to minority and majority schools (3a). Note also that Definition 3 can be used to legitimate both integrated and segregated schooling, depending upon prevailing moral or other principles regarding fairness in interracial relations--which underscores the point made earlier that the term equity has intrinsic problems of ambiguity because it always refers to some other criteria which must be clarified.

Although we continued to argue over the details of Figure 1 right up to the final meeting of the seminar, we did agree on the necessity of some such classificatory scheme. Whether we are talking about equity theories or equity practices, it is important to know what each discussant means by equity. Friedman and Wiseman's conclusion that difficulties in formulating and implementing school finance reforms have resulted in part "from the apparent failure of both the courts and the legislatures to specify the logical relationships between several competing concepts of equity" (Friedman and Wise, 1978: 193) would seem to apply generally to debates on proposed educational reform, which still seem to bog down over unacknowledged disagreements over definition. It is also our feeling that many programs designed specifically to enhance educational equity contain double binds or other kinds of contradictions which prevent them from producing the intended results even when administered by competent and committed persons.

In the next chapter we shall begin our examination of selected social

theorists whose work, whether or not it specifically addresses issues of education and educational equity, seems to offer insights into the sources of and solutions to equity problems. We make no claims for completeness of coverage in the discussion which follows. Our choice of theories and theorists was consciously selective, and anyone well read in sociological theory may find some of his/her favorites missing and may question our grouping of theoretical perspectives as well as our selection of specific theorists (for example, critical and radical theory is sometimes seen as a kind of conflict theory, sometimes as methodologically and ideologically distinct; phenomenologists, symbolic interactionists, and ethnomethodologists, whom we have grouped together, often go to to great pains to distinguish themselves from each other, and so on). But this was a one-year project, and we tried in the time that we had to discover the <u>range</u> of differing views on educational equity and then to select out those which seemed to offer the most promising answers to the perplexing questions about educational inequities.

Chapter 2. The Classical Theorists

A number of philosophers have pointed out that throughout history equality has been seen as desirable--even the "normal" state of human affairs. Inequality has been seen as something to be condemned, or at least explained or justified. As Isaiah Berlin put it, for example:

> No reason need be given for . . . an equal distribution of benefits--for that is "natural"--self-evidently right and just, and needs no justification, since it is in some sense conceived as being self-justified. . . . The assumption is that equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so; that uniformity, regularity, similarity, symmetry. . . . need not be specially accounted for, whereas differences, unsystematic behavior, changes in conduct, need explanation and, as a rule, justification (Berlin, 1961: 131).

The assumption of much philosophical writing is that people are born equal and <u>become</u> unequal only through "the specific kinds of educational nurture or deprivation which a society affords" (Hawkins, 1977: 6). Even a conservative like Nozick, who questions <u>why</u> equality is normative, acknowledges that the norm exists (Nozick, 1974: 223 and 347, footnote 41).

Likewise most of the literature on utopias includes some reference to social equality. The following list of the ingredients of the good society, from Malthus's 1798 essay "On the Principle of Population," is fairly typical:

> Let us suppose all the causes of misery and vice in this island removed. War and contention cease. Unwholesome trades and manufactories do not exist. Crowds no longer collect together in great and pestilent cities for purposes of court intrigue, of commerce, and vicious gratifications. Simple, healthy, and rational amusements take the place of drinking, gaming, and debauchery. There are no towns sufficiently large to have any prejudicial effects on the human constitution. The greater part of the happy inhabitants of this terrestrial paradise live in hamlets and farmhouses scattered over the face of the country. Every house is clean, airy, sufficiently roomy and in a healthy situation. <u>All men are equal</u>. (Malthus, 1961: 107, italics mine).

Malthus's passage suggests, however, that equality, like peace and clean living is an ideal that is honored mainly in the breach, and many of the

early sociological theorists were drawn to try to explain how social inequalities arose and how (or whether) they might be lessened. In this chapter we shall discuss the relevant work of four classical theorists; two (Durkheim and Weber) who wrote extensively on schooling and the structure of educational systems; and two (Marx and Simmel) who had a lifetime interest in the foundations of social inequities of all sorts. All were interested in the evolution or drift from traditional to modern societies (though they described it very differently), and all saw the development of formal educational systems as closely linked to the changes occurring in the larger society.

Marx

For Karl Marx,[1] the distinctive feature of humanity is productivity; human beings produce their world, material and non-material, through human activity. Human society is quite simply human praxis. Marx's assessment of capitalist society is based upon its impact, structural and psychological, on the organization and quality of human activity. The basic proposition of Marx is that every historical period of mankind, its social organization, political, and intellectual history, can be explained in terms of its mode of economic production and exchange and the social structures or relations which are necessary for that mode of production. With respect to capitalist society and education, there are two distinctive features which are of value in this present discussion: the importance of private property or the lack of property as a criterion of social collectivities and inequality; and, the quality of alienation that characterizes human productivity in capitalism.

The issue of inequality is foremost in the writings of Marx, especially in discussing the basis and effects of private property as a fundamental feature in capitalist society. Social class is determined by the common

position of individuals, who either own the means of production, e.g. property, tools, technology, buildings or factories, or sell their labor, i.e. human productivity, to the owners of the means of production. This distinction forms the basis of inequality in the society and is represented in the differential educational experience of working class and upper class children. In a letter discussing equality within society Marx states:

> Equal elementary education? What idea lies behind these words? Is it believed that in present-day society (and it is only with this one has to deal) education can be equal for all classes? Or is it demanded that the upper classes also shall be compulsorily reduced to the modicum of education - the elementary school - that alone is compatible with the economic conditions not only of the wageworkers but of the peasants as well? (Marx, 1972: 396)

The questions raised in the above passage concern the distinction between equity as justified inequality or equity as equal outcomes. The ruling class of capitalist society generally employs the former rather than the latter in its definition. In Capital, Marx examines educational practices which were considered equitable and necessary for working class children even though they were not equivalent to the experiences of upper class individuals.

> Paltry as the education clauses of the Act appear on the whole, yet they proclaim elementary education to be an indispensable condition to the employment of children. The success of those clauses proved for the first time the possibility of combining education and gymnastics with manual labor, and consequently, of combining manual labour with education and gymnastics. The factory inspectors soon found out by questioning the schoolmasters, that the factory children, although receiving only one half the education of the regular day scholars, yet learnt quite as much and often more. . . .Further information on this point will be found in Senior's speech at the Social Science Congress at Edinburgh in 1863. He there shows, amongst other things, how the monotonous and uselessly long hours of the children of the upper and middle classes, uselessly add to the labour of the teacher, "while he not only fruitlessly but absolutely

> injuriously, wastes the time, health, and energy of the children." (Marx, 1972: 300)

The question of the pedagogical value of full-time instruction is not as important in Marx's study as the effect of the difference upon position and ultimately political power in the society. Even in situations in which property requirements have been abolished with respect to rights of political activity, inequality of education, like inequalities of birth and social rank, by being linked to private property, serves in effect to distinguish groups in society.

/ Thus both the quantity and quality of education are determined by the property owners and in terms of their interests.

In defense of the goals of the communist revolution, Marx attacks criticisms of the party's platform and states:

> But, you will say we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social. And your education! Is it not also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you educate, by the intervention, direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, etc.? The Communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.

To "rescue" education from the upper classes involves both the restructuring of education in terms of equality of resources and the return to the worker of the type of experiences that contribute to his/her development as a total human being. For Marx, equal education involves combining elementary and "technical" schools, and providing theoretical and practical instruction to children. Such an education may return to the worker the essential

/ humanity that is generally stripped in the work setting of capitalistic societies. The work experience in this system is inherently one of alienation.

Alienation of labor presents a problem both in productivity and development of human beings. In his economic and philosophical manuscripts, Marx

identifies three aspects of alienated labor:

> First, that the work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature; and that, consequently, he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being.....(Second), His work is not voluntary but imposed, <u>forced labour</u>. It is not satisfaction of a need, but only a <u>means</u> for satisfying other needs.....(Third), the external character of work for the worker is shown by the fact that it is not his own work but work for someone else, that in work he does not belong to himself but to another person. (Marx, 1963: 124-125)

The relevance of the problem of alienation for educational equity is that education for the working class is only a means to combat the by-products of "alienated labour" and not a means to full human development (or, in the terms of contemporary concerns, an opportunity for upward mobility). Marx quotes Adam Smith's assessment of the impact of "ordinary employments" as: "The man whose whole life is spent in performing simple operations. . .has no occasion to exert his understanding . . . . He generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become." (Marx, 1972: 287) As quoted by Marx, Smith further states:

> The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind... It corrupts even the activity of his body and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigor and perseverance in any other employments than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems in this manner to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and marital virtues. (Marx, 1972: 287)

Smith recommends education provided by the state "prudently and in homeopathic doses" as the medicine to prevent this deterioration of people by the "division of labor" (e.g. division of labor between mental and hand labor).

Education therefore serves to develop humanity and to increase the production of the industrial society. The unequal character of education is

based on class differences in such a manner that educational equity is defined in terms of the child's expected future role. Marx states:

> From the Factory system budded... the germ of the education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the efficiency of production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings. (1972: 300)

Weber

Weber's major writings on education are contained in Economy and Society (originally published as Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, in 1922) and in portions of his great comparative studies of civilization ranging from China under the rules of the "literati" through medieval Europe to Prussia in his own day.[2] Like Durkheim, Weber viewed the educational system as closely bound up with the other institutions of society, and like Marx, he was concerned with the impact of the stratification system of a society--in particular what Weber terms the structure of dominance--on its modes of schooling. Weber was especially interested in the changes in formal schooling of elites, which he posited as paralleling the evolution of societies from social orders based upon strong personal ties to social orders based upon "rational" rules applied impersonally to all alike.

Thus in patrimonial societies of the ancient world, education was the privilege of a small group, often priests or warriors, who were often perceived as possessing magical powers along with their official positions. Education consisted largely in passing on the knowledge and rites (often secret) of the elect to a small number of individuals who seemed to have latent or potential heroic or magical gifts which could be made manifest, typically via stimuli which could produce an "awakening" or "rebirth"

rather than by a more systematic form of teaching or training).

The focus of formal education in "traditional" societies, by contrast, was upon learning the rules of "correct" behavior--including respect for and obedience to elders and superiors--rather than upon the acquisition of practically useful knowledge (the latter was incorporated into the training of other persons at lower levels of the society). Thus the education of the Chinese literati included no training in numerical calculation, and the elaborate examinations, which controlled entrance to the higher political and social ranks and which were according to Weber "purely political affairs," tested not whether the candidate had acquired any practical knowledge and skills but whether he had acquired correct ways of thought and a code of conduct consistent with classical literary works. Likewise, in the feudal societies of Europe, elite education emphasized the heroic virtuees and sense of honor. These often were acquired through participation in ritualistic games, such as tournaments (an early form of "learning by doing"), but the feudal virtues contained, in Weber's view, a "studied opposition to the matter-of-fact attitude and to business routine."

In industrial and industrializing societies, advancement, both within and outside of the educational system, is, according to Weber, via merit (in particular, by performance on standardized examinations or by acquiring diplomas or certificates) rather than via social position or privilege. Scientific and technical expertise is more highly valued than knowledge of classical literature and manners. "The expert, not the cultivated man [or the hero] is the educational ideal of a bureaucratic age" (Weber, 1946: 240ff). Weber does suggest, however, that the logical end-point of a bureaucratic society would be similar in certain respects to the Chinese model. In both, social status depends upon educational qualifications

and governmental office. The difference is that the criteria for success in the bureaucratic system are technical rather than humanistic.

Weber posited three ideal types of educational structure, each corresponding to a societal form of stratification, as outlined in Figure 2, a synthesis of Weber's analysis prepared by Persell (1977). He acknowledged, however, that "none of these types ever occurs in pure form," and that the combinations and linkages within and between forms are almost unlimited. He himself described his typology as follows:

> Historically, the two polar opposites in the field of educational ends are: to awaken charisma, that is, heroic qualities or magical gifts; and, to impart specialized expert training. The first type corresponds to the charismatic structure of domination; the latter type corresponds to the rational and bureaucratic (modern) structure of domination. The two types do not stand opposed, with no connections or transitions between them. The warrior hero or the magician also needs special training, and the expert official is generally not trained exclusively for knowledge. However, they are polar opposites of types of education and they form the most radical contrasts. Between them are found all those types which aim at cultivating the pupil for a conduct of life, whether it is of a mundane or of a religious character. In either case, the life conduct is the conduct of a status group.
>
> The charismatic procedure of ancient magical asceticism and the hero trials, which sorcerers and warrior heroes have applied to boys, tried to aid the novice to acquire a "new soul," in the animist sense, and hence, to be reborn. Expressed in our language, this means that they merely wished to awaken and to test a capacity which was considered a purely personal gift of grace. For one can neither teach nor train for charisma. Either it exists in nuce, or it is infiltrated through a miracle of magical rebirth--otherwise it cannot be attained.
>
> Specialized and expert schooling attempts to train the pupil for practical usefulness for administrative purposes--in the organization of public authorities, business offices, workshops, scientific or industrial laboratories, disciplined armies. In principle, this can be accomplished with anybody, to varying extent.

FIGURE 2. Weber's Three Types of Domination, and Educational Ends, Processes, Content, and Evaluation

	TYPE OF DOMINATION		
	Charismatic	Traditional	Rational-Legal
Educational Ends	To awaken heroic qualities or magical gifts	To prepare students for a particular style of life	To impart specialized expert training.
Educational Processes	Magical rites. Cannot be taught or trained for, only awakened. One acquires a new soul through rebirth.	Cultivation for a conduct of life.	Training for practical usefulness in business, science, the military.
Educational Content	Heroic/magical forms.	Culture	Specialized expert training.
Evaluation	Hero trials testing whether one possesses magical powers.	Exploration of whether a person's mind conforms to the ways of thought required of a cultivated man.	Examination of mastery of a specific body of knowledge.

(from Persell, 1977: 8)

> The pedagogy of cultivation, finally, attempts to educate a cultivated type of man, whose nature depends on the decisive stratum's respective ideal of cultivation. And this means to educate a man for a certain internal and external deportment in life. In principle this can be done with everybody, only the goal differs. If a separate stratum of warriors form the decisive status group--as in Japan--education will aim at making a pupil a stylized knight and courtier, who despises the pen-pushers as the Japanese Samurai have despised them. In particular cases. the stratum may display great variations of type. If a priestly stratum is decisive, it will aim at making the disciple a scribe, or at least an intellectual, likewise of greatly varying character (Weber, 1946: 426-427).

While Weber suggests, in the passage quoted above, that most kinds of learning under most kinds of educational systems could "in principle" be "accomplished" by most persons, the differences in individual or subgroup resources and opportunities resulting from the stratification system tend to limit those who are selected to receive the kind of education that leads to high status to those who (or whose families) already have high status. However much educational ideology and structure may vary from one time and place to another, they are always "stamped by the structure of domination and by the social conditions for membership in the ruling stratum'," among whose privileges is that of establishing the criteria used to determine who will be successful. Educational systems are shaped by power and power conflicts, and not surprisingly, those in power use the schools for their own purposes. Weber's conceptualization of educational structure as inextricably linked to prevailing forms of dominance and authority, which they serve to maintain and legitimate, would be later borrowed by conflict and radical theorists attempting to refute the functionalist model of the educational system (to be covered in Chapter 3).

Finally, in an analysis of the concept of justice, Weber pointed to the source of the problem which our seminar, as well as NIE, the courts, and

others concerned with the issues of equity, have encountered in attempting to reach a working definition of equity--which is that the implications of any particular model or postulate of equity, or justice, "cannot be decided unambiguously by any ethic," but rather depend on criteria which are not contained in the concept itself:

> Whether one, for example--as would correspond most closely with the views expressed by Schmoller--owes much to those who achieve much or whether one should demand much from those who can accomplish much; whether one should, e.g., in the name of justice (other considerations--for instance, that of the necessary "incentives"--being disregarded for the moment) accord great opportunities to those with eminent talents or whether on the contrary (like Babeuf) one should attempt to equalize the injustice of the unequal distribution of mental capacities through the rigorous provision that talented persons, whose talent gives them prestige, must not utilize their better opportunities for their own benefit--these questions cannot be definitely answered. The ethical problem in most social-political issues is, however, of this type (Weber, 1949: 15).

And as Weber's analysis of the "rationalizations" underlying various educational structures makes clear, definitions of educational equity, like the definition of the cultivated man or the expert, shift over time, reflecting shifts in the dominance structure of society and the interests of its governing status groups.

Durkheim

The sociology of education as a distinct division of the discipline of sociology really began with Durkheim, who continued to teach courses in pedagogy to primary and secondary school teachers throughout his career and who was the first to bring sociological theory to bear on issues of educational organization and practice in a systematic fashion. Durkheim saw formal education as "the means by which society perpetually re-creates the conditions of its very existence," via the socialization of the young.

Schooling is to produce moral as well as intellectual development. Indeed its major function is to produce social beings, defined as the totality of a "system of ideas, sentiments, and practices which express in us, not our personality, but the group or different groups of which we are part; these are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national or occupational traditions, collective opinions of every kind" (Durkheim, 1956: 124). Thus children acquire in school the collective beliefs and behavior which allow them to take their place in society without seriously disrupting it.

Durkheim's analysis of the education system identifies inequalities at various levels. At the microlevel of the classroom, there is the inevitable--and to Durkheim's mind appropriate or equitable--inequality between the generations: as he put it, "the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life" (Durkheim, 1956: 71). The inequality of the generations is epitomized by the teacher-student relationship. The classroom brings together two populations of unequal culture; there is no possibility of equality or informality in the relations between the two. The teacher's role is characterized by its "indisputable authority," based on age and the moral authority attached to the vocation of teaching. The teacher, as the "agent" of society, is imbued with the life of the community; the students are "subjects" to be civilized."

Durkheim's view of the classroom has been criticized as excessively sober and constrained by sociological theorists (e.g., Coser, 1960) as well as by radical pedagogical reformers, such as John Holt, Jonathan Kozol, and James Herndon, but Durkheim claimed that the disciplined classroom, if it did not lead merely to acquiescence by intimidation, led ultimately to individuals who were "self-determined" as well as social human beings.

At the macro or societal level, Durkheim understood that any educational system was a product of its time and place, and because societies are at different stages of development, educational systems differ in their goals and practices, according to the type of society in which they are found. At this level of the system, he identified two sources of inequality; one justified, the other not. One is a difference in the amount and substance of education received by children of different social strata. While education (or the more prestigious kinds of education) is no longer the prerogative of small elites even in modern societies, there are still major differences between the classes in the education they receive. In The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim argued that this kind of inequality is due to disappear. Although he does not make clear just how this will happen, the implication is that as societies bound together by organic solidarity evolve, the education children receive will no longer be determined by their social class position.

A second, but justified, educational inequality in modern secularized societies results from the educational diversification required by the occupational division of labor intrinsic to such societies. The ever more specialized occupational system demands ever more specialized knowledge and training. Durkheim's discussion on this point suggests a certain ambivalence on his part toward the heterogeneous, vocationally oriented education required by modern societies. While he claims that diversification need not rest on what he considers the "unjust inequalities" arising out of the relationship between social class and education, he acknowledges that specialized education may be restricting, because in order to prepare a child to play a role in a highly differentiated occupational system, "it is necessary to get him to like the idea of circumscribed tasks and limited horizons"

(Durkheim, 1933: 402). He cautions, however, against extremes in education, whether of too specialized or too general an education. On the one hand, too much specialization produces a worker who is "hemmed in by his task," who simply "repeats his movements without knowing their meaning," and who is unable to work well with collaborators. On the other hand: "If a person has grown accustomed to vast horizons, total views, broad generalities, he cannot be confined, without impatience, within the strict limits of a special task." Durkheim's model educational system thus emphasizes moderation or balance between general education and technical/vocational training, and though the specifics of education will necessarily vary from individual to individual, any well-educated person will be capable of realizing that his actions:

> tend, in some way, towards an end that he conceives more or less distinctly. He feels that he is serving something. For that, he need not embrace vast portions of the social horizon; it is sufficient that he perceive enough of it to understand that his actions have an aim beyond themselves. From that time, as special and uniform as his activity may be, it is that of an intelligent being, for it has direction, and he knows it (Durkheim, 1933: 372-373).

Durkheim, like Marx, predicted the eventual emergence of a classless society, but unlike the Marxian model, Durkheim's future society is differentiated as well as classless. The "moral diversity" of occupations would still result in considerable educational diversity, but a diversity that would no longer rest on the unjust inequalities linked to social class. In Durkheim's conceptualizations, education would not be a major force for social change or reform, because in his words, education "is only the image and reflection of society. It imitates and reproduces it in miniature; it does not create it" (Durkheim, 1951: 372).[3] Thus schooling can socialize people to the prevailing values (including possibly the value of equity)

and the role requirements of collective life--indeed Durkheim charged public schooling with responsibility for maintaining or re-establishing the social equilibrium that was often lost in modern urban life--but it is not likely to provide the impetus to reduce inequities at any level of society. Finally, it is important to remember that Durkheim saw the basic teaching-learning process as necessarily unequal though not necessarily unequitable, because "education must be essentially a matter of authority" (Durkheim, 1956: 87), and the crucial role relationship involved a superordinate role (teacher) and a subordinate role (student).

Simmel

Although Georg Simmel, unlike Durkheim, did not give specific attention to the problem of schools and schooling per se, several important ideas relevant to educational equity are contained in two sections of his major sociological work, Sociology, Studies of the Forms of Societalization:[4] the first on the development of the ideas of freedom and equality in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the second his masterful analysis of superordination and subordination.

In both these essays, Simmel points to the basic "antinomy" between freedom and equality. While equality may appear to prevail in those situations of "general" freedom in which there is no recognizable structure of domination, this kind of freedom, "because of its negativity, may be common to elements which in all other respects are highly differentieated." Equality, "although appearing as the first consequence or accident of freedom, actually is only the point of transition through which human insatiability must pass" (Simmel, 1950: 275). In the typical real life situation, whether it be "school classes, groups of merchants, or bureaucratic hierarchies," most

individuals are unsatisfied with the position they occupy and wish to attain a position that is in some way more favorable. Equality with one's immediate superior is usually the first objective, because that position is more visible than ones further up the ladder, but if the individual succeeds in moving up to equality with his or her superior:

> this condition, which previously was the essential aim of his endeavor, is merely a starting point for a further effort; it is the first station on the unending road toward the most favored position. Wherever an attempt is made at effecting equalization, the individual's striving to surpass others comes to the fore in all possible forms on the newly reaching stage" (Simmel, 1950: 275).

While human beings are "insatiable" for the more favored positions in society, they rarely enter the competition as equals, and under such circumstances individual freedom tends to increase the initial inequalities, as those who have already gained power and privileges use them "freely" to gain yet additional advantages. Freedom and equality can coexist over the long run--

> only if society exclusively consists of individuals who externally as well as internally are equally strong and equally privileged. Yet this condition exists nowhere. On the contrary, the power-giving and rank-determining forces of men are, in principle, unequal, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Therefore, complete freedom necessarily leads to the exploitation of this inequality by the more privileged, to the exploitation of the stupid by the clever, of the weak by the strong, of the timid by the grasping. The elimination of all external impediments must result in the expression of different external potentialities in correspondingly different external positions. Institutionalized freedom is made illusory by personal relations (Simmel, 1950: 65-66).

(This theme of the intrinsic incompatibility of freedom and equality is echoed in the conclusions of Coleman's controversial study of school busing and white flight (Coleman et al., 1975), in which three alternative desegregation strategies are presented, one which maximizes equality at the expense

of freedom, one which maximizes freedom at the expense of equality, and a third which strengthens both somewhat but maximizes neither.)

Simmel's discussion of superordination/subordination relationships distinguishes between two types, one justified, the other not. The unjustified kind of relationship parallels the exploitative inequalities conceptualized by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto. The justified kind parallels the necessary, essentially rational kinds of superordinate/subordinate relationships needed to coordinate complex activities conceptualized in The German Ideology (as Marx and Engels put it, every symphony needs a conductor). Simmel notes, however, that people tend to resist unequal relationships even when they are justified for technical reasons, and he feels that an important function of education is to teach people to distinguish between exploitative (unjustified) and technical (justified) kinds of super/subordinate relationships.

Simmel's analysis raises a central difficulty concerning equal opportunity which none of the recent proponents of that definition of equity have been able to resolve satisfactorily. The difficulty lies in what Simmel terms the "inevitable disproportionate distribution of qualifications and positions," which is to say that, at least in modern societies with well-developed educational systems, there are always more people qualified for superordinate positions than there are such positions:

> Among the ordinary workers in a factory, there certainly are very many who could equally well be foremen or entrepreneurs; among common soldiers, many who are fully capable of being officers; among the millions of subjects of a prince, doubtless many who would be equally good or better princes (Simmel, 1950: 300-301).

Much talent is wasted, indeed goes undetected, because while "the 'mind' required for the occupancy of higher positions exists in many men," such

potential "proves, develops, reveals itself only once they occupy the position" (Simmel, 1950: 302). Simmel acknowledges that the reverse is also true, that some superordinate positions are occupied by persons who are not qualified for them, but he argues that this is a less likely occurance because of the very visibility of such positions. Serious incompetence is difficult to conceal in high level positions, especially when "so many other men, thoroughly qualified for this same position,stand aside as subordinates." Indeed when one considers "the senseless and uncontrollable accidents through which men obtain their positions in all fields," the absence of gross incompetence in the performance of most high positions is further evidence of the great number of persons who possess the necessary qualifications to fill them!

Simmel compares the superordinate/subordinate relationship under a variety of conditions (for example, subordination under an individual, under pluralities of various forms, and under a principle), and while he never completely justifies the inequalities that arise from forms of interaction characterized by domination, he notes some of the ways in which subordinate individuals or groups may make the best of such situations. For example, in modern urbanized societies, the individual is "more dependent on the sum of all his suppliers taken together" then he is in simpler societies; still "since he has an almost unlimited possibility of changing or choosing among these suppliers, he has a freedom in regard to each one of them which cannot even be compared with the freedom of man under simpler or small-town conditions" (Simmel, 1950: 233). This model of choice from among various suppliers of a given food or service, even (or especially) when the "buyer" is not in a dominant position, is what advocates of

education voucher systems are trying to simulate in the educational "market".

Simmel also notes that ironically dominance may produce its own kind of equality: "Insofar as a number of people are equally subject to one individual they are themselves equal" (Simmel, 1950: 197-198). The unification of a group of "equal" subordinates in opposition to their common superior is illustrated in Willard Waller's colorful descriptions of student strategies for coping with the "institutionalized dominance and subordination" built into the classroom role structure (Waller, 1932. For a review of more recent research on student response to the classroom power structure, see Boocock, 1978: 4-7). However, the dubious advantages of group solidarity and unification among common subordinates is probably more than outweighed by the overall disadvantages of subordinate positions and by the general lack of communalities between subordinate roles (for a discussion of the implications of the age homogeneity of the conventional classroom which "equalizes" students in terms of their basic social situation and the way they are treated by teachers, from a functionalist perspective, see Dreeben, 1968: Chapter 3), and Simmel himself acknowledges the historical correlation between equalization of subordinates and political despotism.

Simmel does not see any immediate solution to the problem of the disproportionate distribution of qualifications and positions. Not only are there in most real life situations more qualified persons than high level positions, but thus far:

> no procedure has been found by which "the best" could with certainty be recognized and given their positions. Neither the <u>a priori</u> method of breeding a ruling case, nor the <u>a posteriori</u> method of natural selection in the free struggle for the favored position, nor the (as it were) intermediate

> method of electing persons, from below or from above, has proved adequate. But aside from these presuppositional difficulties, there are others. Men rarely are satisfied with the superiority of even the best among them, because they do not wish any superiority at all or, at least, none in which they cannot themselves participate. Furthermore, the possession of power which was originally acquired in a legitimate fashion, usually demoralizes, not always (to be sure) the individual, but almost always organizations and classes (Simmel, 1950: 296).

Since, however, he feels that "general equality" is not feasible and that most groups, large or small, require <u>some</u> government (which means some dominance), Simmel considers ways to prevent the most exploitative aspects of superordination and subordination: (1) an alternative or "circulation" of positions, such that persons who are superordinate at one time would be subordinate at another[5]; and (2) the drawing of high positions by lot. Simmel favors the latter strategy, because it would be easier to carry out "under large-scale conditions" and because the lottery principle "completely severs the mediation between the individual position, the mediation which is represented by the individual's subjective qualifications" (Simmel, 1950: 295), and he argues that this would be the logical mechanism for leader creation under egalitarian socialism.

Conclusions

The classical social theorists were all concerned with the large social changes which characterized the evolution or drift from traditional to modern societies. Though they used varying imagery and terminology to describe these changes (e.g., Durkheim's mechanical vs. organic solidarity, Weber's charismatic/magical/heroic vs. rational/bureaucratic structures of dominance; Toennies's gemeinschaft vs. gesellschaft forms of association[6]), all posited shifts in the direction of greater differentiation, complexity, and impersonality in the social structure and social relations of modern industrialized societies.

The classical theorists were also concerned with the historical foundations or sources of social stratification and social inequalities. All viewed education as closely bound up with other societal institutions, in particular the economy and the polity, and as mirroring the inequalities found in society as a whole. (As we shall see, later theorists would carry this general idea further to argue that societies (or societal elites) rely on the educational system to recreate and legitimate prevailing structures of dominance, and to spell out the processes by which a society's stratification system and social mobility patterns lead to unequal educational outcomes.)

The four theorists discussed in this chapter do, however, illustrate a variety of perspectives or emphases with respect to educational equity (though all examined inequalities at various levels of the social system). Weber emphasized macro-level differences, of differences in educational quality between societies, as they reflected the types of dominance structures characteristic of different societies. Marx tended to emphasize

the differences in the quality of education within a given society, originating in the class differences between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Education is for Marx one of the arenas of the class struggle. He predicted though that these intra-social inequities would disappear with the impending revolution, giving way to a society in which everyone would have a multi-faceted, non-specialized education. In an often quoted passage from The German Ideology, Marx and Engels contrast daily life in a society with a rigid division of labor, where "each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape," with life in the communist society:

> where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic (Marx and Engels, 1947: 22).

For Durkheim, by contrast, education in a normally functioning organic society would be specialized. While there would be a core of general education which would transmit the values and codes of conduct necessary for maintaining solidarity in a complex society, the differential talents and inclinations of individuals as well as the needs of society would justify certain inequalities in education and work assignments (a view which would lead directly into modern functionalist theories of education). Society should interfere with the education and occupation selection process only to remove impediments to fair competition for the more desirable positions.

Simmel too sees educational (and other) inequalities as inevitable, and some of them as justified. However, he is less sanguine than Durkheim

about the widespread acceptance of even justified inequalities, because in highly developed societies, there tend to be more qualified persons than positions which fully use their qualifications, leaving many individuals unsatisfied with the positions they occupy and anxious to attain others which are more favorable. Simmel also sees the very freedom which is so highly valued in modern societies as incompatible with equality over the long run.

Finally, by describing how modern societies came into being, the work of the classical theorists identifies the sources of many of our current dilemmas: the disproportionate distributions of qualifications and positions; the trend toward ever more differentiated and segmented configurations of social stratification, and the social cleavages that accompany them; the difficulties of achieving and maintaining a sense of unity and common purpose in societies held together by rational but impersonal authority rather than by personal bonds based on shared traditions. In societies like ours, increasingly broken down into multiple social groupings often at cross-purposes, it is not a foregone conclusion that consensus on what constitutes equity, let alone on appropriate strategies for achieving it, will be reached. We shall return to this problem in our concluding chapter.

Chapter 3. Contemporary Theories

In this chapter we shall consider four types of contemporary theories which have implications for educational equity. Some of the work to be discussed here is by scholars whose main interest is in general social theory and who are only indirectly or occasionally interested in the specific problems of education and equity (for example, Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton, the equity theorists, Alfred Schutz and other phenomenologists); others have special interest in developing theories to explain the operation of the educational system and the schooling process (for example, Robert Dreeben, Samual Bowles and Herbert Gintis, and Basil Bernstein).

Functionalism became the dominant theoretical perspective in American sociology in the 1940s and 1950s, and it probably remains so even though in the past two decades some of its basic tenets have been challenged by multiple alternative sociological theories, some of which will be included in this chapter. Critical and radical theorists attack functionalism on ideological/political as well as logical grounds; phenomenologists, ethnomethodologists, and others whom we have termed "interpretive" theorists reject the positivistic methodological assumptions of functionalism; while the British "new" sociologists of education attempt to synthesize diverse theoretical perspectives at the micro-level of the school and classroom rather than at the macro-level at which functionalists tend to operate. Whether or not one agrees that sociology is now a "multiple-paradigm" science (see, e.g., Ritzer, 1975), there are now multiple styles of doing sociology, and we have tried to extract from a selection of these alternative theoretical perspectives answers to our questions about educational equity.

Functionalism

Structural functionalism is most notably examplified in the work of Parsons and Merton. In the functionalist scheme, society is a system of interrelated parts. Societies gain the order, stability and equilibrium they need to remain in existence from the organized norms, values, and beliefs which constitute culture and which pattern all of social life. In Parsons' major work, The Social System (1951), he specifies four basic functions that must be carried out in any society if it is to survive and identifies the societal institutions that fulfill each of these functions. Thus education, along with family socialization, is primarily responsible for the function of latent pattern maintenance, or the continuance of basic cultural patterns. (The other three functions are: adaptation, performed by the economy; goal attainment, performed by the polity; and integration, performed by religion and the legal system.)

One of the key documents underpinning the functionalist view of education is Davis and Moore's analysis of the functional bases of stratification, "Some Principles of Stratification" (1945), which justifies unequal rewards on the grounds of efficiency in the use of human resources and the need to provide adequate motivation to those with the talent to perform society's most important roles (Definition 2a). As Davis and Moore see it, "A medical education is so burdensome and expensive that virtually none would undertake it if the M.D. did not carry a reward commensurate with the sacrifice" (Davis and Moore, 1945: 244). Like most functionalists, Davis and Moore tend to be primarily concerned with filling the high status roles, which they tend to equate with "demanding," "burdensome," and so on. Little attention is given to the problems of getting people to perform work

which is demanding and burdensome in the sense of being menial, dirty, and physically exhausting but which brings little in the way of income, prestige and other rewards.

Thus one of the functionalist justifications for the role of educational institutions is that they provide a rational way of sorting and selecting people by talent and ambition such that the most able and motivated attain the most (and most highly valued) education and, ultimately, the highest status positions. A second major function of schooling is to teach the kinds of cognitive and skills and norms which enable people to perform adequately in adult roles. The classic discussion of this function of schooling is Dreeben's On What Is Learned in School (1968), in which it is argued that the distinctive contribution of the school is its inculcation of "norm content, acceptance, and behavior," in particular the norms of independence, achievement, universalism, and specificity. These terms are taken from Parsons' pattern variables scheme for classifying major societal values, and Parsons himself is the author of an influential paper on "The school class as a social system" (1959), in which he identifies the school as a transitional and preparatory environment that stratifies children on the basis of explicit and visible achievement criteria.

It has been pointed out that the functionalist perspective on education is based on a set of assumptions about modern Western societies, all of which have been called into question by theorists of other persuasions. One assumption is that Western societies operate on the principle of meritocracy, that is, that educational and occupational roles are (and should be) achieved rather than ascribed, and that there are universalistic rules for allocating these roles so that children from all kinds of social status backgrounds

have equal opportunity to achieve high status (Definition 3). One of the most articulate spokesmen for a "just" meritocracy, in which "the purpose of societal arrangements is to allow the individual the freedom to fulfill his own purposes," and those who have high status have earned it by competence, is Daniel Bell (see, e.g.,the section on meritocracy and equality from The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Bell, 1977).

A second assumed characteristic of Western societies is their dependence upon expertise--that is, they require the production of increasing amounts of new (especially technical) knowledge and highly trained individuals. In the "expert society," as Burton Clark describes it (1962), ever more extensive education is required (in such a society, "lifelong learning," as discussed in Parelius (1975) becomes a meaningful concept), not so much to teach specific vocational skills (the educational system probably cannot keep up with the highly specialized knowledge and skills needed by more and more jobs), but rather to teach people how to learn, as well as to give them the kind of common culture and values which Durkheim saw as necessary to maintaining organic solidarity in highly differentiated societies.

Finally, the functionalist perspective assumes that "fair process," an important tenet of the socio-political ideology of Western democratic societies will lead toward the achievement of social justice along with the achievement of ever higher levels of technological expertise and economic productivity. The very process of expanding education will produce a more tolerant and less prejudiced, because more informed, citizenry, which will provide the necessary support for true equality of opportunity (Definition 3).

Critics of the functional theory of education point to empirical evidence that parental status is still a better predictor of a child's educational and occupational future than indicators of natural individual

ability (such as I.Q. scores). And the escalating educational requirements which functionalists posit as necessary to modern industrialized societies seem to have outpaced the real needs of many contemporary occupations. Is a college degree really necessary for the efficient performance of say a secretarial or a sales position? As Hurn points out:

> Those who have high levels of education do, of course, generally obtain higher status jobs than those who have less education. But this does not seem to be because of the cognitive skills that educated people learned in school. It is the possession of the education credentials, rather than the acquisition of the cognitive skills that those credentials denote, that seems to predict future status. The relationship between education and occupational status, then, is a good deal more complex and perhaps less "rational" than suggested by the functional paradigm (Hurn, 1978: 40, italics mine. Another critique of the functional theory of education can be found in Karabel and Halsey, 1977: Introduction).

While the positive aspects of educational systems have probably been over-emphasized, and the negative consequences underestimated if not overlooked, it is important to remember that functionalist theory itself, especially as formulated by Merton (1957), posits the possibility of harmful and unintended consequences (dysfunctions and latent functions respectively) of societal arrangements, and acknowledges the inevitability of contradictions and conflicts, because what is functional for one subgroup or at one level of the social system may be dysfunctional for or at another. An example of functionalism used to critique current societal arrangements is Gans' paper on the functions of poverty (1972), substantively as well as theoretically relevant to our discussion because of the similarities in patterns of income and educational inequalities. Poverty, says Gans, while clearly dysfunctional for the poor, has a series of positive functions for the affluent, ranging from ensuring that society's dirty work is done at

low cost to creating lucrative and respectable jobs for the managers of welfare bureaucracies, providing recruits for the armed services, maintaining a market for inferior products and services which would be rejected by those who could afford better, affording satisfaction to those above poverty level for their relative affluence, and producing a raison d'etre for many religious and philanthropic organizations. Poverty has dysfunctions for the affluent too, (e.g., an impoverished lower class is a constant threat to personal property and political stability), but most wealthy people will put up with the dysfunctions rather than to consent to a redistribution of their wealth. As we shall see, Gans, arguing from a functionalist perspective reaches conclusions very similar to the conclusions of radical sociologists concerning the use of the educational system by capitalist elites to maintain current inequalities.

Finally, some theorists have argued that inequality of condition is not inherent in the functional conceptual of stratification. For example, Duncan (1968) discusses the conceptual distinctions among functional differentiation, institutionalized inequality and social stratification. Functional differentiation refers to a basic notion of a society in which members of the population are expected to and regularly perform different roles. Institutionalized inequality is the fairly consistent practice in which different roles or different performances of a given type of role are differently rewarded and differently evaluated. Role performances confers status distinctions. Social stratification is the temporal persistence of positions in a hierarchy of inequality within and between generations.

> The definition (of social stratification) implies that a stratified population is one in which there is intertemporal predictability (to a greater than chance extent) of an individual's status at one time, given his status (or that of

> his family of orientation) at some earlier time. . . . This concept is to be distinguished from the degree of inequality, which refers to the extent of differentiation on a relevant scale of rewards (or dispersion of the status distributed). A society might be highly-or even completely-stratified even though inequality is slight, as in the case of a wealthy and a poor class the difference in whose actual holdings is small but membership in which is virtually fixed at birth (Duncan, 1968: 681).

The relationship of an individual's current status to his/her point of origin in the stratification system is a major point of criticism of the functional argument for justified inequality of rewards. In the "great debate" known to every sociology graduate student, between Davis and Moore (1945) on the one side and Tumin (1953) on the other, Tumin states that one of the dysfunctions of social stratification is that it actually limits the possibility of discovering the full range of talent in society by restricting access to channels of recruitment, centers of training, and sources of motivation to the elites of the system. Thus, as Duncan points out, "A society is stratified with respect to wealth if a wealthy family's offspring are discernibly more likely to be wealthy than are the offspring of a poor family" (1968: 681), and however careful one is to identify the dysfunctions as well as the positive aspects of existing institutions, this theoretical perspective tends to imply that current arrangements, in schools and elsewhere, are basically "good," perhaps in need of reforms or adjustments to improve their operation but not in need of radical change.

Conflict Theories[1]

The category of contemporary theory which is classified as conflict sociology, by contrast with functionalism, emphasizes change, competition, and coercion as the defining characteristics of a social order. In the history of ideas, conflict theory has a distinctive tradition which evolves from the philosophies of Machiavelli and Hobbes. Within sociology, the basic

assumptions of the conflict perspective emanate from the factors of stratification as discussed in the theories of Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marx's theory of stratification focuses upon the "primacy of self-interested conflict, the importance of material conditions, the effects on ideology, and the existence of the economic class struggle" (Wells, 1978: 183). As reconceptualized by Randall Collins, Weber's work expands the Marxian analysis and provides an even broader foundation for conflict theory.

> The principles of property interacting with the state, of interest mobilization, and of the means of mental production are illuminated by Weber's work; his contributions to conflict theory may be understood as amplifying them in regard to the technical conditions of violence and of administrative organizations, as well as adding another principle that we may refer to as the "means of emotional production" which subsumes the contributions Weber made under the labels of "legitimacy" and "status groups," and in his sociology of religion (Collins, 1978: 183).

The "means of emotional production" are those material conditions which influence individuals to experience certain emotions, e.g. social solidarity, fear, awe, or a sense of purpose. These emotions are resources used in conflicts for power, wealth, and emotional gratification and their control is affected by the distribution of resources resulting from other forms of conflict.

Two of the various types of conflict theory are especially relevant in a discussion of educational equity because they focus on the maldistribution of resources and rewards as the basis for the formation of conflict interest groups. First, the theorists who subscribe to the conflict paradigm (e.g. Dahrendorf, 1959) assume that social life is characterized by opposing interests cohering around differences in the distribution of power or authority. Every element of society is involved in the inevitable process of competition and social change. Second, the central issues for the

set of contemporary theories labeled radical, critical and neo-Marxist are the inequalities built into the basic societal institutions, including education, which serve to maintain the social relations of production in capitalism.[2] Radical sociologists utilize conflict theory as a basis for a political program of social change that seeks to reduce and eventually eliminate the social inequalities which serve to maintain the exploitative relationship across class lines. In conflict analysis, every society is based on the coercion of some members by other members.

The inequalities in education serve to maintain the status quo by providing a basis for legitimation of ideas and structures which are resources for certain conflict interest groups. The organization of educational systems contributes to the unequal distribution of control of the means of emotional production and the products of other forms of conflict. The position of education in societal conflict is stated by Collins: "I see education as part of a multisided struggle among status communities for domination, for economic advantage, and for prestige" (Collins, 1977: 3).

Probably the most fully developed and influential formulation of the conflict perspective of education is contained in the works of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, particularly in their book Schooling in Capitalist America (1976) which traces the rise of mass education as a product of the evolution of capitalism. Education, in this analysis, is highly unequal - quantitatively and qualitatively - with the chances of attaining much or little schooling being dependent upon race and the socioeconomic level of the child's parents. For Bowles and Gintis this inherent relationship between social background and the levels of educational attainment is necessary to the organization of the capitalist economy.

> The economic system is stable only if the consciousness of the strata and classes which compose it remains compatible with the social relations which characterize it as a mode of production. The perpetuation of the class structure requires that the hierarchial division of labor be reproduced in the consciousness of its participants. The educational system is one of the several reproduction mechanisms through which dominant elites seek to achieve this objective. By providing skills, legitimating inequalities in economic positions, and facilitating certain types of social intercourse among individuals, U.S. education patterns personal development around the requirements of alienated work. The educational system reproduces the capitalist social division of labor, in part, through correspondence between its own internal social relationships and those of the workplace (Bowles and Gintis, 1976: 147).

In a society that emphasizes the importance of efficiency and technology, the ideas of equality, and democracy, it is difficult to legitimize a hierarchial division of labor. In conflict analysis, education is the means by which individuals are socialized to accept as just: the overall social relations of production, their own position within the system, and the mechanism of allocation through which this position has been attained. This process of legitimation is achieved in two ways. First, the internal organization of the school replicates the division of labor and provides the workers with the appropriate attitudes for the authority relations of the economy.

> Differences in the internal structure of schools themselves and in the content of schooling reflect the differences in the social class compositions of the student bodies. The social relations of the educational process ordinarily mirror the social relations of the work roles into which most students are likely to move. Differences in rules, expected modes of behavior, and opportunities for choice are most glaring when we compare levels of schooling. Note the wide range of choice over curriculum, life style, and allocation of time afforded to college students, compared with the obedience and respect for authority expected in high school. Differentiation occurs also within each level of schooling. One needs only to compare the social relations of a junior college with those of an elite four-year college, or those of a working class high school with those of a wealthy

suburban high school, for verification of this point.

> The various socialization patterns in schools attended by students of different social classes do not arise by accident. Rather, they stem from the fact that the educational objectives and expectations of both parents and teachers, and the responsiveness of students to various patterns of teaching and control differ for students of different social classes (Carnoy, 1975: 50-52).

Thus schools not only provide different kinds of training, technical and otherwise, to meet the technical, rational needs of modern industrial society, but they shape the personalities of children differently to conform to the needs of positions at different levels of the system. This same process is mirrored in other institutions of socialization, e.g. the family. Children from mainly working class backgrounds are trained to be obedient, docile, compliant workers who will be submissive to the needs of the industrial discipline. Braverman (1974) examines the development of alienated labor in modern monopoly capital societies and points out that it was to the interest of the owners of the means of production to further "cheapen" the commodity of human labor by removing control and power over the execution of the production task from the worker. The modern work setting is characterized by a separation of conceptualization of the worktask and actual execution, the latter performed by the worker (both blue and white collar occupations) and the former by the management sector of the corporation. According to Braverman, the increase in the quantity of education of workers to meet the needs of the expert society is paralleled by a decrease in the creative input of worker as to how the work process should be executed. Submission to the authority of management is crucial in this process of maintaining labor as a cheap commodity.

Second, the importance of education to the perpetuation of the class structure is based on the achievement ideologies, e.g. meritocracy, that

serve to legitimize the individual's position in the stratification system and the allocative process. As an example of this process of legitimation, Bowles and Gintis discuss the I.Q. theory of stratification which states that economic success is based on innate talent and training.

> To understand the widespread acceptance of the view that economic success is predicated on intellectual achievement we must look beyond the workplace, for the I.Q. ideology does not conform to most workers' everyday experience on the job. Rather, the strength of this view derives in large measure from the interaction between schooling, cognitive achievement, and economic success. I.Q.-ism legitimates the hierarchial division of labor not directly, but primarily through its relationship with the educational system (Bowles and Gintis, 1977: 229).

The fact that educational attainments are in actuality strongly dependent upon social background even for people with similar childhood I.Q.'s, and that academic achievement is directly related to occupational placement provides sufficient evidence for Bowles and Gintis that the ideal of meritocracy is not realized in the capitalist system.

The history of educational reform in America does not provide any indication that the basic relationship between class structure and education has changed. Several studies (Milner, 1972, Bowles and Gintis, 1976, deLeone, 1979, Carnoy, 1975) have indicated that this pattern is clear, and that even the trend toward more equal educational opportunities for minorities has had minimal impact on the structure of economic opportunity and educational inequality. For the conflict theorists, the failure of liberal reform is based in the relationship between the economy and education. "The tendency of the social relationships of economic life to be replicated in the educational system and in family life lies at the heart of the liberal educational creed. This fact must form the basis of a viable program for social change." (Bowles and Gintis, 1976: 148). Educational

equity in the conflict perspective requires equality (Definition 1) and can only be achieved with changes in the basic inequalities in the other societal institutions. Justified inequalities only serve to maintain the interests of certain groups while depriving others. Equality of educational opportunity does not affect the class structure although it may minimize inequalities due to race or ethnicity. To achieve equitable conditions in education will require radical social change based upon the interests of the deprived.

Interpretive Theoretical Perspectives and the "New" Sociology of Education

Another type of contemporary social theory which represents a reaction against the positivistic/functionalist/normative paradigm has its roots in the writings of George Herbert Mead, Herbert Blumer, Alfred Schutz, Harold Garfinkel, Aaron Cicourel, Peter Berger, and others who are identified with symbolic-interactionism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and the sociology of knowledge. While scholars identifying with any of these theoretical perspectives vigorously resist being grouped with the others and often go to great pains to demonstrate their independence (for brief discussions of the major similarities and differences among these theories, see Morris, 1977: Chapter 2; and Heap and Roth, 1978), they are all centrally concerned with the ways in which individuals "interpret" or give meaning to social events and situations. As Blumer, one of the principal proponents of symbolic interactionist theory, puts it, "human beings act toward things (or people) on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them," and human interaction is distinguished by the fact that human actors:

> interpret or "define" each others' actions instead of merely reacting to each others' actions. Their "response is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such actions (Blumer, 1962: 180).

To the phenomenologist, the human world is a "man-experienced world and in part a man-made world (Luckman, 1978: 10-11). People construct and constantly reshape or revise their own social worlds through interaction with others, rather than being merely acted upon by social forces. In an exposition of his concept of "life-world," Schutz explains that:

> Our everyday world is, from the outset, an intersubjective world of culture. It is intersubjective because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being an object of understanding for others. It is a world of culture because, from the outset, the life-world is a universe of significations to us, i.e., a framework of meaning (Sinnzusammenhang) which we have to interpret, and of interrelations of meaning which we institute only through our actions in this life-world. . . . That is to say, this world has significance and meaning first of all by me and for me (Schutz, 1978: 134-135).

Similarly, ethnomethodologists are concerned not only with the ways in which people make sense of events and of interaction, to themselves and others (via a process which Garfinkel terms "practical reasoning"), but further, with the ways in which human actors account for what they do, i.e., the "practices" by which they

> interpret their everyday activities to themselves and others are themselves perceived as data for investigation by ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel, 1967).[3]

For a phenomenologist or ethnomethodologist, the very process by which different people arrive at a definition of equity is a topic for study rather than a given. In a paper entitled "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," Schutz (1964) examines this process and then tries his own hand at defining the concept. Noting the ubiquity of divisions between individuals and groups which "place" them differentially with respect to each other (in age groups, sex groups, kinship groups, and various hierarchies of superordination and subordination, of leader and follower, of

"those in command and those in submission"), Schutz concludes that ambiguity and ambivalence about the notion of equality are inevitable, since any definition of it is embedded in the "common-sense thinking of concrete social groups." In a passage that echoes Simmel's reflections on the difficulty of ensuring impartiality in conflicts when a super-subordinate relationship is involved (Simmel, 1950: 221-222), and which parallels Merton's analysis of the different viewpoints of "insiders" and "outsiders" (Merton, 1973), Schutz points out that:

> Doubtless the meaning of equality is a different one for those who are aspiring to an equal position with a superior, whether a superordinate individual or a "predominant" group, and for those in the privileged position who are required to grant equal treatment (Schutz, 1964: 267).

Schutz considers a definition of equity as "an equal start for everyone" (Definition 3) and rejects it, not, he claims, because the ideal is not a worthy one, but because an equal start for everyone is impossible given the differences among people in wealth, material resources, access to information (particularly to financial information), even in time resources (some people have more leisure than others, and only a few can afford the long years of education which lead to the highest positions in society). Thus he opts for a more "modest" definition, a variation of Definition 2a in which inequalities are justified, not surprisingly for a phenomenologist, on the grounds of differences in the meaning of equality and happiness, to different people, as well as differences in their objective life situations. Thus equality of opportunity "should assure to the individual who finds himself in the human bondage of his various group memberships the right to the pursuit of happiness. . . and, therewith--<u>in terms of his own definition</u>--the maximum of self-realization <u>which his situation in social reality permits</u>" (Schutz, 1964: 273, italics mine).

Symbolic interactionists, phenomenologists, and ethnomethodologists also share a resistance to positivistic research methodologies borrowed or adapted from the natural sciences, because such methods involve a conscious separation of researchers and their subjects and excessive manipulation of the latter by the former (an "aloof removal of the investigator as a spectator on life whose results depend on hierarchical control and manipulation," as one writer put it, Flude and Ahler, 1974: 82). Interpretive sociologists are also suspicious of available data based on official documents, unless the researcher treats such data as a social product and examines the basis on which it has been "constructed." Concerning educational statistics, for example:

> In order to understand the official statistics of school achievement, it is necessary to view them as the product of the school as a "rate-producing" agency. This involves examining what criteria determine the movement of pupils through the school system, the social processes leading to the categorization of pupils and the opportunities made available to what are perceived by teachers to be different categories of pupils. This concern to explicate the social processes that influence pupil careers and their terminal educational attainments is a different task from taking the rates of educational attainment and then accounting for them in terms of those background variables thought to differentiate successful from unsuccessful pupils (Flude, 1974: 40).

Because they treat as problematic--or least as worthy of investigation--many aspects of classroom life that are normally taken for granted, the task of researchers with an interpretive perspective is to gain an in-depth "beneath-the-surface" understanding of social situations by obtaining the most direct evidence available.[4] Symbolic interactionists tend to favor participant observation as a means of getting close to their subject matter. Inside High School (Cusick, 1973), a study of student life in a single high school, is an example of sociology of education research which combined a

symbolic interactionist theoretical framework--Cusick states as his research objective finding answers to the following questions: What do adolescents do in school? How do they perceive and react to their environment and to each other? How do they view themselves as students? "or, in short, what are the perspectives they use to deal with that they perceive to be the social reality of the school environment?" (Cusick, 1973: 229)--and a participant observation methodology which involves total "immersion" in the high school social situation, including several months of "hanging out" with one of the male cliques in the school. Ethnomethodologists tend to favor reanalysis of institutional case records or long verbatim protocols of verbal interaction between individuals engaged in everyday activities, with the researchers annotating the original data with their own coding of "what really happened" (Garfinkel, 1967: Chapter 1). Since the interpretive process itself is an important component of social situations and structures, the professional sociological literature is also taken as a phenomenon for study by ethnomethodologists. In Garfinkel's inimitable prose:

> Ethnomethodological studies of formal structure are directed to the study of professional sociologists' "accounts" of the formal structure of everyday activities, seeking to describe members' accounts of formal structures wherever and by whomever they are done, while abstaining from all judgements of their adequacy, value, importance, necessity, practicality, success, or consequentiality. We refer to this procedural policy as "ethnomethodological indifference" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1978: 298).

By contrast with the classical theorists and, more recently, the functional analysts, who tended to focus on macro level problems of education and educational equity (in particular, the ways in which the stratification system of a society explains differential educational goals and processes

and differential student outcomes), the focus of interpretive sociologists is at the micro level, on the situational context within which teaching and learning take place, including the hierarchical concept of knowledge and ability built into the traditional curriculum and the various accounting schemes teachers and students use to explain and cope with the classroom situation.

Most of the applications of the interpretive perspective to schools and schooling have been made by British scholars who identify themselves with the "new" sociology of education. Dissatisfied with what they saw as the failure of "traditional" (i.e., positivist, macrosociological, structural-functionalist) sociology to explain the continued gross inequalities in academic achievement, and the failure of the educational reforms of the 1960s (in particular, the comprehensive school) to reduce these inequalities, scholars like Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu (the latter one of the few non-British "founding fathers" of the "new" sociology of education) sought a new approach which would pay closer attention to the content of education and the internal operation of schools. While traditional sociology of education had tended to trace its substantive ancestry to the field of social stratification, the "new" sociology of education drew its inspiration from the sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckman's conceptualization of the "social construction of reality" was particularly influential) as well as from the work of ethnomethodologists, phenomenologists, and symbolic interactionists. Indeed Michael Young, who edited the first collection of papers devoted to the applying these new theoretical models to educational research issues (but who is most widely known as the author of The Rise of The Meritocracy, a satirical novel of life in a future, purely functionalist

society), proclaimed that "the sociology of education is no longer conceived as an area of enquiry distinct from the sociology of knowledge" (Young, 1971: 3).[5]

From the perspective of the "new" sociology of education, educational inequities arise inevitably from the structure of the curriculum and from the "labeling" of students' capacities and performances in ways that facilitate the educational careers of some children and impede others.[6] In an often-cited observational study of an English comprehensive school, Keddie (1971) found that students' academic success or failure was shaped by the routine of classroom activities, particularly by the ways in which teachers accounted for children's learning and behavioral difficulties. Although teachers usually denied that ability is associated with social class, their actual classroom behavior often suggested the contrary, and their differential treatment of students in different ability categories was facilitated by the streaming or tracking system that provided readily available labels for students. Thus a response which would be accepted as correct or knowledgeable when made by a student in a high ability class might be dismissed as erronious or incompetent when made by a student classified as of low ability. Teachers' socially constructed concepts, often in contradiction with their proclaimed educational ideology, shaped their classroom behavior and treatment of individual students.

> Thus, in their dealings with pupils, teachers activated certain imputed characteristics of pupils' home and cultural backgrounds that were assumed to be relevant to the learning process, and their understanding of pupils' attitudes, motivations and behaviors. It appeared to be the case in this study that pupils' ability was assessed by teachers in terms of their willingness to handle knowledge in ways that were congruent with teachers' "expert" definitions of knowledge. This capacity to work within the conceptual parameters provided was seen by teachers to vary according to

> pupils' social class background and stream positions within the school. Pupils who were unable or unwilling to "handle" knowledge in ways that were prescribed or implicit in teachers' organization and presentation of material were typically categorized as "less educable" or "lacking in ability" (Flude, 1974: 43-44).

In other words, children's success or failure in school depends not just on the social attributes which give children differential preparation for the schooling experience (as functional and cultural-deficit theories would argue), but also on the way in which teachers, other school personnel, and other students behave toward children with different social attributes, which in turn depends upon the meaning these attributes have for the various people children encounter in school. Therein lies the source of important educational inequities--in the micro level, face-to-face interactions of persons whose behavior and attitudes toward each other depend upon their "social constructions" of the situation and the participants.

In his efforts to create a new "language" for the study of socialization in schools, Bernstein has borrowed from a number of theorists, classical as well as contemporary (he has, for example, been instrumental in creating a revival of interest in Durkheim's conceptualization of schooling), and unlike some of the other interpretive theorists, he has persistently tried to integrate the micro- or interactional aspects of school life with the macro- or structural aspects of the educational system. His published work has combined an interest in sociolinguistics (a concern shared with the American ethnomethodologist Aaron Cicourel, particularly in his book Language Use and School Performance, 1974) with an interest with cultural transmission, or the "effect of class relationships upon the institutionalizing of elaborated codes in the school" (a concern shared with Bourdieu). In the work which is probably the most widely known in this country, Bernstein

argues that the class structure gives rise to different family role systems, which in turn encourages different modes of communication. In middle class homes, children learn the kind of "elaborated" linguistic code (i.e., one that is based upon abstract general principles which apply to any situation) which is congruent with the conventional classroom situation, while working class children aquire a more "restricted" code, which reflects their own limited life situation. Thus the poor academic performance of many working-class children "can be understood in terms of a confrontation between a) the school's universalistic orders of meaning and the social relationship which generate them, and b) the particularistic orders of meanings and the social relationships which generate them, which the child brings with him to the school" (Bernstein, 1970: 346. Other publications on this topic are Bernstein, 1961 and 1977).

Bernstein's work has been attacked by critics who accuse him of restating the old culture of poverty theory in new terminology, of perpetuating an unjustified image of lower class background as "defective" and in itself responsible for academic failure. It has also been called into question by American studies of children's linguistic development, such as the work of Doris Entwisle (1974) which have shown that "disadvantaged" children actually may begin school with greater linguistic sophistication than their more advantaged peers. Bernstein himself argues that there is nothing intrinsic in working class linguistic development as such that prevents a child from learning the more universalistic codes prevalent in the school, and suggests that the educational prospects of such children can only be improved by integrating the culture of the child with that of the school rather than imposing the latter on the child (Bernstein, 1970).

The strengths and weaknesses of the interpretive perspective have been extensively debated in the sociological literature. It has been criticized, among other things, for not being a theory at all but simply a kind of framework pieced together out of the social characteristics and perceptions of the researcher and subjects, and for ignoring possibly important elements of a given situation that are beyond the view of the participants (see. e.g., Huber, 1973; Persell, 1977). In what is probably the most detailed and thoughtful critique of the "new" sociology of education, Karabel and Halsey conclude that: "it has identified an interesting problem and suggested a possible way of tackling it, but it has not yet produced either close ethnographic descriptions. . . or a serious body of empirical literature based on its theoretical framework," and that what systematic empirical research has been undertaken has produced rather banal results which do not take us far beyond the "old" sociology of education (Karabel and Halsey, 1977: 54). Perhaps its greatest contribution to date is its insistence on the importance of examining our own motivations and assumptions regarding education and equity, as well as taking into account the participants' own view of the schooling process in designing educational research and policy. We shall return to these points in the next chapter, when we consider the effects of subgroup membership and ideology on the results of equity research.

Equity Theory

As we mentioned earlier, one of the few theories to focus specifically on the conceptualization and measurement of equity is a small but developing field of social psychology which attempts to model the reactions of people in diverse interactive situations. Equity theory incorporates elements of social exchange theory (in particular, the concept of distributive

justice as formulated by George Homans), social comparison theory (including the concept of relative deprivation as conceptualized by Robert Merton), cognitive dissonance theory, psychological learning theory (in particular, the concept of reinforcement), and Freudian psychoanalytic theory.[7]

A social relationship is defined as equitable when a "scrutineer" (who may be one of the participants in the relationship or an outside observer) perceives that all participants are receiving "equal relative outcomes" from the relationship. In a definitional formula constructed by Walster, Bersheid, and Walster (1976), equity exists when:

$$\frac{\text{Outcomes}_A - \text{Inputs}_A}{(\,|\text{Inputs}_A|\,)^{k_A}} = \frac{\text{Outcomes}_B - \text{Inputs}_B}{(\,|\text{Inputs}_B|\,)^{k_B}}$$

where Outcomes = the "positive and negative consequences that a scrutineer perceives a participant has incurred as a consequence of his relationship with another"

Inputs = the "participants' contributions to the exchange, which are seen (by a scrutineer) as entitling him to rewards or costs"

A = participant A

B = participant B

$k_i = \text{sign}\,(\text{Inputs}_i) \times \text{sign}\,(\text{Outcomes}_i - \text{Inputs}_i)$

Equity in this conceptualization is based on Definition 2a. That is, the distribution of resources and rewards is to be in accordance with recipients' contributions; thus it is legitimate for those who contribute more to a relationship to gain more than those who contribute less. Indeed, it is much like the meritocratic model mentioned in Chapter 1. Equity theorists have distinguished between the "norm of equity" and the "norm of equality," the latter defined as giving all recipients the same rewards

or resources regardless of their contributions.[8]

The basic premise of equity theory is that individuals will try to maximize their interests or outcomes (defined or operationalized as rewards minus costs), that they can perceive whether they are being justly or unjustly treated in a given situation, and that inequitable social relationships will result in tension or distress which the person(s) experiencing it will be moved to reduce. In other words, equity theory assumes that people are selfish, but that they may adhere to a group equity norm when they see that they may share in collective rewards greater than those they could obtain by their own individual efforts. Thus essentially selfish individuals may be induced both to behave equitably and to take actions to reduce inequities when they occur. The theory has been spelled out in a series of propositions and corollaries, also by Walster, Bersheid, and Walster (1976), predicting when individuals will perceive they are unjustly treated and how they will react when they find themselves "enmeshed" in unjust relationships, as follows:

Proposition I: Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (where outcomes equal rewards minus cost).

Corollary I.1: So long as individuals perceive that they can maximize their outcomes by behaving equitably, they will do so. Should they perceive that they can maximize their outcomes by behaving inequitably, they will do so.

Proposition IIA: Groups can maximize collective reward by evolving accepted systems for "equitably" apportioning rewards and costs among members.

Proposition IIB: Groups will generally reward members who treat others equitably and generally punish (increase the costs for) members who treat others inequitably.

Proposition III: When individuals find themselves participating in inequitable relationships, they become distressed. The more inequitable the relationship, the more distressed individuals feel.

Proposition IV: Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable relationship attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity. The greater the inequity that exists, the more distress they feel, and the harder they try to restore equity.

Corollary IV.1: Other things being equal, the more adequate a harmdoer perceives an available equity-restoring technique to be, the more likely he is to use this technique to restore equity.

Corollary IV.2: Other things being equal, the more costly a harmdoer perceives an available equity-restoring technique to be, the less likely he is to use this technique to restore equity.

Although equity theory has not been specifically applied to student-teacher and other educational system interactions, the results of research in other areas of human interaction have implications for educational equity problems. For example, research on the distribution of rewards in work groups of various kinds, both in laboratory and field settings, generally supports the hypothesis that equitable allocations (as opposed to equal or other kinds of allocations) foster high productivity over the long run, although there are some important exceptions to this general rule. In particular, poor performers, who according to the equity model will increase their effort and performance, may instead become so dissatisfied with their lot that they either quit the group or engage in hostile or negativistic actions which damage group effectiveness. Thus an astute manager (or teacher) will probably do some alternating between emphasizing the equity norm to maximize group productivity and emphasizing the equality norm to minimize hostility between group members (Leventhal, 1976).

Another kind of implication can be drawn from laboratory research on exploitative relationships which examines the likelihood and results of various kinds of harmdoer and victim reactions, from compensation to justification, retaliation, and intervention by outside agencies. Up to a

point, harmdoers seem willing to make restitution for inequities suffered by victims, but past that point, the inequities may be--or seem to be--so great that the harmdoer will despair of being able to make restitution and will instead use dissonance-reducing justification tactics to resist providing further compensation or any compensation at all. Walster, Bersheid, and Walster believe that this process describes and explains the reaction of many Americans to the inequities, educational and other, suffered by racial minorities in this country:

> Many Americans probably feel that no matter how hard they try they cannot make adequate restitution to blacks for their centuries of exploitation. Black leaders have argued that citizens should at least take some step toward restoring equity. However, the idea of making a small step toward restoring equity, making a small compensation, is not very attractive to many citizens. The effort to make a partial compensation mocks their rationalizations that no harm was done or that blacks deserved their treatment. If one cannot compensate enough to reduce his own distress, he is perhaps happier with his rationalizations. If we generalize shamelessly from the preceding findings, we might speculate that an effective strategy for deprived minorities may be to <u>minimize</u> their description of their suffering and to make it clear that if <u>available</u> compensations are extended, it will completely <u>eliminate</u> the debt owed to them. While this is not true, it may be a profitable strategy since it would insure that blacks would receive at least minimal compensation (Walster, Bersheid, and Walster, 1976: 15).

Walster, Berscheid, and Walster go on to argue that societies should be very wary of depending on intervention by outside agencies to correct exploitative or otherwise inequitable relationships, because this can weaken participants' adherence to equity norms:

> If the harmdoer knows that the outside agency will reestablish equity at no cost to himself, he should have little motivation to initiate his own equity-restoring responses. In addition, it is probable that an agency set up to "right all wrongs," would soon find that it was incapable of fulfilling this mandate. Agencies set up to provide social justice are always meagerly funded. Although citizens may be unanimous in their agreement

> that social justice is desirable, they seldom agree that society ought to pursue this goal at all costs. Inevitably, agencies are forced to do the best they can with limited funds. Social welfare agencies thus soon evolved into agencies of "social compromise" rather than agencies of perfect "social justice". . . .
>
> For these reasons, public compensation is seen as a residual source of equity restoration, resorted to only when attempts to induce the exploiter to compensate have failed (Walster, Bertheid, and Walster, 1976: 22-23).

In other words, the most well-intentioned efforts by governmental and other "external" agencies to force compliance with equity norms may be ineffective if they reduce or replace efforts by those who are actually giving and receiving inequitable treatment.

The major impediment to wider use of equity theory, in educational and other kinds of research, seems to lie in the vagueness of some of the terms used in the definitions and propositions. One researcher (Cook, 1975) has pointed out that one cannot assign parameters to the input and outcome variables unless one knows the participants' expectations and level of knowledge concerning the "dimensions of evaluation" (seniority, skill, level of education, level of need, age, sex, etc.) relevant to the situation. "Whether or not a situation is defined as inequitable depends upon the amount of knowledge an individual has concerning the positions or ranks of persons in the same situation on the social dimensions which serve as bases for the distribution of values outcomes, goods, or services" (Cook, 1975: 387); in fact, individuals do not even react to the equity or inequity of a situation unless they are cognizant of the "rules" governing evaluation of performances and allocation of outcomes in that situation.

Conclusions

While the contemporary theorists continue to be concerned with the large themes introduced by the classical theorists, in particular the linkages between societies and their educational systems, they have probed more deeply into certain aspects of schooling. Some have tried to explain the way in which the social stratification system impinges on the socialization process within schools and in turn on the performances of students. Contemporary theorists have generally paid attention to more levels of the educational system, in particular, the micro-level which most classical theorists treated superficially if at all. While Durkheim was interested in the social structure of the classroom, he did not subject it to the detailed examination of say certain ethnomethodologists or "new" sociologists of education. While Marx posited a relationship between social class and all aspects of education, Bernstein and some of the radical sociologists have gone much farther toward elaborating a theory of how the daily life situations of the different social classes constitute different learning environments (and differential preparation for formal schooling). Finally, recently developed and developing theoretical perspectives have called our attention to the importance of the meanings given by participants to their classroom and other educational experiences. Even perspectives as apparently disparate as interpretive theories and equity theory converge on the notion that actors' perceptions, both (a) perceptions of what constitutes equity and (b) perceptions of a particular situation, shape their feelings of being fairly or unfairly treated and their subsequent behavior. The conclusion of a review of the "new" sociology of education would probably, without too much violation, describe the spirit of many of the more recent

theoretical perspectives on educational equity:

> I suspect, in fact, that the most important effect of the new sociology, and the theory of social world building which goes with it, is to force students and teachers alike to consider the whole basis on which they act and to contemplate a radical reconstruction of educational institutions (Williamson, 1974: 9).

Chapter 4. Insiders, Outsiders, and Situated Action: Alternative Theoretical Perspectives on Race and Gender Equity

In a paper proposing a model for the analysis of motivation, published in 1940, C. Wright Mills argued that people's motives and the language in which they express them depends on how they are "situated" in their social/historical environment. In order to understand social action and the motives behind it, we must understand the "historic epochs and specified situations" in which they occur. "Motives are of no value apart from the delimited societal situations for which they are the appropriate vocabularies. They must," says Mills, "be situated" (Mills, 1940: 913).

We have just seen that phenomenologists, ethnomethodologists, and others with "interpretive" theoretical perspectives believe that researchers' and subjects' motivations and assumptions about educational equity should be viewed as data for investigations rather than as givens, and Schutz speculated that equity probably means different things to those in subordinate and superordinate positions in society or societal institutions. The differences in perspective and the biases which may arise as a result of researchers' locations in the stratification system were the subject of a paper on the sociology of knowledge by Robert Merton. Especially in times of great social change, "differences in the values, commitments, and intellectual orientations of conflicting groups become deepened into basic cleavages, both social and cultural," and one of the basic cleavages is that between Insiders (defined by Merton as "the members of specified groups and collectivities or occupants of specified social statuses") and Outsiders (or nonmembers of those groups, collectivities, or statuses. Merton, 1972: 9 and 21). In connection with research on race and race relations, Merton

notes that not only do Insider and Outsider scholars have "significantly different foci of interest," reflecting their different locations in the social structure, but that each "will inquire into problems relevant to the distinctive values and interests which they share with members of their group" (Merton 1972: 16). Merton goes on to point out that while neither side is free from ethnocentrism and chauvinism, research dominated by an Outsider point of view, when the Outsider position is at the same time the dominant one (e.g., Whites with respect to Blacks, males with respect to females, or adults with respect to children), tends toward a glorification of the ingroup and a kind of "sociological euphemism" which may mask conflict, exploitation and segregation.

All sociologists doing research on educational equity are, of course, "situated" in the very system of inequities which they are studying, and we felt that the effects of social/historical location on researchers' conceptualizations of equity problems and solutions deserved further attention. We selected for our analysis two ascribed characteristics which are strongly related to differential achievements of many kinds and which have been the focus of much legislative and policy action as well as research during the past two decades: race and sex. In this chapter we shall compare and analyze (a) how these two types of inequities have been treated in the theoretical literature, (b) by Insider and Outsider scholars (i.e., minority vs. white scholars in the case of racial inequities, female vs. male scholars with respect to gender inequities); (c) during a period of our national history when major social movements have arisen with the specific goals of reducing racism and sexism.

Racial Equity Theories

Through an institutionalized system of evaluation, racial and ethnic groups are ranked in terms of power, privilege, and prestige in a manner similar to individual or kinship units. The result is a structure of racial/ethnic stratification and pattern of relationships between strata often referred to as majority-minority. Ethnic or intergroup relations are a recurrent, distinctive, more or less permanent sector of society (Williams, 1977, Marden and Meyer, 1978, Yetman and Steele, 1975).

A significant portion of American sociological theory has been devoted to the study of racial and ethnic relations. The various models of intergroup relations focus on: the differential position of groups in society relative to cultural, educational, economic, and political resources; the processes by which groups enter into and resolve conflicts for these scarce goods; the impact of ethnicity on contacts across group lines; and the consequences of ethnic stratification with respect to the life chances of individual group members. An understanding of minority-majority relations is important in the study of equity because of the various perspectives on equitable conditions that are developed by groups in different positions. This section will examine the concept of educational equity by analyzing several theories of ethnic relations and reviewing the definitions proffered by minority scholars and educators.

The designation of minority or subordinate group status[1] defines a collectivity as a self-conscious unit whose members experience a wide range of discriminatory treatment and are subject to attitudes of low esteem from majority or dominant group members. They are relegated to positions of relatively low status in society and tend to be endogamous by necessity

and/or choice. A majority or dominant group is a collectivity having pre-eminent authority to function as guardians and sustainers of the controlling value system and as prime allocators of rewards in a society. They are less self-conscious as a group except during periods of crisis or conflict with out-group members. They also tend to be endogamous by choice. Dominant groups regardless of size are characterized by power and authority, subordinate groups by the lack of power and authority.

Theories of intergroup relations are pertinent to our concerns with educational equity because the direction of educational policy is often determined by the extent to which the destruction or retention of ethnic and other ascribed statuses is considered desirable for the society as a whole. Robin Williams identifies three educational issues of significance to majority-minority relations.

> Three issues of educational policy have been of dominant importance for intergroup relations: (1) the question of whether the schools should seek national unity through consensus upon a "core culture" as over against cultural separatism and autonomy; (2) the question of segregation or integration of social categories or collectivities in the schools-religious, sex, ethnic, racial, "ability" and socioeconomic strata; (3) the question of the actual effects of education upon skills, knowledge, values, beliefs, income, citizenship, and so on. (1977: 79-80)

The differences in conceptualization of equitable conditions by majority and minority groups are related to alternative responses to these three questions.

Moreover, education is often viewed, especially by minority groups, as a means of achieving social change. To this end, theories of ethnic relations may provide a "vision" of the society in which ethnic conflict has been resolved in one manner or another. The definition of educational equity varies with the different outcomes of intergroup relations. The

criteria needed to assess these outcomes are: evaluation of the prior position of each grouping; social orientation, the actual character of relationships between ethnic groups, e.g., hostility or friendliness, extent of integration or segregation, etc.; and cultural orientation, the goals of assimilation or convergence vs. cultural distinctiveness (Williams, 1977).

The four models which we shall examine are summarized in Figure 3. One dimension concerns differences in assumptions concerning consensus, which we have for simplicity termed order or consensus vs. conflict. Order models assume a high degree of value consensus among segments based upon shared culture, modes of communication and political organization. The emphasis in this model is upon societal stability with minimal conflict within and between units (Horton, 1966, Barth and Noel, 1972). Theories of intergroup relations that are based on this assumption are concerned with the eventual integration of different ethnic groups into society and generally are not supported by the actual experiences of ethnic minorities in America.

> Sociologists, by and large have accepted this image of Horatio Alger in the Melting Pot as the ideal definition of American society. Although they have repeatedly documented the discrepancy between social reality and cultural myth in America, they have also taken the view that the incorporation of America's ethnic and racial groups into the mainstream culture is virtually inevitable. (Metzger, 1971: 628)

> Despite more than a century of study, blacks remain a sociological puzzle. The principle reason for this failure of a major discipline to deliver what it had promised is that American sociological thought has been dominated by a progressively more complex version of Aristotle's view that all things change according to principles of slow, orderly, and continuous motion. (Lyman, 1972: 171)

Two theories of intergroup relations that are based on consensus or order assumptions are assimilation and the race relations cycle, both of which have been highly influential in their impact on educational policy with respect

FIGURE 3. Majority and Minority Perspectives on Equity

Theoretical Assumptions/ Group Position	Social Orientation	
	Separatism	Participation
Order (Majority Group)	RACE RELATIONS CYCLE (Accommodation) MODEL Equity = justified inequality	ASSIMILATION MODEL Equity = fair process (same or equal inputs as equality of opportunity
Conflict (Minority Group)	INTERNAL COLONIALISM MODEL Equity = equality (no variance on resource variables)	COMPETITIVE SOCIETY MODEL Equity = equality and fair process (different or unequal inputs as equality of opportunity)

to ethnic minorities.

Conflict models, by contrast, assume a high degree of value dissensus based upon incompatible or mutually exclusive goals on the part of units in a social system. Societal change is considered an inevitable result of the conflict generated around vested interests groups and the changes in the relative coercive power of contending groups (Barth and Noel, 1972). The theories of intergroup relations that are based upon these assumptions are concerned with the factors that contribute to the dominance of one group over another and are necessary for change in the status quo. As discussed in Chapter 3, conflict theories are based upon Marxian or Weberian analyses of stratification and social change. Neocolonialism and competitive race relations are the two models employing these assumptions that will be examined in this chapter.

The differences in structural position of majority-minority groups is another factor which affects cultural orientation and often is reflected in the utilization of the order and conflict models, respectively, to discuss questions of inequality and equity. While both minority and majority scholars employ both models in their assessment of society, we suggest that with respect to issues of educational equity it is feasible to associate non-minority scholars with the concerns of the order model and minority scholars or educators with the concerns of conflict theory.[2]

The explanatory value of the order model is often questioned by minority (and non-minority) scholars because they interpret facts concerning social problems "within the context of ideological assumptions about the nature of man and society." The normative quality of these theories presents difficulties because of the basic differences in knowledge and beliefs about

the social realities for majority and minority group members. The problem with respect to educational equity is that these theories based on the order model are often utilized in formulating policy and are assumed to be objective when they do not always represent a complete view.

> The problem for the sociologist is not that normative theories contain values, but that these values may go unnoticed so that normative theories pass for empirical theories. When his own values are unnoticed, the sociologist who studies the situation of the American Negro, for example, is a little like the middle-class white boy in Gover's novel [The One Hundred Dollar Misunderstanding], except that only one story is told, and it is represented as the story. The result could be a rather costly misunderstanding: the Negro may not recognize himself in the sociological story; worse, he may not even learn to accept it (Horton, 1966: 701).

In discussing issues of equality and/or equity, minority scholars are generally concerned with access to material and non-material resources, of power or prestige tactics to affect the dominant value system, strategies to improve the position of the group with respect to the societal authority system, and mechanisms to improve the life chances of individual group members without destruction of the group's culture. While minority groups differ on answers to questions regarding how, when and at what level alterations in structures in inequality should occur, they agree that definitions considered equitable must contribute to a permanent improvement of the collectivity's position. The differences between majority and minority group perspectives is also identified in Figure 3 and will be analyzed further in the discussion of the specific models which follows.

Race relations cycle model. The notion of gradual change in and possible reduction of racial/ethnic inequalities was propelled into a position of dominance in sociological thought by the race relations cycle model developed by Robert E. Park. The cycle is initiated when two groups are

in on-going contact and ultimately compete for scarce resources. The stage of conflict is ended by accommodation, a stable but asymmetrical and unequal social order. Accommodation eventually gives way to assimilation, i.e., when two groups merge culturally and physically to become a homogeneous society. As perceived by Park this cycle was to serve as an ineluctable law of historical development and its sequence could not be changed or halted.

> In the relations of races there is a cycle which tends everywhere to repeat itself. . . . The race relations cycle which takes the form . . . of contacts, competition, accommodation, and eventual assimilation, is apparently progressive and irreversible. Customs regulations, immigration restrictions and racial barriers may slacken the tempo of the movement; may perhaps halt it altogether for a time, but cannot change its direction; cannot at any rate reverse it. The forces which have brought about the existing interpenetration of peoples are so vast and irresistible that the resulting changes assume the character of a cosmic process (Park, 1950: 149-50).

The impact of the race relations cycle extended beyond the boundaries of the discipline and the period in which it was developed. "As theory and ideology, as a guide to the past and a measure of the present, Park's cycle has seen wide service in sociological theory, social reform, and practical politics " (Lyman, 1972: 27). The notion of inevitable assimilation focused sociological theory and research on the obstacles to the final merging of culturally and/or physically diverse groups in American society. Generally some notion of incompatible goals, values, or a combination of proscriptive and prescriptive norms was held accountable for the prolonged state of accommodation. In a discussion of the American cultural creed of equality of opportunity, its relationship to the beliefs and practices of Americans, and the manifestations of discriminatory behavior and prejudicial attitudes, Merton states:

> ...The creed asserts the indefensible principle of the human right to full equity-the right of equitable access to justice, freedom and opportunity, irrespective of race or religion or ethnic origin. . . .It is indeed dynamic, subject to change and in turn promoting change in other spheres of culture and society. It is, moreover, unevenly distributed throughout the society, being institutionalized as an integral part of local culture in some regions of the society and rejected in others. . . . It is often evaded, and the evasions themselves become institutionalized, giving rise to what I may call the "institutionalized evasion of institutional norms." Where the creed is at odds with local beliefs and practices, it may persist as an empty cultural form partly because it is so flexible. It need not prove overly obstructive to the social, psychological and economic gains of individuals, because there are still so many avenues for conscientiously ignoring the creed in practice (Merton, 1949).

Discrimination--unequal and differential treatment--is maintained by a socialized reward system. Rewards supply the motivation for discrimination but only as long as the standard of legitimation or moral code defines these advantages as fair. Thus discrimination is sustained by direct gains to those who discriminate and the cultural gains which legitimize discriminatory behavior.

As depicted in the upper left cell of Figure 3, the concept of educational equity in the accommodation stage of the race relations cycle is a situation of justified inequality supported by a combination of proscriptions and prescriptions. Specifically, this definition is based on inequalities of amount and/or type of education which are explained by present (perceived) abilities or the expected futures of children. To the extent that the dominant group receives "justified" gains from unequal conditions and the minority group is economically dependent upon and substantially congruent in values with the majority group, separate educational programs, resources, and even facilities are warranted. The benefit of this inequality

is that it resolves the conflict of the earlier competitive stage and does not totally rule out assimilation or equality forever, only for the forseeable future.

An application of this model of equity is provided by an industrial educational policy for black Americans in the South at the turn of the century. The program, developed by General S.C. Armstrong of Hampton Institute and later expanded upon by Booker T. Washington, ex-slave, author, and educator, provided instruction in industrial arts for blacks distinct from the curriculum of humanities and arts developed for white Americans (immigrant and Native born). This program was viewed as politically, educationally, and socially responsible given the relatively permanent inequality between the two groups. In a study of philanthropy and education, Kenneth J. King discusses the reasons why this type of differential educational experience was justified.

> During the beginnings of this pan-African educational activity Armstrong's particular interpretation of industrial training had been gaining ever-widening support among Northern and Southern whites. It was a process much helped by the term 'industrial' with its complex of moral, political, and eduational overtones. . . . For Southern whites it signified disavowal of all political ambition on the part of the Negroes and a readiness to stay in the South as a steady labour supply. The Northern whites of missionary and philanthropic disposition were gratified by the insistence upon the 'morality' of the Hampton Industrial work, and felt able to continue to liberally support a system which Armstrong stressed was primarily 'for the sake of character.' The tendency to regard some form of industrial education as peculiarly appropriate to the current stage of Negro development was given great stimulus and semi-official approval by the foundation of the million dollar Slater fund in 1882. Not only were its own grants largely awarded to encourage industrial courses, but it attracted other moneys for the same cause (King, 1971: 8-9).

The accommodation, competition/conflict and contact stages of the cycle

are based on some form (and justification) of inequality and consequently suggest the persistence of a definition of equity based on unequal resources, inputs and/or outputs. The only stage in which ethnicity is irrelevant with respect to equity is the last, assimilation, and we have decided to discuss this separately since its impact in sociology extends beyond the cycle. The race relations cycle, however, does present some insight as to why such inequality persists throughout the various stages. The advantages for the dominant group are obvious.

Simpson and Yinger (1966) state that while the reasons for the development of prejudice in a society are unique for each minority, they are to some degree generic. While some differences between groups will be the focal point for prejudicial attitudes and each group varies in its distinctiveness (e.g. racial, cultural, religious), the kinds of differences chosen are accidental by-products of a given situation and are not intrinsically important in themselves. There are two basic factors related to the choices of characteristics subject to low esteem. First, each group has a distinguishable hierarchy of values which will generally set it apart from other groups. Second, the dominant group will tend to emphasize those differences which will distinguish other groups whose exploitation will be profitable to the dominant group. The pattern of prejudicial attitudes within a society changes as the system of values and standardized beliefs change; however, the targets remain the same across generations.

A number of studies have described the gains to the dominant group of situations of accommodation. One of the most well-known is Dollard's Caste and Class in a Southern Town (1957), which describes the economic, sexual and status gains made by whites in such a situation. In the development

of a theory of minority-group relations, Blalock relates the types of gains described by Dollard to discriminatory behavior:

> Economic and status factors are most likely to be major determinants of minority discrimination if both of the following hold: (a) there are a relatively small number of means to status and economic goals that are perceived to be efficient; and (b) discriminatory behavior is perceived to be instrumental, either for large numbers of persons or for influential elites, in achieving status objectives by these most efficient means (Blalock, 1967: 49).

For Dollard the factors necessary to move toward assimilation of black Americans included improvement of economic position, pressure to "equalize educational opportunities" and equitable treatment in the eyes of the law. However, he also noted that:

> In the American evolutionary scheme, every ethnic group has had to stand in line, to endure the cruel paring of beloved cultural habits, to work and wait for assimilation. In one sense, therefore, the Negro has met the same fate as every other ethnic group which has been introduced to the society (Dollard, 1957: xi).

In other words, change in majority-minority relations is necessary, but it is also necessary that change be gradual.

Assimilation model. A more optimistic view of the race relations cycle is that assimilation, the cultural and physical merging of two distinctive groups, is inevitable. This model, shown in the upper right cell of Figure 3, has influenced sociological thought and public policy despite considerable evidence that the actual realization of assimilation has been forestalled in America for a number of ethnic groups. The assimilation model presented a vision of an integrated society, one in which the value and normative systems focus upon individuals rather than groups as the basic unit and in which recognition of individual rights surpasses any recognition

of or commitment to maintaining group differences. Equitable conditions, especially in public institutions (including education), are defined in terms of equality of opportunity for individuals irrespective of group membership.

> Successful assimilation, moreover, has been viewed as synonymous with equality of opportunity and upward mobility for the members of minority groups; "opportunity", in this system, is the opportunity to discard one's ethnicity and to partake fully in the "American Way of Life"; in this sense assimilation is viewed as the embodiment of the democratic ethos (Metzger, 1971: 628).

In the interests of furthering assimilation, schools are assigned the responsibility of seeking "national unity" via consensus upon a core culture and thereby insuring a fair process which employs equal inputs.

To see why assimilation involves equality of opportunity within a common culture, it is necessary to discuss briefly the nature of ethnic subculture and the process of merging groups into a unified whole. Assimilation has as a basic goal the adaptation of groups to the core (i.e. dominant) culture of the society. According to Metzger the argument for the eventual assimilation of ethnic minorities is based on: (1) assumptions about the nature of dominant white American society, and (2) assumptions about the nature of the minority groups and minority experiences in dominant society:

> Central to the view of those sociologists who have taken the position that racial assimilation is the key to the American racial problem are certain beliefs about the nature of modern society in general and American society in particular which imply that prejudice, discrimination, and racist institutions are incompatible with the major features of modern social organization and hence will eventually "wither away" (Metzger, 1971: 629).

The assumptions about the nature of dominant white society are based upon the beliefs that the institutional supports of segregation and discrimination will be removed by modernization of underdeveloped regions of the

nation (e.g. Southeastern states) and the improvement of educational economic and occupational status of majority and minority group members in an urbanized, industrialized nation. With respect to ethnic groups and their experiences in the unequal structures of society, it is assumed that American minorities desire assimilation into the mainstream or core culture; there are no insuperable obstacles in the sociocultural characteristics or ideologies of ethnic groups to prevent their assimilation. And since minorities share in the majority commitment to the American creed, the rate of their assimilation is "directly proportional to their access to the socializing agencies of the dominant culture" (Metzger, 1971).

The process of assimilation is not, however, unidimensional nor solely dependent upon internalization of the core culture. As Milton Gordon argues in Assimilation in American Life (1964), within ethnic groups a network of organizations and informal relationships develop which both permit and encourage members of the group to retain within the confines of the collectivity all of their primary relationships and some of their secondary relationships throughout all stages of the life cycle. With the exception of governmental relationships which are organized in ethnically mixed political institutions, economic and educational institutions are only partially mixed. The institutions of religion, family, and recreation (except for impersonal relationships at mass entertainment functions) are essentially ethnically closed (Gordon, 1964: 37). Glazer and Moynihan (1977) point to the resurgence of ethnicity in the 1960's as a basis of identification and organization. Ethnically isolated communities or "subsocieties" provide a source of group identification, a patterned network of institutions, and allow the group to reconstruct the core cultural patterns of behavior and values through

the "prisms of its own cultural heritage" (Gordon, 1964).

The process of assimilation entails more than acculturation which, as a subprocess, is often incomplete due to the modification of the core culture by the group's subculture. The other types of subprocesses of assimilation are: structural, marital, identificational, attitude receptional, behavioral receptional, and civic. The distinctions between the various subtypes as conceptualized by Gordon are presented in Figure 4.

The emphasis upon equality of opportunity in assimilation, especially with regard to acculturation, develops because it is a means of exposing the ethnic group to the values, norms and behavioral patterns of the core culture; a subprocess which, it is assumed, will enable group members to compete for scarce societal resources without dominant groups employing cultural dissimilarity as a basis for discrimination. However, as Gordon, Metzger, Moynihan and Glazer suggest, ethnic groups are selective in their acculturation to the core society, retaining institutional support for group identity. Even for those groups who receive (willingly or unwillingly) sufficient exposure to the major socializing agents of the society, total acculturation does not automatically result in completion of the other types of assimilation.

The key condition to total assimilation, however, is massive contacts at the primary group level (something that is only fulfilled in a limited manner within the educational systems). Total assimilation is prevented by the resistance of dominant or majority group members to interaction with minority group members at the primary group level and by the reluctance of ethnic minorities to pay the high cost of assimilation, the elimination of the subsociety and subculture.

The impact of public policy with regard to the process of assimilation is

FIGURE 4. ASSIMILATION VARIABLES

SUBPROCESS OR CONDITION	TYPE OR STAGE OF ASSIMILATION	SPECIAL TERM
CHANGE OF CULTURAL PATTERNS TO THOSE OF HOST SOCIETY	CULTURAL OR BEHAVIORAL (EXTERNAL)	ACCULTURATION
LARGE SCALE ENTRANCE INTO CLIQUES, CLUBS, AND INSTITUTIONS OF HOST SOCIETY ON PRIMARY GROUP LEVEL	STRUCTURAL	NONE
LARGE-SCALE INTERMARRIAGE	MARITAL	AMALGAMATION
DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE OF PEOPLEHOOD BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON HOST SOCIETY	IDENTIFICATIONAL	NONE
ABSENCE OF PREJUDICE	ATTITUDE RECEPTIONAL	NONE
ABSENCE OF DISCRIMINATION	BEHAVIORAL RECEPTIONAL	NONE
ABSENCE OF VALUE AND POWER CONFLICT	CIVIC	NONE

Source: Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life, 1964, P. 71

limited because, as Gordon stresses, the government's role in implementing equality of opportunity is limited to public (and quasi-public) facilities and services which involve basically secondary relationships. With regard to education, the strongest role taken by the government to date has been to effect desegregation.

Internal colonialism model. The tenacity of ethnic structures of segregation and inequality in the United States, especially in Northern and Mid-Western urban areas, demonstrated the limitations of theories of assimilation for examining intergroup relations. Scholars, especially from minority groups, increasingly began to focus upon the power dimension of unequal group relations that result from exploitation and control of one group by another. In this perspective acculturation was viewed as a process of containment of the minority group by the majority, a process which basically serves the interests of the latter. Acculturation required minority groups to surrender their subculture, conforming to the demands of a monocultural rather than plural society, without significantly altering the position of the subordinate group within the structure of inequality. Horton points out that:

> Thus the liberal fate of minorities, including Negroes, is basically containment through socialization to dominant values. Supposedly this occurs in a plural society where some differences are maintained. But liberal pluralism like liberal egalitarianism allows differences only within a consensual framework. This applies both to the liberal ideal and the sociological description: the plural-democratic society is the present society (1966: 707-708).

Succintly stated, this type of process does not account for, legitimize, or even permit the differing viewpoints, cultural systems, or interests of minority groups that may be in conflict with the majority group.

The monocultural society and the emphasis upon acculturation to dominant

value systems has been attacked by minority scholars as dysfunctional for dealing with the basic nature of ethnic inequality in America and for denying individuals their "right" to cultural diversity. The criticism of the monocultural model is especially pertinent for issues of educational equity. For example, in discussing the issue of cultural pluralism and education, Castañeda states that:

> As far as the educational picture today is concerned, particularly as it affects many Mexican-American children, the institution continues to maintain policies of exclusion, omission, and prohibition which deny the Mexican-American his culturally democratic right to explore freely the mainstream cultural environment with those cultural forms and loyalties he has learned at home and in his community (Castañeda, 1974: 34).

In a more virulent assessment, Heath suggests that the forced assimilation of Indians via the school system is a rationalization for "exploitation, decimation, and attempted genocide".

> The historic assumption is that the Redskin's culture and character are too defective for him to succeed independently. The schools, the national instruments of acculturation, must integrate the Indian into white culture so he can transcend his innate (whether by culture or by genes) inferiority. This is the racist myth of "compensatory education." It includes a panoply of pseudoscientific terms like the "culturally deprived" and, more recently, the "socially disadvantaged." Beyond the abstruse verbiage and cultural blind spots, one can detect a sophisticated white racism: Indians must be enriched with the elixir of life, the cure-all of the downtrodden, . . . and the happy tonic is white folkways and education (Heath, 1972: 28).

At the micro-level concerning issues of learning and schools, a panel of Black scholars, including Ronald Edmonds, Andrew Billingsley, James Comer, William Hall, Robert Hill, and Howard F. Taylor, responding to the conclusions of Christopher Jencks in Inequality stated that:

> Our society's perception of "equality" is ethnocentric. That means that high income will not make an individual

> equal unless that individual has habits of speech, appearance, and behavior that conform to society's ethnocentric notions. Culturally autocratic schools effectively teach ethnocentrism. Selective teaching of reading, writing, and computation is a manifestation of cultural autocracy and helps to sustain ethnocentrism (Edmonds et al., 1973: 83).

The colonial model of dominant-subordinate group relations has been employed by minority scholars (e.g., Blackwell, 1975, Cruse, 1962, Clark, 1964, Pinkney, 1975, Ramirez, 1976) to examine the implications of "cultural autocracy" for ethnic inequality. This type of framework provides the possibility of integrating the "insights of caste and racism, ethnicity, culture, and economic exploitation into an overall conceptual scheme" (Blauner, 1971: 53). Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton utilize the colonial model to demonstrate that the nature of unequal group relations is vital to the interests of the dominant group and detrimental to the concerns of the subordinate group.

> To put it another way, there is no "American dilemma" because black people in this country form a colony, and it is not in the interest of the colonial to liberate them. Black people are legal citizens of the United States with, for the most part the same <u>legal</u> rights as other citizens. Yet they stand as colonial subjects in relation to the white society. Thus institutional racism has another name: colonialism (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1972: 291).

They apply the colonial model to an analysis of power-powerless relations in three areas: political, economic, and social. Kenneth Clark cited these areas of colonial relations and extended the analogy to the social, cultural, and educational structure of society.

> Ghettos are the consequence of the imposition of external power and the institutionalization of powerlessness. In this respect, they are in fact social, political, educational, and above all-economic colonies. Those confined within the ghetto walls are subject peoples. . . . Its (the ghetto's) social agencies are financially precarious and dependent upon sources of support outside the community. . . . Its economy is dominated by small businesses

> which are largely owned by absentee owners, and its tenements and other real property are also owned by absentee landlords. . . . Under a system of centralization, Harlem's schools are controlled by forces outside of the community. Programs and policies are supervised and determined by individuals who do not live in the community (Clark, 1964: 10-11 and 79-80).

The extensive utilization by minority scholars of the colonial model to examine the cultural, political, economic, and educational subordination and exploitation of minority groups contributed to the modification, by Robert Blauner, of the traditional conceptualization of colonialism, which "refers to the establishment of domination over a geographically external political unit." In the case of the internal or domestic colonialism which involves superordination within a single society, "the mother country-colony separation in geography is absent" (Blauner, 1971: 53). Blauner identifies four basic elements of the colonization complex. First, colonization is initiated by forced, involuntary entry of a group into a territory. Second, cultural destruction of the subordinate group results from a colonial policy which "constrains, transforms, or destroys indigenous values, orientations, and ways of life." Third, the colonial relationship is such that members of the colonized group "tend to be administered by representatives of the dominant power." Fourth, racism[3] is the final fundamental of the colonization complex (1971: 54). The colonial relationship is maintained by political and economic coercion.

Three of the four aspects of the internal colonial model, cultural destruction, political/economic power, and group prestige, form the basic concerns of minority groups in defining educational equity. These areas of concern correspond to the Weberian bases of stratification: class, status, and party (usually translated as power). For example, Isaiah E. Robinson and John Henrik Clarke, in separate discussions of the history of education

for blacks (Haskins, 1973), posit the inequality of educational opportunities as resulting from racism and ultimately the goal of retaining power in the white community. The attainment of educational equity, in the analyses of these scholars, involves the dismantling of racism and the sharing of power throughout the society. From the position of the subordinate group, equitable conditions in education are defined in such a manner that they are synonymous with the concept of equality, i.e., no variance in resource or outcome variables.

Education is a means for improving the minority group's position in society and is of strategic importance in the competition for those resources necessary to change the basic power-powerless relationship between groups. This particular perspective of education as a party to group conflict has evolved throughout history and as Randall Collins points out: "Education has been part of struggles for practical economic skills, for cultural integration and prestige of particular associational groups, and for political control by and within formal organizations" (Collins, 1977:5). As suggested by the colonial model, the demand for cultural integration and group prestige has been especially important from the minority perspective in shaping the struggle for social change. The importance of cultural recognition modifies the definition of equality from one suggesting simply no variance across groups lines on any outcome variable to include, especially within education, recognition of the various cultural patterns, experiences, and value systems of ethnic groups. Equitable conditions are defined as those in which the group is able to obtain training in the culture of the dominant group but retain the distinctiveness of the subordinate collectivity's experiences and culture, in order to develop survival skills for individual group members, to change basic inequalities resulting from

powerlessness, and to thwart attempts to destroy the culture of the subordinate group.

The theme of schooling for survival and conflict appears in the writings of several minority groups, at various time periods, and is applied at the macro and micro-levels of education. As early as 1903 William E.B. DuBois, the black sociologist and civil rights leader, argued against an industrial curriculum as the sole form of education for blacks because it would limit the self-confidence, self-assertion and self-knowledge necessary for group members to challenge socially and politically the structure of inequality.

> On one point, therefore there can be no queation - no hesitation: unless we develop our full capabilities, we cannot survive. If we are to be trained grudgingly and suspiciously; trained not with reference to what we can be, but with sole reference to what somebody wants us to be; if instead of following the methods pointed out by the accumulated wisdom of the world for the development of full human power, we simply are trying to follow the line of least resistance and teach black men only such things and by such methods as are momentarily popular, then my fellow teachers, we are going to fail ignominiously in our attempt to raise the Black race to its full humanity and with that failure falls the fairest and fullest dream of a great united humanity.
>
> When we have gained for our race training in modern industry, and for our national leaders, self-assertion through a higher training in life and thought and power, then we can move toward the goal. What is the goal? It is at present one great ideal: the abolition of the color line; the treatment of all men according to the individual desert and not according to their race (DuBois, 1973: 9-10 and 14, italics mine).

More recently several black scholars and educators have echoed a similar theme in demands for an educational experience that meet the needs for survival and social change (e.g. Wright, 1970, Haskins, 1973, Sowell, 1972). Louis Williams and Mohamed El-Khawas (1978), black professors of psychology and history, respectively, elaborated a philosophy of black education that essentially repeated the demands DuBois had made 75 years earlier:

> As an instrument of social change, Black community control of the educational policy should be built around four central educational reality concepts: (1) quality education invested with care and concern plus awareness; (2) development of reflective attitudes and feelings and self concepts about the Black experience; (3) cultivation of individual uniqueness and achievements; and (4) career applications and graduate training, and community service which is both traditional and innovational, and relevant to Black people and humanity at large. Properly instituted, the Black Education Concept can constitute a formative conceptual frame of reference for the young student and form a unitary approach to Black experience and existence. These goals should enable the Black student to study cross-cultural human behavior, problem solving, and provide an enriched and meaningful environment that is conducive to their learning and participation in the greater society (Williams and El-Khawas, 1978: 179).

These demands for an enriching, liberating educational experience are stated in the literature of several minority groups including Mexican-Americans (see Casavantes, 1973, Castañeda, 1974, Barrera, 1974, Sanchez, 1976, and Garcia, 1979), and Puerto Ricans (see Cruz and Ricks, 1975, and Cordasco, 1975). In a study of the Native American seizure of Alcatraz in November, 1969, Heath stated that the group had planned to develop an Indian educational and culture center on the island because of their perception of the importance of culturally relevant education for the survival of the Indian.

> From the Indians' painful consciousness of tribal self, turned outward into activism, has crystallized the saving admission that, in the long term, struggle requires intellectual nurture, if it is to be more than frenetic and abortive Sisyphean perplexity. An Indian educational and cultural center would cast into enduring scholarship and teaching the Indians' image of self and culture. It is this codification of the Indian dialectic that would ultimately guarantee sanctuary for the Indian spirit. Self-affirming education is the only viable method for tribal Americans to defend themselves (Heath, 1972: 21).

Minority group members are also very specific in their understanding of the implications of utilizing cultural resources to achieve equity within

the classroom. Castañeda states that the goal of democratic cultural pluralism as far as education is concerned is biculturalism, i.e., recognition of culturally distinctive: (1) modes of communicating, Spanish or nonstandard English; (2) relating to others, particularistic rather than universalistic orientations; (3) incentive-motivation style; and (4) the cluster of cognitive characteristics which reflect a student's preferred mode of "thinking, perceiving, remembering, and problem-solving" (1974: 35-36).

> It is our observation that the conflict many Mexican-American children experience centers in one or more of these four areas because most educational institutions are characterized by educational styles--preferred modes of communicating, relating, motivating, and teaching--which are more characteristic of the Anglo-American middle class culture and that these styles are considered, by virtue of one form or another of the melting pot ideology, to be the ideal modes which all children must acquire. . . . If the educational policy of the school is one which either excludes, ignores, or prohibits expression of modes different from the ideal, we characterize it as a culturally undemocratic educational environment for any child whose modes of relating, communicating, motivation, and learning are different from the preferred educational style of the school (Castañeda, 1974: 36-7).

A similar conclusion is reached by Edmonds, et al. in their discussion of the ethnocentric quality of the concept of educational equality.

> Implicit and explicit. . . is the notion that people vary in their cognitive styles and that until schools learn to recognize this and plan different ways of teaching the same requisite skills to all children, they will not come close to providing equality of educational opportunity. The problem of cognitive styles is compounded when the "objective" measures used by social scientists to measure the level of cognitive functioning rest on assumptions about language and cognition which may not be valid for culturally different children (1973: 83).

Thus the colonial model of race relations as employed by minority scholars suggests that educational equity involves both an infusion of cultural diversity within the educational experience in order to achieve equal outcomes and that equitable conditions in schooling are directly related to

serving the interests of both the dominant and subordinate groups within the larger society. This particular perspective of equity focuses on outcomes of the educational process in terms of improving (quantitatively and qualitatively) the position of the group and the life chances of its individual members.

Competitive Society Model. The model of internal colonialism reflects a conflict perspective that is essentially non-Marxian in its lack of emphasis on class factors as the primary basis of inequality in intergroup relations. Several theorists, however, have analyzed race relations in contemporary society as inherently linked to the inequities of the capitalist system. For example, Robert Allen (1969) states that attempts to "integrate" blacks into the American economy are not viable in the foreseeable future, because the power elite benefit from the continued exploitation of this underclass. Contemporary education reform programs and movements have served to maintain rather than break the subservient ties between the black and white community. To achieve equity requires a change in the existing social relations of production in capitalistic society.

There has been a growing controversy among black scholars over the significance of race or class as the primary factor inhibiting the achievement of equality within the society (see Wilson, 1978, and Willie, 1979). For those theorists who assign paramount importance to class factors, the model of a competitive race relations, developed by Pierre van den Berghe, is an appropriate assessment of America.

> It (competitive race relations) is characteristic of industrialized and urbanized societies with a complex division of labor and a manufacturing basis of production. The dominant group is frequently a majority or a large minority (more than 20 or 25 per cent). There is still a color bar, and racial membership remains ascribed, but class differences become more salient relative to caste,

> whereas the gap in education, income, occupation, and living style between castes tends to narrow. Typically, there is even an overlap in class status between castes, so that the caste line is best described as oblique rather than horizontal. Racial membership still plays a role in the division of labor, but achieved criteria of selection take precedence over strictly ascriptive ones. . . .The political system often takes the form of a "Herrenvolk democracy," that is, a parlamentary regime in which the exercise of power and suffrage is restricted, de facto, and often de jure, to the dominant group (van den Berghe, 1978: 29).

The structural features of a competitive society determine to a large extent the prevailing mode of race relations, which are characterized as antagonistic, with racial aggression emanating from both dominant and subordinate groups. The conflictual nature of race relations is based on the competition for the means or resources to achieve high income, occupation and status. Ethnic antagonism serves three functions: (1) it diverts attention from the basic structure of economic inequality in capitalist societies; and (2) it provides the basis for a split labor force, i.e., separation of workforce by ethnicity; which (3) depresses the costs of labor by maintaining a "reserve army" of unskilled workers (see Bonanich, 1972, 1976). With the movement into the stages of advanced capitalism, the opportunities to absorb the lower classes into "mainstream" of the economy are diminishing.

William Wilson's (1978) analysis of the position of blacks in the 1970s employs the model of competitive society and the split labor theory of ethnic antagonism and concludes that given the economic and political changes in twentieth century America and the resulting impact on race relations, black America is characterized by an increasingly rigid class structure that renders a black underclass at the very bottom of the societal class ladder. The black proletarians are plagued by poor education, low-paying, and unstable jobs. The barriers to upward mobility for this black underclass and

for possible harmonious black-white interaction have racial significance only in their consequences, not in their origins; i.e., economic competition is the basis for racial hostility and exclusion. A similar conclusion was stated by the late Oliver C. Cox for whom the economy represented the concrete structural means by which black Americans are more or less assigned to the status of an outsider.

> All modern race relations ultimately center about the nature of their involvement with critical economic variables inherent in the system. If we could conceive of Negroes moving unimpededly into the avenues of economic initiative, those especially of business entrepreneurship, we can probably also conceive of a society without a 'race problem' (Cox, 1976: 17).

The emphasis upon the importance of class as a major basis of inequality, even in racial issues, has implications not only for intergroup differences, but also for intragroup divisions. As Wilson points out:

> Unlike more affluent blacks, many of whom continued to experience improved economic opportunity even during the recession period of the 1970's, the black underclass has evidenced higher unemployment rates, lower labor-force participation rates, higher welfare rates, and, more recently, a sharply declining movement out of poverty. The net effect has been a deepening economic schism in the black community that could very easily widen and solidify (Wilson, 1978: 142).

The growing intragroup stratification structure presents some problems for minority students when the definition of equity is limited simply to one of equal educational opportunity based on the same or equal inputs. In "The Black Child and Equity in School Finance: Analysis and Alternatives," Singleton (1975) concludes that "more equality of expenditures for all children attending school in our largest cities may well result in less equity of expenditures for Black children." For example, in the issue of equitable school financing, there is no a priori reason for assuming that

most blacks belong to the "disadvantaged" class nor that equal expenditures in a school system "designed to serve, and biased toward, white culture," will result in quality education for blacks. The obstacle to attaining quality black education lies in part in the definition of equity as equal inputs in a fair process.

> Equality connotes evenness of distribution. Equity connotes fairness. The value judgement involved in the latter will ultimately be made by whomever prevails between the advocates for quality education for Black children and those who are saying that Black children should get no extra resources (or worse, are genetically inferior) (Singleton, 1975: 271).

In an analysis of the implications for black education of the California Supreme Court decision (Serrano vs. Priest) declaring the education expenditure disparities resulting from inequalities in property tax wealth as a violation of the equal protection provisions of the U.S. and California constitutions, Singleton points out that:

> First, note that the court is addressing itself to disparities in wealth and expenditures among districts and not to what the districts do with the revenues to provide equity in educational opportunities among children from different schools or communities. Second, except for the New Jersey suit, Robinson vs. Cahill, the causes of action have to do only with equity on the input side of the education process, i.e. school expenditures, with no parallel regard for the equity with regard to outcomes, despite the recent literature defining the latter as true "equalization of education opportunity." Third, the court said nothing about the structure of governance of the school system, i.e. who should make the decisions regarding how the money is allocated once it is apportioned a district. Fourth, the court placed the emphasis of its remarks on the issue of expenditure disparities caused by disparities in wealth, narrowly defined as assessed valuation, although the real value of the educational dollar is also a function of inequities in educational costs, educational need, the costs of other government services and, in general, overall effort to provide equal quality of educational and other public services in various settings (Singleton, 1975: 275).

Thus the definition of equity as discussed above is inadequate because

it fails to assess: equality of outcomes, the necessity for differential inputs because of differences in educational costs, the disparities within districts, and the type of or participation in decision-making regarding school expenditures. Given these conditions of equity, the black inner-city school child is probably placed in a less equitable position even vis-à-vis the middle or upper income black suburban child.

In addressing similar concerns, Thomas Sowell (1972) concludes that a voucher system may be the best alternative for black children in the reform of public schools because it would:

1. Be the ultimate form of decentralization with each parent having the power to make decisions for their own child but not for other people's children;
2. Make each school "automatically" and directly accountable for performance outcomes to all parents, with the latter selecting criteria for evaluation of school results; and
3. Provide a more equitable distribution of benefits and costs of schooling unlike the present system of financing in which individuals with students in private schools or no children have every incentive to vote against taxes, bond issues and similar measures that support public schools.

As proposed by Sowell, definitions of equitable conditions in education not only include equality of results but also unequal or different resources, e.g., as compensatory education, a means to equal educational opportunity.

For those theorists who focus on the interactive effect of class and race in society, the concept of educational equity requires both equality and fair process in educational opportunities as manifested by different

and unequal inputs, e.g., differential expenditures based on educational costs, or remedial or compensatory educational programs. As such, the definition of equity would vary among different classes within a society and among the racial/ethnic groups within the structure of economic differentiation. This conception of equity is based on assumptions regarding the importance of class interests in the determination of race/ethnic relations in a society and the concern with structural changes that limit the chances for upward mobility or the underclass.

We shall now turn to a somewhat briefer examination of some theories concerning gender equity, so that we may compare similarities and differences in the ways in which the equity problems of two Insider-but-subordinate categories of persons in our societies have been conceptualized and the solutions formulated.

Gender Equity Theories

Like race, sex is an ascribed characteristic that has throughout history been correlated with multiple inequalities. The patterns of race and gender inequities are, however, quite different, and while there have been some superficial comparisons (e.g., the woman-as-nigger literature), there has been little systematic effort to synthesize theory and research on race and gender inequities (one of the few exceptions is the recent and ongoing work of Anne Foner, e.g., 1979).

Probably no area of sociology has developed more rapidly during the past decade than the sociology of sex roles, probably reflecting the increases in the number of female scholars (many of them with feminist orientations) receiving Ph.D.'s in sociology, teaching in colleges and universities, and conducting research on the sociology of sex roles. Recent research efforts have focused upon documenting the gender inequalities which permeate all areas of American life, explaining linkages between sex role socialization and differential education and occupational achievement, and developing alternative models of institutional organization which would promote greater equity between females and males.

Before turning to the theories themselves, it seems useful to review beiefly the pattern of gender differences in educational achievements which the theories attempt to explain. In this country (and in other contemporary Western societies), each sex tends to outperform the other at some phase of the school career. At the elementary level, girls outperform boys in nearly all academic areas, and boys are six times as likely as girls to have reading problems. In fact, the apparent learning disadvantage of boys in the early elementary years has led to serious proposals that the sexes be separated for the first few grades and that large scale efforts be made

to recruit more male tachers at this level. At least through the high school years, girls achieve on the average better grades and are more likely to gain academic honors, such as making the honor roll or qualifying to take the National Merit Scholarship exams (though boys get more of the scholarships actually awarded). By late adolescence, however, boys overtake girls in educational attainment, although the point at which this occurs is later in the United States than in most other countries. While the proportion of females of college age actually enrolled in college has been higher for females than for males since 1972, females still receive less than half of all college degrees awarded, and the higher the degree, the smaller the proportion earned by females. The achievement gap at the higher education levels is narrowing, though, and if present trends continue, the proportion of males and females earning bachelor's and master's degrees will be approximately equal by the 1980s (National Center for Educational Statistics, 1974, 1975, and 1976).

The gradual closing of the higher education gap has not yet, however, had a marked impact on the most clearly documented sex inequality--the income differential, in particular disparities in occupational earnings, between the sexes. In 1955, full-time women workers earned only 64 percent of what men did, but by 1973, this proportion had dropped even further to 57 percent. (This does not include the earnings of part-time women workers, which would make the sex differential even greater). These striking sex differences remain even when such factors as race, age, marital status, social class, amount and type of schooling, and tenure on the job are considered. Despite Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex as well as race, color, religion, and national origin: (1) in every category of occupations women

were employed in the lesser-skilled, lower-paid positions; and (2) women not only have unequal access to the higher paying jobs, but they still get unequal pay for equal work (Foner, 1979; Bem and Bem, 1978; Signs, Spring 1976 supplement).

These differences in educational and occupational attainments do not seem to be explained by innate differences in the mental capacities of females and males. There is no evidence of significant differences in total or average intelligence between females and males, and among a host of specific types of intellectual and personality development, only visual-spatial aptitude, verbal aptitude, and aggression/activity appear to be based upon genetically biologically based sex differences, and even these traits can be manipulated experimentally or enhanced through training (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974).

What then does explain the continued inequalities between females and males in societies like ours which ostensibly proscribe sex discrimination? There is not a feminist theory of male/female educational inequities. Even within the most recent phase of the women's movement(s), during the last two decades, there are sharp disagreements about the source of gender inequities as well as about appropriate solutions. There is general agreement on two points. One is that an adequate feminist theory will be comprehensive enough to encompass and explain the full range of specific social issues and problems pertaining to women's status and the relations between women and men, and that it should be both descriptive (of the social reality of women's situation) and prescriptive (of solutions for eliminating sex inequities). As one pair of feminist scholars put it, an adequate feminist theoretical framework is "empirical insofar is it examines women's experiences in the world; but it is normative as it characterizes certain features

of that experience as oppressive and offers a new vision of justice and freedom for women" (Jaggar and Struhl, 1978: xi).

A second point of agreement is on the inadequacy--indeed the erroneousness--of theories which explain (and often defend) women's position in society on the grounds that it is in accord with some kind of biological imperative, and justify sex inequalities on the basis of unremediable biologically based differences between men and women (Definition 2b). Feminists of all persuasions look to Freudian theory as illustrative of the kind of thinking about women which they find most objectionable, and almost any serious feminist analysis contains a critique of Freud's theory of feminine development, often explained in terms of the extreme sexism of the Viennese society of which Freud was a member.

According to Freudian theory, the path to "normal" feminine development produces individuals who are incapable of higher intellectual or social development. In a lecture on "Femininity," Freud attributes this psychological underdevelopment to little girls' response (the famous penis envy) to the discovery of their physiological inferiority relative to little boys:

> The fact that women must be regarded as having little sense of justice is no doubt related to the predominance of envy in their mental life; for the demand for justice is a modification of envy and lays down the condition subject to which one can put envy aside. We also regard women as weaker in their social interests and as having less capacity for sublimating their instincts than men. . . . I cannot help mentioning an impression that we are constantly receiving during analytic practice. A man of thirty strikes us as a youthful, somewhat unformed individual, whom we expect to make powerful use of the possibilities for development opened up to him by analysis. A woman of the same age, however, often frightens us by her psychical rigidity and unchangeability. . . . There are no paths open to further development; it is as though the whole process had already run its course and remains thenceforward insusceptible to influence--as though, indeed, the difficult development to femininity had exhausted the possibilities of the person concerned (Freud, 1933: 184).

It is interesting that Freud reaches this conclusion even though he acknowledged, earlier in the same lecture, that he also got the impression from his analytic practice "that little girls are more intelligent and livelier than boys of the same age: they go out more to meet the external world and at the same time form stronger object-cathexes." Unlike the all-important genital difference, however, Freud dismisses these initial differences in intelligence and liveliness as "not of great consequence!"

There are, of course, a number of ways to react to the "conservative" view that gender inequalities are inevitable, because biologically determined, and acceptable. In the following sections, we shall outline briefly three kinds of feminist response to the "biological imperative" (Definition 2b) conception of sex inequalities.

Liberal feminist theory. Liberal feminists argue that equity requires that women have opportunities for education and professional advancements which are equal with those of men, that the rules of the game should prohibit sex discrimination in any area of life. That is, it is based upon Definition 3, usually 3a, of equity as fair process.

Liberal feminism has its origins in Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women, published in 1792, and the nineteeth century liberal philosophers, particularly Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill, whose essay on "The Subjection of Women," published in 1869, influenced the English and American woman's-rights movement over the next half-century. Mill argues for the "removal of women's disabilities," for "giving women the free use of their faculties, by leaving them the free choice of their employment and opening to them the same field of occupation and the same prizes and encouragements as to other human beings," on the grounds that justice or equity, both to women and to society as a whole, requires it. Thus to the question:

would mankind be at all better off if women were free? he answers yes, because of:

> the advantage of having the most universal and pervading of all human relations regulated by justice instead of injustice. . . . All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind, have their source and root in, and derive their principle nourishment from, the present constitution of the relation between men and women (Mill, 1973: 230, italics mine).

Moreover, in a fair contest, society as a whole as well as individual women, would be the gainer:

> Now, the most determined depreciator of women will not venture to deny that . . . many women have proved themselves capable of everything, perhaps without a single exception, which is done by men, and of doing it successfully and creditably. . . . Is not this enough, and much more than enough, to make it a tyranny to them, and a detriment to society, that they should not be allowed to compete with men for the exercise of these functions? Is it not a mere truism to say, that such functions are often filled by men far less fit for them than numbers of women, and who would be beaten by women in any fair field of competition? . . . Is there so great a superfluity of men fit for high duties, that society can afford to reject the service of any competent person? Are we so certain of always finding a man made to our hands for any duty or function of social importance which falls vacant, that we lose nothing by putting a ban upon one-half of mankind, and refusing beforehand to make their faculties available, however distinguished they may be? (Mill, 1973: 216).[4]

Contemporary liberal feminists like Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem make essentially the same points--that the costs of sexist discrimination are too great, for society as well as for women, and that each individual should have the choice and freedom to develop her (or his) full humanity. To this end, they favor changing the rules of the game so that the contest is fair--giving women equal legal rights with men (liberal feminists have provided the most active support for the Equal Rights Amendment), enforcing laws banning sex discrimination in employment, providing maternity leaves,

child care centers and other services which enable women to compete for the better jobs, providing equal, unsegregated educational facilities for females and males, and guaranteeing women the right to control their reproductive lives (see, e.g., the NOW Bill of Rights, in Jaggar and Struhl, 1978: 108). Also like Mill, contemporary liberal feminists have great faith in education, believing that education under equitable conditions will, by curing ignorance and developing the powers of reason, help to overcome sexist prejudices.

Socialist Feminist Theory. Socialist feminists argue from the historical materialist perspective conceptualized by Marx and Engels, that women's "oppression" is a symptom or component of the pervasive oppression endemic to a class society. They criticize both the liberal perspective, for failing to take into account the gross inequalities in wealth, position, and power which characterizes any class society, and the radical feminist perspective for conceptualizing women as a separate caste rather than as part of the class struggle of all oppressed people, male and female alike. Moreover, the roots of women's oppression are historical and social rather than biological in nature; in the following passage from Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, women's oppression is seen as beginning with the introduction of private property:

> With the rise of the inequality of property--already at the upper stage of barbarism, therefore--wage labor appears sporadically side by side with slave labor, and at the same time, as its necessary correlate, the professional prostitution of free women side by side with the forced surrender of the slave. . . . Thus, wherever the monogamous family remains true to its historical origin and clearly reveals the antagonism between the man and the woman expressed in the man's exclusive supremacy, it exhibits in miniature the same oppositions and contradictions as those in which society has been moving, without power to resolve or overcome them, ever since it split into classes at the beginning of civilization. . . . The first class antagonism appearing in history coincides with the development of the antagonism of man and wife in monogamy, and the first class oppression with that of the female by the male sex (Engels, 1978: 117 and 121).

Marxian feminists believe that women were not always an oppressed or "second" sex, that the decline of their position came with the breakup of the matriarchal clan commune and its replacement by a class-divided society whose institutions of the patriarchal family, private property and state power reduced women to the role of breeders, household janitors, and buyers of consumer goods (Reed, 1970). Thus women do not belong to a separate and inferior "caste" (as Marxist feminists accuse radical feminists of believing) which would call for a "caste war" of all women against all men to bring about the liberation of women. On the contrary:

> The underlying source of women's oppression, which is capitalism, cannot be abolished by women alone, nor by a coalition of women drawn from all classes. It will require a worldwide struggle for socialism by the working masses, female and male alike, together with every other section of the oppressed, to overthrow the power of capitalism, which is centered today in the United States (Reed, 1970: 75).

Once the means of production become the property of society as a whole, rather than belonging to a few (mostly males), sexual inequities will disappear along with all other forms of oppression.

Some socialist feminists feel that traditional Marxist analysis needs to be revised or enriched if it is to be adequate for explaining the complexities of women's oppression. Juliet Mitchell's influential work, Woman's Estate (1971) argues that economic oppression and sexist oppression are inseparable and must be struggled against simultaneously. The interdependency of gender and class are described in the following statement by a group of socialist feminists:

> The demands of feminism cannot be met by capitalistic society. In order to achieve such goals as the elimination of sex roles, free 24-hour day care, and women's control over their own bodies, women must not only struggle to build a strong women's movement, but must work along with other oppressed groups. Socialist feminism moves

> beyond an attempt to create equality of women within the system to a struggle for equality within a new system that is not dependent on male domination or any exploitation of one group by another. . . . For example, when we organize for day care, we challenge the power structure and economic system that are responsible for the present inadequacies. . .
>
> Even though women are divided by class society, we are all united by our oppression as women. Just as women cannot achieve their full liberation except under socialism, so socialism cannot truly succeed unless all people are free from exploitation, manipulation, and prejudice (Charlotte Perkins Gilman Chapter, 1978: 141).

Socialist feminists also place great importance upon education, but they tend to emphasize how the educational system is consistent with and reinforces the inequities in other societal institutions. Pointing out that in societies like England, which purport to have equal educational facilities for all children, the two sexes as well as the middle and working classes are treated as "occupationally distinct groups," (with, e.g., working class girls learning practical arts and crafts, domestic subjects, and typing, which will prepare them for work in an office, shop, the catering trade, the clothing industry or other light manufacturing trades), Mitchell concludes that:

> The whole pyramid of economic discrimination rests on a solid extra-economic foundation--education. The demand for equal work, in Britain, should also take the form of a demand for an <u>equal educational system</u>. In post-compulsory education there is no evidence whatever of progress. The proportion of girl university students is the same as it was in the 1920s. Until these injustices are ended, there is no chance of equal work for women. It goes without saying that the content of the educational system, which actually instills limitation of aspiration in girls, needs to be changed as much as methods of selection (Mitchell, 1971: 149).

<u>Radical Feminist Theory</u>. Radical feminism is the most recent and as yet the least fully developed feminist theory. The core assumption of radical feminism is that the oppression of women is the first and most

fundamental social inequity:

> Male supremacy is the oldest most basic form of domination. All other forms of exploitation and oppression (racism, capitalism, imperialism, etc.) are extensions of male supremacy: Men dominate women, a few men dominate the rest (Roszak and Roszak, 1969: 273).

The most fully developed theoretical statement with this perspective is Shulamith Firestone's The Dialectic of Sex, which traces the origins of women's oppression, and indeed the origins of the sex class system, to the biologically determined reproductive roles of males and females. Because women bear and nurse children, they are dependent on males for their very survival. Ironically, radical and conservative theories both trace the origins of gender inequalities to biological sources. However, conservatives think these inequalities are justified, while radical feminists think that they must be eliminated by technological advances even more radical than current birth control methods (e.g., extrauterine reproduction). Firestone's conception of equity is probably the most pure or extreme example of Definition 1 that we have encountered in our study. Reforms in the status of women are not anywhere near sufficient; all sex role typing must be abolished:

> the end goal of feminist revolution must be. . . not just the elimination of male privilege but of sex distinction itself : genital differences between human beings would no longer matter culturally. . . . The reproduction of the species by one sex for the benefit of both would be replaced by (at least the option of) artificial reproduction: children would be born to both sexes equally, or independently of either, however one chooses to look at it; the dependence of the child on the mother (and vice versa) would give way to a greatly shortened dependence on a small group of others in general (Firestone, 1970: 11).

Although radical feminists have not to date written extensively about education and the educational system, what has been written about desirable life-styles and adult-child relationships indicates that the educational system, indeed the very notion of schooling, would be overhauled along with

the rest of society. Most favor loose nonlegal arrangements of two or more partners, of whatever sex, for varying durations of time. Children would live in groups of children and adults who liked and wanted to be around children; child care and other domestic chores would be equally shared by all adults with contributions by the children suitable to their age and abilities; and children would be free to form close relationships with those whom they chose without being anyone's "property," as is the case in the legal nuclear family. The specific details of how children are to be socialized and formally schooled (if indeed formal schooling is to exist at all) have yet to be spelled out in the radical feminist literature.

Sex Inequities in the Classroom. While feminist theory has not addressed the structure of everyday life in the classroom, a few sociologists of education have pointed out that boys and girls are treated so differently in many classrooms that they may be said to have entirely different school experiences (Lightfoot, 1975; Richer, 1978; Boocock, 1980: Chapter 5). Lightfoot also calls attention to the insufficiently explored implications of the predominance of female teachers, particularly in the elementary school, and the contradictions between the idealized myth of the teacher we continue to hold and the low-status stereotype of teachers as womanly (even when they are not in fact women) and childlike:

> Envisioning the teacher as woman is not simply a reflection of the large proportion of women in the profession. Rather it symbolizes the psychosocial qualities that we attach to both male and female teachers. We expect the teachers to have the traditional womanly qualities of nurturance, receptivity, passivity, and subordination (Lightfoot, 1975: 117).[5]

A similar observation by Willard Waller, in his classic study of the sociology of teaching, suggests that the classroom itself recreates in its own unique way the gender and race inequities of the outside world:

"It has been said that no woman and no Negro is ever fully admitted to the white man's world. Possibly we should add man teachers to the list of the excluded" (Waller, 1932: 50).

Conclusions

The various theories of racial and gender inequality are indicative of differences in the perspectives of equity that are related to the position of the individual or group defining or legitimating the concept. As the theorists in this chapter have demonstrated, recognition of a set of conditions as equitable varies in terms of the situation and the circumstances connecting the parties involved in the process of definition. Our discussion has presented two types of variations of the concept of equity: (1) differences based on the group's position in a structure of stratification--insider and outsider distinctions; and (2) intragroup differences based on the range of theoretical views within a collectivity. The differences in perspective based on group position are fairly distinct. Definitions of educational equity developed by subordinate group members generally conceive of equity as equality (Definition 1) and equality of opprtunity (Definitions 3a and 3b). In comparison, those theories of group differences developed by dominant group members are more likely to define equity as either justified inequality (Definitions 2a and 2b) or as fair process that requires the same or equal inputs into the structure (Definition 3b).

The second type of variation in definitions of equity is related to the range of theoretical views employed by scholars to explain the differences and experiences of collectivities within society. Within groups, the definition of equity varies depending upon the extent to which theories suggest that sufficient social change is attainable through reform of existing

structures or requires the creation of new forms of social organization which are based on a societal-wide revolutionary change in ideology and the bases of legitimation of the concept. Therefore, attempts to achieve equity in schooling will be differentially evaluated on a continuum of "successful" to "catastrophic" by different individuals and groups. Given these variations in the definition of equity, evaluation of a program which strives to operationalize the concept of educational equity must be based on criteria that assess the desires of members of various groups and the effects of the program--manifest and latent--on the larger structures of racial/gender inequality.

Finally, research on the sociology profession indicates that social theorists in general--whether insiders or outsiders, female or male, minority or majority group members--are likely to have a different perspective on social equity than either the population at large or those who create and administer public policy. Lipset and Ladd (1972), who have intensively studied the political and social orientations of the American professorate, have found that academics are much more liberal in their attitudes, values and voting behavior than most other Americans, including those in other professional occupations. And Fennessy and McDill (1979), who have analyzed the values of sociologists specializing in education and/or social stratification, have concluded that this particular group of scholars "may be more critical of the major social arrangements of the societies in which they live than are other specialists," and, furthermore, that: "sociologists of education often gravitate to their subdiscipline because of its and their focal concerns with understanding the lot of the 'underdog' in society and contributing to a fund of knowledge which might improve his life chances"

(Fennessy and McDill, 1979: 7 and 8). Thus it important to keep in mind that the deep concern about educational equity expressed by many of the writers discussed in this report is probably itself a "minority"perspective, and the translation of equity theories into social action requires more political than conceptual skills.

Chapter 5. Some Policy Implications

In the preceding chapters, we have tried to communicate a sense of the range of sociological theories on the sources of and solutions to problems of educational inequity, and we have suggested that variations in theoretical perpective reflect differences in: (1) authors' conceptualizations or visions of what constitutes an equitable society, and the role of education in it; (2) the level(s) of the social system with which theorists are concerned (including the "equity for whom?" question); (3) the cultural and/or subgroup identification(s) of theorists; and (4) the social/historical context--C. Wright Mills' "historic epochs and specified situations" --within which theories are constructed, including the normative climate of the larger society as well as the prevailing paradigms governing scientific and other research. In this chapter we shall try to pull together some of the most important themes and arguments introduced in the earlier chapters, and make some observations on their implications for educational policy and practices.

Cutting through the multitude of details which differentiate theories and theorists are several basic disagreements about what constitutes an equitable educational system. One's position on a particular educational policy partly depends, we believe, on one's position on the following kinds of issues.

One disagreement concerns the curriculum, in particular, whether an equitable educational system requires a common or a diversified curriculum. As we saw earlier, Marx felt that the only fair system was one in which all children would receive a multi-faceted, non-specialized education, and the state would regulate the "general production" so that all adults would have

opportunities to use their multiple skills in a variety of meaningful work tasks. Durkheim, by contrast, felt that while everyone should receive enough general education to acquire a sense of identity with the larger society and shared values and a feeling of common purpose with its other members, they also needed specialized technical/vocational training in order to play roles in a highly differentiated occupational system. The notion of specialized education was elaborated in the human capital variations of functionalist theory, which stressed the technical function of education and the need for efficient identification and utilization of human resources.

The criteria for justifying a particular form of curriculum, whether common or diversified, have differed from one time and place to another, reflecting differences in societal class structure and in the conceptualization of educational equity. For example, Coleman (1968) has posited four stages in the development of the concept of educational opportunity--each with its own curricular implications--in this country. In the early nineteenth century, American public schools, by comparison with European schools at that time, were attended by representatives of many social classes, and the "first stage in the evolution of the concept of equality of educational opportunity was the notion that all childr[1] must be exposed to the same curriculum in the same school" (Coleman, 1968: 139). Only in the early twentieth century, with the expansion of secondary education, was the common curriculum seriously challenged. This second stage was based on the paired assumptions that different children would have different occupational futures and that equity required providing different curricula for each "type" of student (see, Coleman, 1968: 138, for discussion of the equity implications of a definition that accepts as given a child's expected future). In the

third stage posited by Coleman (from the 1896 Supreme Court decision upholding the notion of "separate but equal" educational facilities, to the 1954 ruling that legal separation by race inherently constitutes inequality of opportunity), the assumption that equity depended on the opportunity to attend the same school was rejected; rather the "underlying idea was that opportunity resided in exposure to a curriculum; the community's responsibility was to provide that exposure, the child's to take advantage of it" (Coleman, 1968: 139, italics mine. Discussion of curriculum composition was during this period subordinated to discussion of racial composition). In the fourth (post 1954) stage, a concept of equality of opportunity which focused on the effects of schooling began to take form, although Coleman notes that the education debates of this period have often confused premises concerning the results of schooling with premises concerning the appropriate criteria of racial integration.

The latest round in the common vs. diversified curriculum disagreement is the debate over bilingual education, in particular for Hispanic-American children. Perhaps the most striking difference between the struggles of Black and Hispanic minorities for equity in American society is that whereas Black separation has been defined largely by race, for Hispanics the greatest barrier to success often seems to be language. As we saw in Chapter 4, many Hispanic scholars and political leaders have ascribed the social problems of their people to the linguistic and cultural biases of the English speaking majority, have viewed the drive for educational integration (especially when it involves busing) with considerable ambivalence, and have presented bilingual education as a plausible or even preferable alternative to desegregation (e.g., Castaneda, 1974; Barrera, 1974; Sanchez, 1976;

Garcia, 1979).

An extensive discussion of the bilingualism/biculturalism issue by an Anglo (i.e., Outsider) author is contained in Gary Orfield's exhaustive analysis of the school busing controversy (Orfield, 1978: Chapter 7). Orfield questions the effectiveness of bilingual classes as an academic strategy, citing research findings indicating that learning a second or "majority" language is easiest in classes where most of the students speak that language. But his strongest reservations arise from his concern that bilingual/bicultural programs lead to even greater racial segregation in the schools and thereby exacerbate the already serious racial cleavages in our society:

> Carrying the idea of bilingualism to its ultimate conclusion, some enthusiasts would use public education to keep alive distinctive group identities and languages that might not otherwise survive as new groups become successful. For a society that has traditionally viewed its schools as a necessary institution for the building of a common culture and a civic consciousness, this would be a striking departure. . . .
>
> [Moreover] In a country that has been unable to resolve its racial problems, it seems unwise for the government to undertake programs that may encourage or deepen linguistic-cultural cleavages. Linguistic politics in countries with deep ethnic divisions have proved to be volatile, emotional, and persistent. There should be serious investigation of the possibility that policies intensifying separate linguistic and ethnic identities may increase the already high levels of Hispanic segregation and generate bitter linguistic politics (Orfield, 1978: 222 and 227).

A second disagreement is over the <u>distribution of talent</u> in a society, in particular, whether talent is scarce or plentiful, and whether unequal rewards are necessary in order to induce those with the most valuable talents to use them in the service of society. On one side of this disagreement is the functionalist justification of a hierarchical stratification system, which rests on the assumed need for and scarcity of highly trained

expertise in modern industrialized societies. As Lipset puts it:

> The stratification system is perceived, therefore, as a motivation system; it is society's mechanism for encouraging the most able people to perform the most demanding roles in order to have the society operate efficiently (Lipset, quoted in Bell, 1974: 21).

Simmel argues, by contrast, that in most societies there are more able people than positions to match their abilities, and that the limited room at the top is a source of individual grievances and societal instability, as those in subordinate positions strive to move up to more favored positions. A similar claim is made by Collins, arguing from the perspective of conflict theory. In countries like the United States, claims Collins, the educational level of the labor force has risen beyond the skill requirements of many jobs. In addition to the consequences of the disproportionate distribution of qualifications and positions mentioned by Simmel, Collins and others point to the possible dysfunctions of "overeducation" for work productivity. Not only does increased education often produce dissatisfaction among youngworkers, especially assembly-line factory workers who believe that they are "settling for less than the desired occupation stressed by the school system" (Janowitz, 1978: 255), but "better educated employees are not generally more productive and in some cases are less productive, among samples of factory workers, maintenance men, department store clerks, technicians, secretaries, bank tellers, engineers, industrial research scientists, military personnel, and federal civil service employees" (Collins, 1977: 122).

One of the British "new" sociologists of education (Williamson, 1974) carries Simmel's argument further to say that the distribution problem lies not only in the shortage of jobs at the top of the hierarchy but also in

the still-large number of undesirable jobs at the bottom, jobs which can only be filled at low cost if a sufficient number of people can be defined as not talented enough to do higher level work and in fact lack other kinds of work alternatives. As Williamson concludes: "as long as this society needs dustmen and shop assistants, and so long as some people have more power than others to ensure that their children don't get such jobs, the problem will not change" (Williamson, 1974: 12).

A third disagreement concerns the level of the social system at which equity strategies should be targeted. In Chapter 1 we observed that equity can be examined at various levels of the social system, and the succeeding chapters indicated that as sociological theory has developed, it has covered more levels (and has suggested that inequities may originate and be resolved at multiple levels) as it has provided more insight into complex processes by which structural features affect life chances.

What we would like to emphasize here is that it is possible to have equity at one or some levels and not at another or others--that, moreover, an equity strategy targeted at one level may conflict with or be detrimental to equity at other levels. This presents a policy dilemma as great as that posed by the double binds mentioned earlier. This dilemma is particularly well illustrated by the question of the talented student, in particular, talented children from societal groups which have relatively low average achievement and attainment levels. At the individual level, a rational strategy (and one favored by those with functionalist orientations) is to identify talented but poor minority children and place them in special programs or schools where their talents may be developed to the point that they achieve at a level equal to that of equally talented majority children. Thus equality

of outcome for at least some minority students and some majority students would be achieved. However, the very strategy which may enhance equality between individual students or between some groups of students may be detrimental to children who are less talented (or who are not "discovered" in talent hunts) and who are not given special treatment on the basis of their predicted potential. Most recently, this result has been dramatically illustrated in the study of twelve London schools attended mainly by poor children, Fifteen Thousand Hours (Rutter, 1979). While similar in their poverty, the schools differed sharply in a number of outcome measures--attendance rates, behavior problems and delinquency, and academic achievement. It was also found that a school that was "good" on one of these outcome measures tended to be "good" on the others (i.e., schools with high rates of attendance were likely to have few behavior problems and high academic achievement), and the researchers did an intensive comparison of "good" and "bad" schools. One of the more important characteristics of "good" schools was what the researchers termed "ability balance," which meant that the school had retained a critical mass of able students. Ability balance was positively correlated with overall achievement on exams (0.61), attendance (0.76), and low delinquency (0.75). As one reviewer concluded: "Bluntly, the evidence supports the belief that the whole performance of a comprehensive school is degraded if the neighborhood's abler children are 'creamed off' from it" (Rogers, 1979: 393). The magnet school, a U.S. strategy designed to increase racial integration by attracting students to attend high quality educational programs, often in "undesirable" neighborhoods and at some distance from the students' homes, seems to have similar potential for increasing equality between some individual students or groups

of students but at the possible cost of equality between communities and total racial groups, since students not admitted to the magnet school could be stigmatized, and a talent or interest focus in one school could drain other schools of human and non-human resources.

Research on school desegregation via busing suggests that policies aimed at reducing educational inequities may have unintended effects when they focus upon too low a level or too small a unit of the social system. Coleman's conclusion to his controversial analysis of "white flight" is that:

> the present politics of school desegregation which focus wholly on within-district segregation exacerbate the already unstable ecology of our large cities. They are increasing, rather than reducing or reversing, the tendency for our large metropolitan areas to come to consist of Black central cities and white suburbs. Thus their long-run effect is in a direction counter to their immediate and short-run effect of desegregating the city's schools (Coleman, 1976: 12).

Similarly, Orfield argues that since the 1974 Milliken vs. Bradley decision (in which the Supreme Court ruled that desegregation plans must be limited to a single school district regardless of its racial composition, thus denying a metropolitan desegregation plan for Detroit and its suburbs), meaningful desegregation of the large city school systems which contain ever greater proportions of minority children from low income families becomes for all practical purposes impossible. Orfield favors desegregation of entire metropolitan areas on the grounds that it maximizes stability as well as racial integration:

> Minimizing busing by merely integrating lower class children from adjacent hostile neighborhoods is far less likely to produce lasting success than plans incorporating middle class neighborhoods and schools. The judicial decision to prevent busing across city-suburban boundaries may forestall the development of plans that are much preferable, educationally and socially, and require relatively little

additional busing. . .

> In other words, the smallest desegregation plans may have the worst effects on housing integration and the largest may create the most favorable conditions. The smallest create easily accessible havens of segregation; the largest equalize the burden, raise the cost of the flight, and diminish the differences between city and suburban schools. Policymakers and judges who attempt to minimize flight by limiting the area of desegregation may be following exactly the wrong strategy (Orfield, 1978: 149 and 101).

At its most general level, the current debate over the appropriate level at which to target equity strategies is really a continuation of a very old argument: whether <u>any</u> changes within the educational system can do much to reduce the gross inequalities in children's life chances, or whether reducing the gap requires basic structural changes at the level of the total society. The radical, neo-Marxist position is clearly the latter, but this view is now held by social scientists with a variety of political/ideological as well as theoretical perspectives. One of the most articulate and comprehensive recent statements is Richard de Lone's <u>Small Futures</u> (1979), an analysis of children and inequality done for the Carnegie Council on Children. From his review of social reform movements from the Jacksonian era through the Great Society of the 1960s, de Lone found in each that great emphasis was placed on <u>individual</u> growth and development, primarily through formal education, but that none of the politices or programs designed to "help" the poor at the individual level suceeded in overcoming the overwhelming effects of class, race, and sex in determining a child's future. De Lone presents dramatic case study and statistical data to demonstrate that the odds of children from poor families achieving high status as adults, or even of moving up a short distance on the SES ladder, have not improved over the past century, and he concludes that: "<u>the dynamics of our social structure are not likely to produce more equality of</u>

opportunity unless there is more equality to begin with" (de Lone, 1979: 10).

Neither the family nor the school, the institutions typically assigned responsibility for improving the "morality, character, skill and intelligence of children," can do much to narrow the gap between our political ideals and our economic realities. While families may not "breed" inequality (as the cultural of poverty theory would have us believe), they do reflect and transmit it. And in a passage that is reminiscent of Durkheim, de Lone characterizes the school as an institution--

> ...embedded in a larger social structure, and the same mechanisms that undercut the effectiveness of other social programs are at work in the schooling enterprise. For a number of reasons, the effort to create greater social equality through focusing programs on individuals in schools is just as likely as other social programs to transmit inequality from generation to generation (de Lone, 1979: 101-102).

Class, race and other inequalities will not be removed by providing services to poor minority children, or their families or schools, or by trying to change their "attitudes" and capabilities," argues de Lone, but only by redistributing income, opportunity, power, experience, and the other resources that differentiate children before they ever get to school and predetermine the quality of their adult lives. De Lone's solutions include programs of income distribution, full employment, and tax credits without rigged exemptions, in order to reduce the gap separating families at the top and bottom of the income pyramid and ensure that "no child should face systematic hardship in the present or systematic inequalities in life chances."

On the other side of this debate are social scientists who argue just as vigorously that schools could change the lives of poor children, that social reform is possible through educational reform and that it is more

feasible to make changes in schools than in the larger society, but that until now we have simply not used schools effectively to advance equity interests. One proponent of initiating reform at the level of the school sums up the present situation as follows: "Schools teach those they think they must and when they think they needn't they don't" (Edmonds, n.d.: 3). Those the schools think they don't need to teach are primarily the children of the poor, and Edmonds defines educational equity as public schooling which "begins by teaching poor children what their parents want them to know and ends by teaching poor children at least as well as it teaches middle-class children" (Edmonds, n.d.: 2). He backs up his claim with empirical research evidence showing significant between-school differences in achievement of all kinds, even controlling for students' family background. The schools in which poor children performed at relatively high levels were schools in which there was consistent emphasis on the accomplishment of basic reading and math objectives, in which the teachers and principal believed that all of their students could master these basic objectives and expressed acceptance of the concept of educational accountability, and in which the principal was actively involved in instructional and evaluative activities and assertive as an instructional leader and as a disciplinarian.

Edmonds' views coincide with those emerging in a number of research projects, in this country and elsewhere. For example, in the Fifteen Thousand Hours study of London schools mentioned earlier, Rutter and his associates found that "good" outcomes tended to be clustered in a few of the London schools they studied, and that the "school processes" in these schools were also distinctive. In the "good" schools, homework was regularly

assigned and checked; praise and encouragement were used more often than corporal punishment; students were given relatively greater responsibilities, including responsibility for disciplining themselves; and the disciplinary policy and curriculum were discussed and worked out together by the teachers, rather than being dictated from above (Rutter, 1979; Rogers, 1979). In sum, how a school was run made a substantial difference in how much children learned and how they behaved, although Rutter acknowledged that:

> Education cannot compensate for the inequalities of society. Nevertheless, we do suggest that school constitute one major area of influence, and one which is susceptible to change (Rutter, 1979, italics mine).

The research literature also suggests that some other societies are more optimistic than we are about the potentialities of schools for reducing societal inequalities and more vigorous than we are in pursuing innovative equity strategies. In his most recent book on Japanese society, Vogel (1979) suggests that the Japanese educational system has been remarkably successful both as a "homogenizing" social influence and at the same time teaching all children basic knowledge and skills, two goals regarded by many American educators as irreconcilable. In Israel, while the conceptualization of the "disadvantaged" student has shifted over time, as have the structure and substance of programs to promote equal opportunity, the sheer variety of activities designed to manipulate--and sometimes literally change--the educational environment of Israeli children of Afro-Asian origin demonstrates Israel's commitment to educational equity, and at least some of the innovative programs have demonstrated that the performance of the total student population can be raised even though differences between subgroups may not disappear (Peleg and Adler, 1977; and April 4, 1979 seminar).

Finally, it is worth noting that even so apparently confirmed a pessimist about the potential effects of education and educational reform as Jencks (Jencks et al., 1972) acknowledges in his most recent book, Who Gets Ahead? (1979), that education makes an independent contribution to subsequent status, at least for males; his secondary analysis of eleven surveys containing data on men's family background, academic ability, personality traits, schooling, and economic success led Jencks and his associates to conclude that: "The best readily observable predictor of a young man's eventual status or earnings is the amount of schooling he has had" (Jencks et al., 1979: 230).

Thus the level at which we have placed responsibility for eliminating educational inequities has oscillated over the past decades, from the individual student (and her or his family) to the school to the larger society and back again. The general point we wish to make is that assumptions about the appropriate level of educational reform, like assumptions about the distribution of talent in our society and about the composition of the school curriculum, influence (consciously or unconsciously) the specific policies and practices we impose on our schools, and it is our belief that our pedagogical and policy debates would be less vituperative and more productive if the discussants' assumptions were made clear at the outset.

In his great essay on "Science as a Vocation," Weber (1958) observes that the primary task of the social scientist is to recognize and to teach others to recognize "inconvenient facts." In addition to the three disagreements outlined above, some other ideas which emerge from the work of sociological theorists point to potential difficulties in the formulation and evaluation of programs to promote educational equity. These have

to do with the inconvenient facts that any educational policy or program is likely to have multiple, and often unintended, outcomes; and that the climate of the times may not often constitute a receptive setting for a given equity model.

The difficulties of evaluating educational and other innovations have been discussed by Williams, who notes that an adequate assessment would take into account the desires of those ethnic or minority group members most affected by the innovative program, the effects on the larger encompassing social system(s), and second-order effects upon each of its collectivities, and that this task is made more difficult by the fact that:

> major societal programs always have multiple outcomes, each of which is likely to be judged by several different criteria. Thus, there typically will be a profile of outcomes, ranging from "successful" to "catastrophic" as evaluated by different individuals and groups. We could arrange schools that would produce high academic performance by a few and poor performance by the great majority. An educational program can be imagined that would produce happy peer-group interaction and almost no subject-matter learning. It is commonplace to find unintended results that are also undesired from well-intentioned activities. Not surprisingly, for instance, any procedure that publicly identifies and stigmatizes individuals as members of a "bad" or "inferior" category will tend to undo rehabilitative efforts. Thus a work-study program for inner-city high school boys that seemed on its face to have many possibilities for rehabilitating "problem" youths turned out to have unanticipated negative effects (Williams, 1977: 57-58. For a fuller discussion of the stigmatization process, see Goffman, 1963).

McPartland and associates at the Johns Hopkins Center for Social Organization of Schools have attempted a more systematic conceptualization of the relations between variations in school resources and important student outcomes by constructing a hypothetical matrix of tradeoffs of school effects on students, as shown in Table 5. (The figures in the table are hypothetical because empirical research which would provide accurate "real

TABLE 5

MATRIX OF TRADEOFFS OF SCHOOL EFFECTS ON STUDENTS

(Values are hypothetical values of possible relative gains or losses in standardized scores of student outcomes due to school differences).

School Organization Property	Student Outcomes: Cognitive Learning (Basic Skills)	Originality or Creativity (Self-Reliance)	Perseverance and orderly Work Habits	Realistic Risk Taking and Problem Solving Ability	Tolerance for Differences	Satisfaction with School Life
Permissive vs. Controlled Authority Structure (High Involvement in Decisions)	-.02	+.08	-.03	+.02	+.03	+.15
High reward contingencies (regular response to student behavior with valued rewards).	+.02	-.03	+.09	-.05	-.01	-.15
Variety and novelty of Tasks (mixed modes of instruction, timing and social arrangements).	+.01	+.03	-.01	+.07	-.02	+.02
Mixed demographic Composition of students and staff.	-.01	.00	-.02	-.05	+.10	-.02
Range of Absolute Differences	.02	.080.	.090	.070	.10	.15

Source: McPartland et al., 1976: 46

life" values is not yet available.) Table 5 suggests the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of four components of school organization (including racial or other integration) on six broad classes of student outcomes, both academic and nonacademic. The bottom row of the table gives the largest absolute difference hypothesized by the authors due to any school component for the various school outcomes. McPartland et al. summarize the major points of the table as follows:

> (1) A comparison of the values in the final row of the Table indicates that some student outcomes may be much more responsive to school changes than other outcomes. In this hypothetical example, cognitive learning is only slightly affected by school changes, while satisfaction with school is most open to influence, and various coping skills and elements of creativity are in-between. Such a finding, or some other clear ordering of outcomes by environmental sensitivity, would direct attention to outcomes that schools can most readily improve.
> (2) The values in the body of the table show the possibility that each student outcome is most positively influenced by a different school component, and that changing particular school components can have positive effects on some outcomes at the expense of weak or negative influence on other outcomes. With such a matrix of outcomes, the public would have to place priorities or weights on the alternative student outcome goals in order to decide on the combination of school organization components it wished to establish to provide the educational environment for the average student (McPartland et al., 1976: 45).

We would guess that the most common unintended outcome of equity programs is maintenance, even reinforcement, of the status quo, but we did not really have time to explore this fully in the Rutgers seminar. As one of the seminar members put it:

> One of the alleged strengths of sociologists is their ability to point out unanticipated consequences of taking a given step toward any given conception of equity. We haven't done that, but I don't think we could have before we satisfied ourselves about what sorts of steps might conceivably be contemplated--and I seriously think that it's a legitimate foundation for another year's seminar (Bredemeier, December 30, 1979 seminar).

Like the societal institutions which they attempt to explain, social theories are the products of their times. We shall not attempt here to provide an answer to the thorny question of what societal states are most, or least, conducive to innovative thinking and activity with regard to social justice, except to note that a number of social scientists have suggested that new theoretical paradigms or perspectives typically appear when there is a convergence of feeling that the old ones are inadequate. Concerning the "new" sociology of education, for example, one of its practitioners observed that its emergence cannot be divorced from the social and intellectual context, in particular the "supposed failures of educational reform in the fifties and sixties," and that this perceived failure was "not only a failure on the part of the old sociology to ask new kinds of questions; it is also seen as a political failure on the part of democratic reformism itself" (Williamson, 1974: 8-9).

Political concern for inequality has fluctuated throughout our national history, and a number of social scientists seem to fear that the present time is not a particularly propitious time for making a major assault on educational inequities. In an interview following publication of Small Futures, its author did not express optimism about the liklihood of his recommendations being heeded in the near future: "As for whether it's politically feasible to have massive redistribution of anything in the economy we're going to have in the '80s, well you've got to be pretty optimistic. . . I can't imagine a more important goal for a society than the well-being of its members. . . [but] I never said it was easy" (de Lone, interview reported in The New York Times, August 24, 1979: A14). Morris Janowitz's (1978) analysis of what he terms the "master trends" of the last

half-century (increased political "volatility," including a long-term attenuation of stable attachment to one or the other of the two major political parties; an ever more differentiated pattern of social stratification, "reflecting the complex division of labor and the persistence and growth of cleavages based on age, sex, region, and primordial attachments"; and more intensely debated issues of national defense, especially arms control, in a context of a shift in military strategy to a deterrence posture which requires an expanded "force in being") includes some speculation about commitments to social equality. Janowitz concludes that:

> while popular support for equality of opportunity for excluded social groups is extensive, implementation of such goals by administrative and judicial decision fails to provide self-generating acceptance, since the decisions are viewed as arbitrary. Again, the result is a decline in confidence and trust in the legal system (Janowitz, 1978: 549).

(Janowitz's conclusion is similar to one of the policy implications drawn from equity theory, as discussed in Chapter 3--i.e. that when the mandate for providing social justice is allocated to "outside" agencies, individuals' adherence to equity norms and their sense of responsibility for maintaining or restoring equity is weakened.

In sum, a number of thoughtful social scientists have expressed doubts about the strength of our political will to achieve a more equitable society in the current period of stagflation, low levels of confidence in many societal institutions, and social cleavages which are dividing people into ever more "special interest" subgroups. Moreover, these doubts are being raised in a time when there also seems to be a convergence of opinion, among at least some social scientists concerned with educational theory and policy, that Definition 1--Equity = Equality-- is the only one that will really break down the depressingly consistent pattern of differential life chances which has characterized this country throughout this century. Policies or

programs that allow certain kinds of inequalities to be justified or "exempted," for whatever reasons (Definition 2), and even policies and programs which would ensure impeccably "fair" standards and treatment (Definition 3) are increasingly seen by theorists of many theoretical persuasions as unlikely to have any real impact on this highly predictable pattern of unequal outcomes. Indeed among minority scholars, any definition which does not address both distribution of resources and subsequent outcomes is widely perceived as constituting an evasion of the basic issues if not an outright cop-out.

On the other hand, one of the clearest messages we received from the work of the great classical theorists is that the times are almost never "right" for social reform but that the social scientist should not be deterred from attempting to:articulate the reasons behind our social problems, lay out the alternatives that are open to us (as well as the alternatives that are not open to us), and calculate the social costs and benefits of each. Deeply concerned about the cleavages and conflicts dividing his own society, Durkheim wrote:

> . . . if there was ever a time and a country in which the sociological point of view was indicated, in a particularly urgent fashion, for pedagogues, it is certainly our country and our time. . . . It is not because sociology can give us ready-made procedures which we need only use. Are there, in any case, any of this sort? But it can do more and it can do better. It can give us what we need most urgently; I mean to say a body of guiding ideas that may be the core of our practice and that sustain it, that give a meaning to our action, and that attach us to it; which is the necessary condition for this action to be fruitful (Durkheim, 1961).

Similarly, Weber was worried by the "rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world" which he felt characterized his nation, but he protested that "nothing is gained by yearning

and tarrying," and urged his colleagues to "set to work and meet the 'demands of the day,' in human relations as well as in our vocation" (Weber, 1958: 155-156).

Social theories will not solve our equity problems for us, but they may, as Nicholas Mullins has expressed it, "provide a bridge between language and experience" (Wells, 1978: 61). Ultimately, whether we make things fairer for American children, in and outside of schools, is a practical matter of power and political persuasion, but sociological theory may help us to get our arguments straight.

NOTES

Introduction

1. The exceptions include the literature on what social psychologists term equity theory (see, e.g., Berkowitz and Walster, 1976) the debate over school finance reform (see, e.g., Friedman and Wiseman, 1978, on the difficulties of interpreting legislative and court decisions in the context of unclear, and often competing, conceptions of educational equity), and an occasional sociological analysis, such as Bell, 1974.

Chapter 1

1. Typically by reference to some moral or philosophical fiat. Wallace also pointed out that however the legitimacy underlying a given definition of equity is established, equity questions--like most other societal questions--ultimately rest on considerations of power, because "to establish equity in real life always involves politics."

2. In a working paper prepared for the seminar, Bredemeier grapples with this problem in an imaginative fashion, by introducing the concepts of respect and "equality of duties." As he puts it, one could maximize the ways in which we are all equal by virtue of being members of the same species, and minimize the costs or negative consequences of the "genetic lottery" if one could get everyone to believe that: "It is everyone's duty to learn to respect everyone's varied contributions" (Bredemeier, 1978: 16).

Chapter 2.

1. The major references for our discussions were the translations of Capital, The Communist Manifesto and Critique of the Gotha Program by Robert C. Tucker, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, by T.B. Bottomore and The German Ideology by C.J. Arthur.

2. The major references for our discussions were the translations of Weber's work by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Weber, 1946: especially 240-244 and 416-444, and be E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch (Weber, 1949: especially 1-47).

3. A similar argument is presented in the recently translated series of lectures by Durkheim as The Evolution of Educational Thought, where he notes that: "Educational transformations are always the results and the symptom of the social transformations in terms of which they are to be explained. In order for a people to feel at any particular moment in time the need to change its educational system, it is necessary that new ideas and needs have emerged for which the former system is no longer adequate" (Durkheim, 1978: 106-107).

4. First published in German in 1908. The sections used in our discussion are from the translations by Kurt Wolff (Simmel, 1950: 50-84 and 181-303).

5. Simmel's discussion partially parallels Pareto's analysis of "circulation" of social elites, though Pareto sees such cyclical processes occurring, naturally, throughout history, while Simmel seems to doubt whether such cycles would occur without deliberate intervention (Pareto, 1935: 1421-1432).

6. Although we have not analyzed Toennies's work in detail in this report,

his book Community and Society (1957), which predated and probably influenced Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, represents the beginning of the "paired comparison" approach used by so many sociological theorists to analyze social change.

Chapter 3

1. We have for purposes of simplification combined in this section the work of theorists who are often distinguished in sociological theory textbooks as (a) conflict theory and (b) radical, critical and neo-Marxist theory (e.g., Wells, 1978). Our justification in this case is that all of the theories react to functionalism by emphasizing social change and conflict and competition between individuals and groups and that all have a similar view of the sources of educational inequities (and their inevitability in capitalist societies).

2. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis have defined the social relations of production in capitalist societies as "the legally sanctioned power of the directors of an enterprise to organize production, to determine the rules that regulate workers' productive activities, and to hire and fire accordingly, with only moderate restriction by workers' organizations and government regulations". They employ the basic definition developed by Karl Marx (see, e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1977: 214).

3. C. Wright Mills, who made many of the ethnomethodologists' major points some twenty years earlier, put it rather more elegantly: "The differing reasons men give for their actions are not themselves without reasons" (Mills, 1940: 904).

4. Symbolic interactionists and others often refer to Weber's conceptualization of verstehen as illustrative of what they are trying to accomplish in their research. In The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Weber argues that "understanding" involves both "direct empirical understanding of the meaning of a given act" and "explanatory" or subjective understanding of the motivations underlying the action observed (Weber, 1974: 22-23). What researchers with interactionist perspectives often overlook or forget is that Weber saw subjective understanding only as a first step in the process of searching for causal explanations in the social sciences.

5. The first announcement of the "new" sociology of education, by name, as an emergent "alternative paradigm" is credited to a 1972 article by David Gorbutt that appeared in the British journal Education for Teaching.

6. Although the "new" sociology of education is largely a British creation and has so far made few inroads into U.S. educational research, it has many parallels with American phenomenological sociology on criminology and juvenile delinquency, in particular that incorporating labeling theory. For one of the few American attempts to apply labeling theory to the processes of schooling, see Rist, 1977.

7. An annotated bibliography of conceptual and empirical research studies based on equity theory, prepared for Volume 9 of Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Berkowitz and Walster, 1976) contains 167 items published between 1961 and 1974, with a consistent increase in publications over the time period reviewed. This volume and the publications of J. Stacy Adams (e.g., Adams, 1963 and 1965) provide basic expositions of this theoretical perspective.

8. Leventhal, who feels that the norms of equity and equality "often operate as opposing forces in determining an allocator's decisions," also points to some further alternative procedures for distributing resources or rewards: (1) reciprocity, by which all recipients would be treated as they had treated the other(s) in the relationship or situation; (2) responsiveness, by which those with greater need would receive more than those with less need; and (3) adherence to commitments, by which allocations would be made in accordance with prior agreements (equitable or not) between the interactors (Leventhal, 1976: 94).

Chapter 4

1. While we shall use the words minority and majority group, because that is the terminology most often used in the literature, it is important to remember that the numerical strength of the group is not as major a determinant of "minority" or majority" status as the group's access to power resources and its position in the political and economic structure of a society (Marden and Meyer, 1978). A "minority" group may, in fact, be the numerical majority in a society, as in South Africa. A more accurate terminology would probably be the subordinate-superordinate dichotomy, as used by Simmel. Racial groups, for our purposes, are social categories. They are groups that are defined by others and/or define themselves as different from other groups by virtue of physical characteristics which are believed to be intrinsically related to moral, intellectual, and other non-physical attributes. See, e.g., Van den Berghe, 1978.

2. The imposition of this dichotomy upon majority and minority scholars

is taking great liberty in the interpretation of the various theories and concepts to be discussed, especially in recognition that the two conflict models to be studied in this paper were in fact developed by non-minority scholars. However, our point is that the different definitions of educational equity developed by minority scholars are based upon and concerned with the assumptions of the conflict model. They represent different views of the same problem (see, e.g., Merton, 1972, referred to at the beginning of this chapter).

3. Racism is defined as the "principle of social domination by which a group seen as inferior or different in terms of alleged biological characteristics is exploited, controlled, and oppressed socially and psychically by a superordinate group" (Blauner, 1971: 54).

4. Note the contradiction between Mill's position and that of Simmel, who argued that we nearly always have more able people than positions in which to place them, and that this is an important source of inequities between individuals.

Chapter 5

1. With some important exceptions: e.g., upper-class children in private schools; the poor, who seldom went to school; and Native Americans and Southern Blacks, who had no schools.

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APPENDIX A

The Rutgers Seminar on Educational Equity

--Participants

--Agenda

The Rutgers Seminar on Educational Equity

PARTICIPANTS

Regular Members

Sarane Boocock, Professor of Sociology, Rutgers College
Harry Bredemeier, Professor of Sociology, Douglass College
Marilyn Johnson, Director of Research, Center for Women in Politics, Eagleton Institute
Richard Lehne, Associate Professor of Political Science, Rutgers College
Katherine Kenyon, graduate student in sociology, research assistant for Peter Berger's project on mediating structures
Ann Parelius, Associate Professor of Sociology, Rutgers College
Robert Parelius, Associate Professor of Sociology, Douglass College
Karen Predow, Lecturer in Sociology, Rutgers College
Randall Smith, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Rutgers College
Benjamin Zablocki, Associate Professor of Sociology, Rutgers College

Occasional Members or Invited Speakers, Rutgers University

Peter Berger, Professor of Sociology, Douglass College
Susan Cachel, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Rutgers College
Sherry Gorelick, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Livingstone College
Eve Sachs, Dean and Director, Equal Opportunity Program, Rutgers College

Invited Speakers, Outside of Rutgers University

Chaim Adler, Professor of Sociology and Director, NCJW Research Institute for Innovation in Education, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Walter Wallace, Professor of Sociology, Princeton University

The Rutgers Seminar on Educational Equity

AGENDA

Session 1. September 20, 1978

General organizational meeting (planning time and place of future sessions, circulation of reading materials, etc.).
Individual presentation of special interests and expertise of seminar members.
Initial discussion of concept of equity and exploration of possible topics and invited guests for future sessions.

Session 2. October 11, 1978

Discussion of concept of educational equity.

Reading:* Harry Bredemeier, "On the Concept of Equality and Its Attainment" (working paper prepared for the seminar).
James Coleman, "The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity."
Edmund Gordon, "Toward Defining Equality of Educational Opportunity."

Session 3. November 1, 1978

Presentation of social psychological equity theory, by Randall Smith (seminar member).
Discussion of the equity implementations of school finance, led by Richard Lehne (seminar member).

Reading: Richard Lehne, The Quest for Justice

Session 4. November 29, 1978

Discussion of voucher plans as strategy for achieving equity, led by Katherine Kenyon (seminar member).

Reading: Henry Levin, "Educational Vouchers and Educational Equality."
Tyll Van Geel, "Parental Preferences and the Politics of Spending Public Educational Funds."
Denis Doyle, "The Politics of Choice: A view from the Bridge."

Session 5. December 20, 1978

Construction of equity theories. Discussion led by Benjamin Zablocki and Robert Parelius, seminar members who prepared memoranda for this session.

*All readings were circulated to seminar members in advance of each session.

Session 6. January 24, 1979

Continuation of discussion of construction of equity theories.

Reading: Harry Bredemeier, "Some Theoretical Notes on Possible Foci of Seminar Attention" (working paper prepared for the seminar).
David Hawkins, The Science of Ethics and Equality.

Session 7. February 21, 1979

The humanist perspective on educational equity. Presentation and discussion by Peter Berger (invited guest).

Reading: Peter L. Berger and Richard J. Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy.

Session 8. March 14, 1979

Application of a general paradigm of sociological theory to the specific issue of educational equity theory. Presentation and discussion by Walter Wallace (invited guest).

Reading: Walter L. Wallace, Sociological Theory.

Session 9. April 4, 1979

The real life context of equity problems: the case of Israel. Presentation and discussion by Chaim Adler (invited guest).

Reading: Rachel Peleg and Chaim Adler, "Compensatory Education in Israel: Conceptions, Attitudes, and Trends."

Session 10. May 14, 1979

Joint session of the Rutgers Seminar on Educational Equity and the Rutgers College Department of Sociology and Anthropology Colloquium. Presentation and discussion by Susan Cachel (invited guest) on the research and policy implications of recent work in sociobiology.

APPENDIX B

Transcript from Seminar on March 14, 1979

Invited guest: Walter L. Wallace, Professor of Sociology, Princeton University, author of Student Culture (1966), Sociological Theory (1966), The Logic of Science (1969), Black Elected Officials (1976), and other publications in the areas of social theory and Black studies.

Boocock: We like to give our guests at least a head start before we all plunge in and talk. I think Wally's been invited to do almost everything, but essentially I think that the larger issues are that we're still struggling with the concept of equity itself, and so we'd welcome any enlightenment just on the concept. I think the main thing that people have been asking all along is how you would take your scheme in Chapter 1, which everybody's read and brought with them, and apply it to this particular problem, if it is applicable. And anything else that you think of that would help us.

Wallace: Well, I thought that I would make my opening comments very brief and then we'd discuss them, ask questions, and so on, because I am not familiar with most of the literature with which you have become familiar, as I understand, in the course of this seminar. I really can't comment on that but I will make some comments which will maybe make it possible for you to ask me questions and for us to get a discussion going.

On the question of equity, I don't know the nature of the difficulties that you've been having with that, but the term, it seems to me, has intrinsic difficulties--difficulties that anybody must have with it because, as I understand it, the notion of equity is equivalent to the notion of fairness and it's different from equality. Equality is a pretty clear concept, but equity is always relative to some standard of legitimacy and the standard of legitimacy can be anything. It may be equitable for one person to be a master and another person to be a slave, given a certain definition of legitimacy. So that it doesn't seem to me that there is a clear, sort of unambiguous definition of equity which carries within it its own criteria. It always refers to some other criteria which has first to be established, and that, it seems to me may be a source of difficulty with the very idea, the very concept of equity itself as distinct from the concept of equality which I think is a fairly clearly definable term; it is indeed its own criteria, it doesn't refer to anything else. That's one point I would like to suggest; then, the second...

Boocock: Can legitimacy be established any way other than politically? I mean, are there, what are the grounds for establishing legitimacy?

Wallace: Well, if you say that politics has to do with power, I would say certainly power is one way to establish the criterion of equity but there are other ways, I think. Morality is one way, and when I say one way of establishing equity, it is a way of establishing a definition of equity; it may not be a way of establishing equity in real life, because to establish equity in real life always involves politics. Equity is a power concept, it seems to me. Therefore, if you want to establish a definition of it conceptually, it doesn't have to be political definition, it can be a moral definition, or say a more general or philosophical definition.

Okay, the second point I wanted to make has parts. In other words, if I sidestep the whole question of the definition of equity in the way that I just tried to, then the question arises: suppose someone does propose a definition of equity? Suppose we had one or we derived one in some way or other--and with my initial remarks I want to say I don't know what that way is, I have some idea of what the parameters are as I suggested but I don't know--so now suppose we have a definition of equity. Then it seems to me there are certain questions that arise. First, there's the question of: equity with regard to what? And then secondly, there's the question of: equity for whom? And then thirdly, there's the question of: equity how, how to accomplish it? And let me say just a few words about each one of those three questions.

First about equity what, or equity with regard to what: obviously, it seems to me that there are two kinds of, two areas in which one can speak about equity with

regard to any given behavior. One is opportunity and the other is outcome obviously. The question of opportunity I would like to expand to something I tentatively call generating conditions--the conditions that generate a given behavior. One could establish equity with regard to those conditions, and among those conditions I would include things like skill, like aptitude, ability, and here I'm referring to both innate qualities and I guess the last two terms I mentioned sort of tend on the innate side and the first term, skill, tends on the acquired side. But these are conditions that help to determine whether a given behavior will occur, say more generally whether a given event will occur.

And then, of course, in the kind of concerns that you are focusing on, there's the question of reward, which I include as a condition of performance, because what I want to deal with is not really reward but it is the anticipation of reward. It is the belief that reward will occur if a given behavior is manifested. That becomes, then, a prior condition for the behavior. OK, so one could say more generally not only reward but motivation in general.

And then among the generating conditions of a given behavior are what one can call the environment, the situation in which the behavior takes place. It makes a difference if you try to read in good light or bad light and it also makes a difference, if you are running a race, whether you have a handicap in the race or not, in a steeplechase or something of that sort. Those are environing conditions that change, that affect the emission of a given behavior.

So, the first thing is whether one wants to create equity with regard to generating conditions; the second question is whether one wants to create equity either, or, or both, with regard to outcomes, with regard to product, including what we call (I suppose following Merton) latent functions, say not only primary effects, primary product, primary outcome, but also secondary and tertiary, say side effects, unintended effects, whatever, of the behavior.

So, that's sort of some some comments on that first question of equity with regard to <u>what</u> and I divided it into two, (1) with regard to generating conditions or (2) with regard to products or outcome. And I think they are separate equities and can be handled, can be addressed, in separate ways.

<u>Bredemeier:</u> Can you elaborate on that distinction a little bit? Can you manipulate outcomes, help to determine outcomes, without operating on conditions?

<u>Wallace:</u> Yes, I think so. That is, you can say...

<u>Bredemeier:</u> You don't have to operate on the <u>same</u> conditions, obviously, but without operating on <u>any</u> conditions?

<u>Wallace:</u> Yes, I think so.

<u>Bredemeier:</u> Okay.

<u>Wallace:</u> That is, you can say, without operating on conditions, that is to say you can take conditions into account: you say to yourself that individual A starts here, individual B starts here. At the end of a given interval of time, they are here and here. One can then judge that A has won, even though B crosses the line before A. One is then looking at the...judging the outcome, taking into account the generating conditions but not manipulating them at all.

<u>Bredemeier:</u> We've changed the condition of the name of the game.

<u>Wallace:</u> Right.

Bredemeier: The game is not to cross the line first now; the game is to have overcome difficulties or achieved growth from yesterday, or something of that sort.

Wallace: Yeah. That's a definition of equity.

Bredemeier: Okay. But, then, to get that accepted, one would have to go to questions of the reward in this, of the acceptability, of such a switch of the name of the game to participants. I see now, that goes to your third point, how you accomplish it.

Wallace: Yeah, I think so, yeah.

Bredemeier: Okay, right.

Wallace: Okay, so now for whom...(inaudible) I think there are at least five different alternatives: They'd have (1) equity between individuals, (2) equity between groups of individuals, (3) equity between groups of groups, or what I will call organizations, (4) equity between organizations of organizations, or what one can call communities, and (5) equity between communities of communities, or what one can call societies. So we can have equity between individuals, or equity between groups, (small groups), equity between organizations, equity between communities and equity between societies. Now, it seems to me there's a very big difference there because it's the within between variants kind of idea. One can obviously try to create equity between two groups and, that is, achieve that equity between two groups, but individuals within each group will not have equity between themselves. And the same thing is true on up the scale for groups and organizations and communities. I guess I wanted to emphasize that because what I have seen of your discussions has emphasized equity between individuals, and it seems important to me to distinguish equity between individuals from equity between organizations. Okay? As an example, what I have in mind, are something like equity between the black community and between the white community does not necessarily imply equity between individuals in either community.

Smith: Same mean, different variance.

Wallace: Right, between groups--same mean, different variance.

Bredemeier: Or, no correlation between the dependent variable and membership in one of these groups. It still leaves room for variance in the dependent variables, but that variance isn't accounted for by membership in the various groups.

Johnson: It's other factors that create within group variance.

Wallace: Yeah, that's right. OK, that's the second point, I guess. The third is how. I see my little scheme somewhere here...and I have nothing to add to that really, except that suggests that there are really four directly manipulable variables, determinants of equity, and they are the four that I call technologism, social structuralism, nurturism, and (that's the blank one, by the way, I've given it a name, nurturism) and symbolic interactionism. Those are the ones that we can manipulate directly, it seems to me. And then there are four indirectly manipulable; that is to say, we can manipulate these four variables, namely ecologism, demographism, materialism, and psychologism are the variables that they indicate. We can manipulate them but only indirectly. We can manipulate them only by manipulating first one or more of the directly manipulable variables, and then bringing them to bear on the other variables. What I have in mind as an example is that the innate psychological and/or physiological characteristics of human beings can be intervened

with, can be interfered with, manipulated, but only by first manipulating social structure (that's often done with regard to marriage rules and things of that sort), and also technologically. Cloning is a good example or genetic counseling, various other ways. So, it seems to me that scheme really is an effort to differentiate two sets of determinants of any social outcome, of any social outcome that you're interested in, whether it's equity or inequity or inequality, or whatever. And I think it applies as well to the present problem as anything else.

OK, then, on how also: there's a second sort of question which doesn't appear here, and that is something I've been trying to work on for a while. It's an effort to codify what one could call causal models; that is to say, an effort to codify the ways in which various determinants of any given outcome may be combined. I say may be combined, and I really mean that, but I really don't feel confident that I've really done that. I think I have been able to see some codification of the ways in which they have been combined. The ways that I described...first I divide them into two kinds of categories: one is static formulation and the other is dynamic formulation. In the static I'm really interested in what variable is connected to what variable and in what manner and in the dynamic formulations I'm interested in the path, the change in the dependent variable that is induced by the independent variable...various kinds of changes that we're interested in; as an example, revolutionary change is a certain kind of change.

So, now let me go back and say, very briefly, the results so far of this effort at codification. One type of static relationship or static formulation is, I call it enumerative. It's simply the idea of enumerating various causes or determinants that may affect a given outcome. Just enumerate them, but for your purposes I would say that could be interpreted as a simultaneous and separate application of several different determinants to achieve a given outcome. Say, a technologistic and a social structuralistic and whatever being applied simultaneously but separately.

The second is what I call sequential and that is simply one after the other. It's like the billiard ball analogy: you really want to get to the point of having, of bringing, say, just pick it at random, an ecological change, to bring about equity. That is going to be the proximate determinant, the closest determinand, to affect it. But in order to affect that, you have to affect something previously, say technology. And in order to affect that, you have to affect some change in attitude or belief or knowledge and that may be symbolic interactionist. So you have a chain, a kind of causal chain where one thing leads to another. And the final thing, then, has an impact on the outcome in which you're interested, the equity in which you're interested.

The third model is value added. It comes from econometricians via, for me, via Neil Smeltzer's Collective Behavior, in which as you recall he discusses the notion of value added, which is really a sort of a shaping in which determinants operate in sequence, but their determination is added to each other so that the outcome is shaped.

The fourth one is a closed system in which you are applying again multiple determinants, and simultaneously, but now not separately--applying them in their interaction, as a global net impact of the desired outcome. OK, so much for static, I have one more which is not relevant here, that's open system, in which everything affects everything else--that's not relevant here nor is it in most scientific investigation except as an ideal.

Then on the dynamic side: the kind of impact one looks to achieve, that is to say its development throug[h] time, one can say for example with regard to equity, that you're looking to ac[hieve] an evolutionary change in equity which means a succession of many small incr[eases] in equity, and it opposite is evolutionary, some decline in something, many sma[ll] decrements.

And then the next set, really it's a threefold set, which is cyclical. It's conceivable that you may want to induce a cyclical change in equity, so that equity will increase over time and then decrease over time and increase with some periodicity. And then it is conceivable that you may want to keep things just the way they are, so there's a static possibility which is described as a line, a horizontal line. And third, it's I suppose conceivable but not likely that you would want to induce random changes in equity, which is equivalent to what we speak of as disorganization or chaos or whatever--that's not likely, but it certainly is a career, a path that social phenomena have been described as following in the past. Okay, that's all I have to say for openers... (Laughter)

Johnson: Would something like circulation of elites possibly be an example of a cyclical model?

Wallace: Yes, exactly.

Bredemeier: That's an interesting point. I didn't think of that as an example of cyclical. Can both of you say something more about that? You have circulation of elites--what is the equity that's being increased then decreased in the period?...

Johnson: Well, that one would have to increase equity in order to create inclusion of previously excluded groups in order to prevent the atrophy and the downfall of elites, and then once you go through a phase of inclusion it might be then possible to let that decline and either go to another base of inclusion or start the whole thing all over again as the need becomes apparent to include other...

Bredemeier: For example, with respect to the for whom question when dealing with groups--this would consist of saying: we're taking a 20-year time span and our question is: over 20 years how equitable is the distribution of income between Blacks and Whites even though in a given three years most of it is possessed by Blacks and the next three years most of it is possessed by Whites? We could say over 20 years not much variance was accounted for by race. That would be a circulation of elites, right? And the equity would be constant over a period of X years. But I didn't think that's what you meant by cyclical, but I do think that's what could be meant by circulation of elite.

Wallace: When I heard the phrase "circulation of elite", I'm thinking of Pareto, and that seems to me clearly cyclical. Sometimes lions, sometimes foxes. Sometimes residues first class, sometimes second class. And they alternate.

Bredemeier: Could you use Pareto's language and also put the word equity in a sentence or two?

Wallace: It is conceivable that one could define equity as a circulation, as an alternation; I suppose there are those who define equity in American politics as an alternation between the in's and the out's. That's why you have a two-party system and so on, that when you get to the point where you only have the same people "in" all the time, you don't have equity, by some definition. So that one could define equity as an alternation of in's and out's--as a matter of fact, Simmel defines it precisely that way. He talks about mitigating the effects of superordination and subordination, he's directly addressing the problem that Marx...directly addressing Marx and Engels, and he says that,...I'm getting off now, I'm sorry, I'm getting off and doing another...

(Several voices talking together)

Kenyon: But I would like to hear you apply Simmel to this.

Wallace: Well, Simmel implies that there are two kinds of superordination and subordination, two kinds of superordinate and subordinate relationships. One is exploitative, and that's the one that Marx and Engels were talking about in the Communist Manifesto. But another one is not exploitative, it is essentially rational, and that is the one that Marx talks about in the German Ideology where he says, "A symphony orchestra needs a conductor." (And we know that are certain symphony orchestras that, maybe they needed one but they get along without one.) But still he says it needs a conductor so that's technically rational, in order or accomplish the very same goals that Marx and Engels wanted, which is satisfaction of individual needs, mainly physical needs, food, shelter and clothing. The best way to do that is to institute a kind of equity which involves subordination and superordination, but it is a technically rational, non-exploitative superordination and subordination. Now, Simmel addresses that by saying: People are going to feel exploited even in technically rational superordination and subordination. They're not going to know that it's ...you can tell them that it is but they're not always going to believe it. So now the question is, how are you going to remove the feeling of exploitation when it is in fact not present but the feeling is?

One way that he says is to alternate, that some people should be superordinate at certain times and others should be, at time one, and others should be subordinate and it should reverse. And he says that there's also not only a temporal alternation but there's a functional alternation, that with regard to some kind of activity some should be subordinate...you know.

Bredemeier: This is taking the...it is a time span that distinguishes this particular conceptualization.

Wallace: Cyclicality. All the dynamics.

Bredemeier: Over a period of time, equality, you might say that's the conception of equity we're dealing with. Over a certain period of time it applies, it exists, and these others are either...well, the others apply over a period of time too.

Wallace: Yeah, all the dynamic formulations do.

Bredemeier: So that you could take the evolutionary line and look for successive increments of approach toward equity, however defined. But it suddenly occurs to me, is that on the same logical level as the cyclical? You could have the cyclical within that, right?

Wallace: Oh, yes, right.

Bredemeier: And revolutionary, too, you could have cycle of revolution for that matter.

Wallace: Yes, absolutely...Let me just add one other thing, you can have these strung together too, one period of evolution followed by another period of revolution, or whatever. The idea of all due deliberate speed is an evolutionary idea, it seems to me, but a freedom now idea is a revolutionary idea and you can have all due deliberate speed first and then freedom now or vice versa.

Bredemeier: All due deliberate is evolutionary, speed is revolutionary and this was an effort to compromise. (Laughter)

Johnson: I have two questions: one is whether you don't have different kinds of

cyclical models, one might be something like the union democracy.

Wallace: I'm sorry...oh, two different kinds of cyclical models.

Johnson: At least, there are possibly several different kinds, and one might be the alternating leadership that was the model of union democracy. Another is a kind of...I'm not sure it really disturbs the power structure, I haven't thought it through, but I'm thinking of fluctuations in social participation that have been exhibited sometimes by women and possibly by other groups, such as fluctuations in office-holding or in labor force participation. There are times when this participation is called for by certain exigencies, and then other times in which it's whatever the goal at that time was having been achieved. It then falls into decline--it doesn't mean a replacement of elites, it means that there's a certain incorporation and then sort of decorporation that occurs.

Wallace: Yes, I would agree. If I understand you, you're saying that one could regard cyclicality as no change.

Johnson: I think it may mean no change in the power structure, otherwise decorporation couldn't occur. It's not really a circulation of elites, except that for a time limited numbers, the more talented members, say, of minorities, are admitted to elite status. Then that's stopped after a while and I think we have some actual historical examples of it.

The other thing I was wondering that you probably already have it clear in your head and I'm not sure how to do it...

Wallace: Well, keep on wondering!

Johnson: ...is that what kind, there may be limitations to the kind of change you can aim for depending upon your model...the manipulable conditions or the causal explanations that, if you see a phenomenon, if you're dealing with superordination, subordination, leadership of certain kinds, to define equity in terms of everybody having the same amount of it at the same time leads to certain kinds of frustration, so you're going to aim...maybe a cyclical model is the best you can aim for in defining equity...that what kind of change model or implementation model occurs depends upon how equity is defined, and how it's explained, the generating conditions...

Wallace: Absolutely.

Johnson: Have you spelled these out in your head?

Wallace: No.

Johnson: Oh. You have some homework! (Laughter)

Wallace: I knew I shouldn't have come to this...

Johnson: I said it first; I was afraid you'd tell me to do it! (Laughter)

Kenyon: I have a question somewhat along these lines. I appreciate, in your talk, the use of a variety of theories, perhaps linked together, an evolutionary one followed by a revolutionary one, to explain different cases of equality as we find them in the empirical world. It's interesting to me that in thinking about your article, though, I have an entirely different reaction. My reaction in thinking about the different theories was that within each of the different theories, as you've laid them out in terms of their philosophical premises really, there is almost naturally

within several of them a different assumption about what equality would mean. In other words, if you are a technologist, then it would seem to me that you would have a tendency to define equity in terms of some kind of relationship to technology. While the Marxist, while any kind of a materialist position would have within it a tendency to define equity in terms of some kind of relationship to material phenomenon. In any definition of equity, within a materialist conception, that did not include a relationship to material phenomenon would be a form of false consciousness. This, for instance, was precisely what Marx accused Hegel of.

Wallace: Well,...

Kenyon: Do you see what I'm talking about?

Wallace: I do, I do, I think I do. I'm not sure that it necessarily follows. I can see that there may be such a tendency. But you see, one can say: use technology to establish equality vis-à-vis knowledge, and in large part, I think that's what Marx did in the end, to establish a kind of cognitive equality among individuals so I can see that there would be a possible connection but I don't think (inaudible)

Kenyon: From within a Marxist position, though, you would, (just taking your analysis of Marxist position), you would have to say that any understanding of equality that did not deal with the relationship between technology and whatever else you're interested in, would be false, would be based on an incorrect understanding of social relations.

Bredemeier: Any understanding of equity, do you really want to say that? Or, given any understanding of equity, concerned with certain variables, produce it, maintain it or change it?

Kenyon: Well, I don't think that standing from within a Marxist tradition, that they would give you any definition of equity, and that's what I'm trying to get at, that there is a correct understanding of what one has to take into account when one is concerned with equity. One has to take into account the technology of the economic, the material base in society, or else you're not dealing with the real world.

Wallace: Oh, yes. If you're saying that Marxism contains a definition of equity, I agree. And that that definition of equity pertains to the relationship that individuals have to the means of production, I agree.

Kenyon: Okay, but each of these, in its own way, has a similar definition that technologists do. Would that be so? That's what occurred to me, in any case, as I was reading. Your approach is different from that which someone, standing out here as a sociologist, looking at the world, not concerned about the philosophical presuppositions that someone from within these positions might be concerned with, can use to best explain the phenomenon that you're concerned with. But that's very different from someone who's inside...

Wallace: ...who's inside.

B. Parelius: A true believer.

Wallace: Yeah, a true believer.

Kenyon: There is if one is concerned with philosophical presuppositions as you are

in this little chart. Those are a matter of belief. You're going to violate the philosophical presuppositions of some of these theories by using them.

Wallace: I tell you, that doesn't bother me in the least.

Kenyon: It doesn't bother me either but I wanted to see if you (laughter)

Wallace: Doesn't bother me in the least.

Johnson: But I know some people it would bother.

Wallace: Oh, sure.

Johnson: Laid-back theorists! (laughter)

Bredemeier: It's not clear to me that it's true whether one would be bothered by it or not. Could you give another example? You started out with Marxism, materialism...

Smith: Try a demographic one.

Bredemeier: Or try one of the other, the four primary things that could be manipulated, as Wally said at the outset.

Kenyon: Symbolic interactionism?

Bredemeier: Okay, sure.

Kenyon: I think the symbolic interactionist would say any definition of equality that didn't get down to the subjective immediate interaction between two people was a false understanding of equality.

Wallace: I'm inclined to agree with you.

Kenyon: The symbolic interactionist would say that you have to deal with, for instance, equality between organizations by defining organizations in terms of face-to-face interactions--the equity within organizations would have to be defined in terms of...

B. Parelius: The understanding might not be wrong, perhaps, but just irrelevant, beside the point...

(End of side 1)

Side 2 begins with comments by Bredemeier comparing Marxist and symbolic interactionist conceptions of equality.

Kenyon: I think Marx would say that it's basically in false consciousness because it deals with people as individuals and not in terms of their position in a class.

Bredemeier: But what he wants ultimately--and what Marxists in general want ultimately--is a relation in which individual A and individual B deal with one another, define one another, as mutually cooperative individuals owing one another equal amounts of respect, sharing equally in rotations among fishing, writing poetry, and philosophizing in that marvelous little sketch of the utopia. So that the utopia would be the same, wouldn't it? At least it wouldn't be inconsistent.

Kenyon: No, I think it would be very difficult. I don't think that symbolic interactionists would, for instance, find the inequalities between classes as fundamental as the inequalities that are rooted in other, more face-to-face kinds of contacts. What immediately comes to mind is that Marxists are able to overlook individuals in their understanding of equity in a way that symbolic interactionists are not.

Boocock: Like the latter might think that say the basic age and power in equality of teachers and students are so important that the fact that they were of the same social class or different social class was much less important than the terrible inequality of the classroom.

Kenyon: Right, I think that's a good example.

Wallace: We're really sort of focussing more and more on a discussion of Marxism... For example, your last statement that Marxists are able to overlook the individual may be true for Marxists but it was not true for Marx.

Kenyon: Well...

Wallace: It was not true for Marx. Marx says we start out from real live individuals, that's where we start from. And he says we must always remember that we start from individuals and their individual needs. Classes are not overlookings of individuals--and not only do we start from them, from Marx, but we end with individuals--because Marx, above all, was a humanist, he was interested in what he considered (by his own definition though, obviously) the well-being of the individual to be able, as he puts it, to hunt in the morning, to herd sheep in the afternoon, to criticize after dinner, just as they have a mind to. Now that links to another comment: Marxism is a whole body of theory. This (referring to his chart in his introductory essay) does not represent whole bodies of theories--I started to stop you there the first time you said it--these are not whole bodies of theories, these are explanantes, these are factors that are applied to explaining given social phenomena. Now every fully developed theory--certainly Marxism and symbolic interactionism and technologism are--uses all the factors in one or more of the combinations that I discussed. So that all these explaining factors are involved, generally involved, in every single full theory that you find.

Kenyon: Right. I understand that.

Wallace: Now, the way in which they differ is the way that they are combined and the primacy, the weight, the explanatory weight which is distributed among them.

Now, Marxism as a whole body of thought, begins with certain premises about the individual's innate physiological needs and their causal primacy. So when Marx says we begin with real live individuals, what he means is, we begin with real live individuals physiologically speaking, not psychologically speaking. Weber says: the main characteristic of human beings is that they lend significance to things, they create culture, they have ideas. Marx says: first a whole lot of other things, and only after that he says--the fifth wheel--only after that do we find that mankind has consciousness, but not a separate consciousness, it's always physiological consciousness and it's always social consciousness. So he begins with materialism. Marxism appears at least three times in this scheme (referring to chart): that is to say, there are at least three explanatory factors which play major roles in Marxism: one is materialism, one is technologism, and one is social structuralism, conflict social structuralism because the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle, not individual struggle but class struggle. And then the way in which that class struggle is going to be solved, apart from revolution,

is really technological. There can be no question about it, I think. It is technological. As Lenin said, the electrification of a countryside is the key to Communist. A technological implement is the key.

And then I have to mention symbolic interactionism there too--I guess that's four, right?--because that's class consciousness. You can't do anything without class consciousness and you can't do any class consciousness-- not in capitalism--without a Marxist class consciousness.

Kenyon: Symbolic interactionists mights resist that a little bit.

Wallace: Well, they're so much the worse for them! (laughter)

Bredemeier: We told our symbolic interactionist not to come! (laughter)

Wallace: I should say, I'm as much a symbolic interactionist as I am any of these other things.

Johnson: Just sticking with Marxism, I was wondering: What would educational equity mean within a Marxist definition of equity? Would educational equity, as it's being talked about in government circles today, even be relevant to a Marxist utopia or a Marxist definition of achieving that utopia?

Wallace: Yes, I think so. I would say the Marxist definition of equity has different stages. Forget about the first stage which is prior to class society, that's primitive communism, forget about that. But the stage in which we are now, which is the stage of class struggle--class society--is one definition of equity. There's a second definition of equity for the stage, the brief stage, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and a third definition of equity for the final stage which is advanced communism. I would say the first definition, a Marxist definition of equity in class society, would be represented by the Communist Manifesto. The last part of the CM): Communists (as they say) never for an instant stop trying to teach the working class the validity of this whole scheme. (When I say this whole scheme I mean everything that's gone before in the Manifesto) So equity means that the proletariat must be taught a certain way during the period of class struggle and the bourgeoisie must be taught in a quite different way, in a way which disrupts them, which prepares them for the coming revolution, which confuses them, which gives them how many different explanations here instead of one or two or whatever. And then in the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is intensified; the bourgeoisie is--that part of the bourgeoisie which is able and willing to--is taught the ways of the proletariat, is taught Marxism and, to the extent to which they accept it, they become proletariats. But if they do not, they do not.

Kenyon: Off with their heads!

Johnson: So educational equity is some outcome that involves true consciousness.

Wallace: Yes, a true consciousness, but it is true in the sense of, as he says praxis, practice tells you what is true and what is false in terms of what will, in his judgment, achieve the revolution; that is equity.

Johnson: That is educational equity?

Wallace: That is educational equity. Ideally, the bourgeoisie should not be educated at all, because that prepares them for the coming revolution, prepares them to lose it. And the same thing is true in the dictatorship of the proletariat,

although there's some effort to re-educate and so on. But then in advanced communism the system is altogether different because you don't have any bourgeoisie any more, you don't have any multiple classes, you only have one class.

Johnson: At first I thought you were talking about political education but when you said ideally you wouldn't educate the bourgeoisie at all, that suggests you were talking about certain kinds of skills and...

Wallace: I went too far too fast, because Marx says that the bourgeoisie is just as necessary to the revolution as is the proletariat. And one primary reason why the bourgeoisie is just as necessary is that the bourgeoisie has developed technology and science, natural science and social science. Interestingly, in a way, Marx credits the bourgeoisie with dialectical materialism insofar as it is a science, and they give rise to...all but the electrification of the countryside, but they make that possible. And he says that slavery cannot be abolished without the spinning jenny, the steam engine and so on.

B. Parelius: I was just going to inject a small thing here. Bowles and Gintes, when they talk about policy in education, they suggest that we apply the Marxian maxim to each according to their needs and from each according to their abilities. That would imply that what you need to do is refinance. For instance, this is their example: you should refinance education in such a way as we spend much more on those who are presently doing poorly in schools than we do on those who are doing well. At the present time we do just the reverse, we spend much more per pupil on those that are already doing well than on those that are doing poorly. It's not just an equalization that's called for but a reversal of present funding patterns.

Boocock: But isn't it also a real change in what is being taught, I mean this would almost imply you either just close down the schools and everybody would first have to do nothing but get their consciousness changed. And then you would I guess bring back in especially the technological things that were necessary.

Wallace: Yeah, but I think you'd have to...

Boocock: It seems to me that the Chinese system in the last years of Mao is a kind of example of that first phase. You completely close down the school system, and then you start up again and you especially favor the peasants--it's hard to say what they really did with bourgeois kids but definitely they treated them as problems and kind of shunted them aside. But kids were rewarded for displaying that they had the right kind of political attitudes. Then secondarily, if they got through this thing, then it was possible they might get sent to get technical training, always only the sort of training that was valuable to the whole society. Would that be an example of first stage education?

Wallace: No, I would call that an example of second stage education, dictatorship of the proletariat education. You've given it away by telling me it's China in which the revolution has already occurred. And presumably, by Marxist, roughly one could say this is now the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat is in part a continuation of the period of class struggle that went before it, because, during that dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship itself is the carrying of the class struggle now under changed circumstances. The previous circumstances were the circumstances of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, whether by parliamentarian or whatever means is irrelevant (elemantary, I mean), but now it is the changed situation of the class struggle.

A. Parelius: What is the third stage look like, educational equity in the third stage?

Wallace: First of all, there are only proletarians and they are trained in a wide variety...it's a liberal arts education. Everybody gets to know everything and...

A. Parelius: There's equity in opportunity, to go back to your original question, but...

Wallace: Yes, there's equality in opportunity.

A. Parelius: And equality in outcome follows from equality in opportunity.

Wallace: Yes, exactly, right. Because Marx assumes--unlike others like Pareto or Durkheim--Marx assumes the innate quality of every single individual. And there are many differences between individuals but those differences are consequences of socialization and social class really, one's position in society.

Johnson: It assumes perfectability, too.

Wallace: Yeah, of everybody equally.

Bredemeier: Does this also imply another kind of dynamic in your (inaudible) category or is this one included in one of the others--might be called regression in the service of equity. You retreat from equity in order to get a running start in a new kind of structure that will produce more equity.

Wallace: I tried to cover those kinds of things by saying that these various models, dynamic models, can be connected together so that you could connect a devolutionary phase to a subsequent revolutionary phase. Two steps backward and twenty steps forward.

Kenyon: If we can go on to something else...

Wallace: Other than Marxism?

Kenyon: Yes.

Wallace: Oh, good!

(Several voices together and laughter)

Johnson: We can tell them that we can wait doing this Marxist education.

Wallace: Don't tell them that I brought it up because I didn't bring it up.

Kenyon: I've been reading Alfred Schutz the past weekend, a long article on equality, at the same time I was reading your article--and I was wondering: where would you put phenomenology?

Wallace: Symbolic interactionism.

Kenyon: Symbolic interactionism? I thought that that would probably be it, but I know that Schutz would object to being put into the objective category.

Wallace: Well, now I tell you about that. I have modified my view on that objective/subjective category.

Kenyon: You have.

Wallace: Yes.

Kenyon: That's encouraging.

Wallace: In fact, now the only part of the scheme that I work with is the left-hand part. I discuss Parsons--who can write about theory without discussing Parsons? But he doesn't occupy that much, and I draw a different distinction. The objective/subjective definition thing is still there but it's there in a different way that's too complicated to go into now, I think, unless we have more time.

Kenyon: Because what the phenomenologists start with is consciousness, individual consciousness.

Wallace: That's all right, so do the symbolic interactionists.

Kenyon: Right, and so they belong together. Parsons and Durkheim start with collective consciousness and they (my understanding of Parsons, maybe I should just say Durkheim)--they both are really primarily concerned with consciousness or what I was reading as subjective. If you eliminate the subjective line, where do you put phenomenology and symbolic interactionism, assuming that it doesn't belong in the objective category?

Wallace: I think I have misstated it. It's this right-hand column I have modified.

Kenyon: Not the category itself.

Wallace: Not the category. What I've done really, I've dropped this whole thing and take away objective/subjective difference. I'm just talking about these 8 basic explanantes: ecologism, demographism, et cetera, right down there, including symbolic interactionism.

Kenyon: But in the objective category.

Wallace: There isn't an objective category. In the category of, "generated by the social via characteristics of the participants themselves which are principally nervous system." So that's subjective in that sense and I would put phenomenology there.

Kenyon: Okay.

Wallace: I didn't mention phenomenology in this whole thing but there is a comment on ethnomethodology which I think is very close.

Kenyon: By the way, Schutz begins his essay very much along the lines that you began your talk today.

Wallace: Oh? I've forgotten what those lines were.

Kenyon: He talks about different definitions (?) relative to some standard of legitimacy and he talks the necessity to define equality in terms of some social type which he talks about in terms of a relevant structure in society. And then he goes about you can, in certain societies, identify the relevant structures; he then goes on to say that

they're objective and subjective, understanding relevant structures...

Boocock: If you're not going to take Marx's model for answering that question--and the Marxian instructions are rather clear in their ways about education. Are there any "instructions" that would come out of alternative theories? Do any of the others say anything specifically or could one draw implications about the educational system from them that would be an alternative to the Marxian way of enhancing equity?

Wallace: I don't know whether it would be an alternative to the Marxian way because the Marxian way, as I said, is spread all over this thing. But there are many alternatives to the materialistic way and to the conflict structuralistic way. One way is teaching machines , the talking typewriter, that kind of thing.

Boocock: That's not really an equity...

Wallace: Oh, I see, you're talking about a definition of equity.

Kenyon: I'd like to ask a basic question. Can sociologists, qua sociologists answer the question of what is equity? In other words, does someone who claims to be an ecological sociologist have to assert a definition of equity and then apply the theory to that, or is there within their theory implied a definition of equity?

Wallace: Well, that's an interesting question coming from you in particular, because you said earlier that you thought there <u>was</u> a definition of equity implied in each one of these.

Kenyon: Well, I think that there <u>can</u> be.

Wallace: Of course there can be.

Kenyon: My question really comes out of Weber, who would say that you cannot, as a sociologist, answer questions of value. So you can, in fact, apply these theories as a sociologist and use them as a sociologist, but you have to bracket any kind of value assertions that might be...

Wallace: I would say that any sociologist can decide: this is my definition of equity. Now, whether someone wants to say that is not a sociological definition of equity because there <u>cannot</u> be a sociological definition of equity, I would tend to agree with that, but sociologists can do it.

Kenyon: They can assert it and then talk about it sociologically.

Wallace: Yes, that's right. Absolutely. And then you can say, well, given that definition of equity, what then?

Kenyon: Right. Depending on the theoretical perspective of the sociologist, certain definitions of equity you're going to be able to address but others you won't, simply because your theory doesn't...

Wallace: Well, you see, that's what I sort of disagree with. I think that if the theories are encompassed by this thing, is the theory's explanatory factors are encompassed by this, whether the theories want them to or not, they're applicable to any social end one wishes, whether they do it or they don't want to do it or whatever. It's out of their hands.

Bredemeier: Going back to the question of the conceptions of that equity means, we've worked out a tentative classification of things they could mean. I don't have a copy of that here. Does anybody? Have you had a chance to look at it at all? There was another summary of this that I had produced which puts this...It's this that I was talking about which incorporates this. Did you have a chance to look at that?

Wallace: Yeah, I glanced at it, really, but Harry, I can't say I'm ready to discuss it.

Bredemeier: You wouldn't be in a position to say: From any of these frames of references that you so neatly encompass here, can you think of another conceptualization of equity? I think it would be useful to have Kathy talk about this too. Here are conceptualizations of equity which come, not out of sociology, but out of logic. And so far, our tentative notion, and I take it is, that those are the things and the only things that might be meant by equity. It's a tremendous range of things, to be sure, so I'll put two questions to both of you. One is one I've already articulated--are there from a Schutzian point of view or any other point of view, or any other combinations of point of view, another conception of equity? Secondly, assuming that we have an exhaustive classification of what equity might mean, is it not the case--put it that way literally--is it not the case that they are to be realized or not by manipulating one or another or a combination of sets of these explanatory variables?

Smith: I think the key is the use of categories as saying where the focus would be to bring about equity. Given a definition of equity, (a demographer would say (inaudible) a plus, symbolic interactionism says it's student-teacher relationships, technology says the talking typewriter type thing), and given any particular definition of inequity, I think these categories should suggest different focusses in order to bring about whatever it is, so that if we could cross-tabulate the categories by definitions of equity, the solutions are in there.

Bredemeier: Precisely. That's what I'm saying. I seems to me they are. And it seems to me that Kathy thinks they may not be, and I thought maybe at some point you were agreeing with Kathy in that, and that's why I brought it up.

Wallace: No. I don't think I was.

Bredemeier: I like Randy's way of summing up.

Wallace: It's an exhaustive property space. These conceptions versus these two dimensions. If these are exhaustive...

Bredemeier: ...we wrap it up. (laughter)

Kenyon: I don't really know because I'm not trained yet enough in methodological skills to be able to understand how to read that chart very well, but I suspect...

Bredemeier: This, you mean?

Kenyon: No, not that one. That...yes. I have a hard time with it but I suspect that the phenomenologist or the symbolic interactionist would resist a purely logical approach to definitions of equity, that what they would say is that you have to deal with equity in its everyday meaning context.

Bredemeier: And that everyday meaning context escapes the net of logic?

Kenyon: No. The sociologist, though, imposes logic; in this case the sociologist is imposing the logic on the world that in some sense can falsify it, and symbolic interactionists and phenomenologists, as I understand, would say that you need to come at social reality not by imposing a logic on it but by coming through the reality itself, drawing the concept of types out of reality itself. Now, those types, once you've got them, that are really there, I suppose can be shoved into one of the logical definitions of equity. I don't know. I would certainly not assign any kind of analytical (I think that's the best way of saying it) priority to those definitions of equality.

Bredemeier: Of equity.

Kenyon: Of equity, right. The phenomenologist would assign some kind of analytical priority to understandings of equity as they grow out of the everyday context in which people exist and come up with names. Does that make any sense to you?

Johnson: I think what we may be dealing with is the distinction between formal definitions that are logical possibilities in terms of some set of dimensions, and the substance that is plugged into those blocks when you answer the question of equity with respect to what. And then the epistemological means for understanding that would differ between a phenomenologist and say a demographer...well, it would be a phenomenologist versus a positivist, I suppose. But Harry has, here, sort of logical definitions of equity, and he said at the outset that this doesn't say with respect to what, it has to be with respect to something. Ane then the what is, Wally posed the what here in terms of some...

Wallace: I'd like to ask Harry a couple questions about this, OK?

Bredemeier: Yeah, good.

Wallace: First of all, do I understand...

Bredemeier: Let me look at it when you're finished so I remember!

Wallace: Oh, I've got him at a disadvantage! Do I take it...

Bredemeier: It doesn't matter what the question is, the answer is power! (Laughter)

Wallace: Do I understand that there are four major categories here? This one: equity equals equality, equity equals justified inequality, equity equals lottery, equity equals efficiency, and equity equals brave new world? And these are secondary categories under this, secondary topics to the five main topics? So you've got five main definitions of equity.

Bredemeier: Yeah.

Wallace: I take it you mean by this: equity equals equality, you mean <u>justified</u> equality in the same way that you mean <u>justified</u> inequality. But equity is always justification.

Bredemeier: Equity here, this means that there is a conception of equity which makes it identical with equality; equity exists to the degree that equality exists. There's another conception of equity that says: equity exists to the degree that all the inequalities that exist are justified. And there's another definition of

equity that says: equity exists to the degree that there's inequality, but it's random, which of course is a way of justifying it.

Wallace: So that's random inequality.

Bredemeier: That's random but it's (inaudible) randomly separated...

Wallace: ...it's another type of justified inequality.

Bredemeier: That's right, you're right, exactly. The line up here is awkward...

Wallace: I see. And what about equity equals efficiency?

Bredemeier: That is also a version of justified inequality so long as the inequality leads to maximization of GNP or military supremacy or...

Wallace: So does it turn out that there are only two definitions of equity here, one equality and the other justified inequality?

Bredemeier: That's right, exactly so. Justified by various philosophies, ideologies. These are simply labels, Wally. The real logic of these was introduced really by Ben and Randy early on; it's over here. These are summary sloganized titles for the fact that we can either be talking about--to refer to the following phenomena--we can be talking about equity as it concerns distribution or as it...

Wallace: Of what?

Bredemeier: Anything.

Wallace: Anything and anywhere.

Bredemeier: Right. Or equity as it concerns some system state which is non-distributive...

Wallace: Or non-distributional in...or which may also be distributional--system state.

Bredemeier: Well, we're saying to ourselves there is a notion--Sarane introduced this, as a matter of fact--some people say: Equity consists of maximizing freedom; GNP, space travel, science, whatever. And whatever it takes to do that is by definition justified, equitable, fair. That is a way that people have of talking about what's right, what's equitable, what's fair...

Wallace: End justifies means.

Bredemeier: Yes, exactly. Then some people say: No, we're not talking about end states, we're talking about equity ought to refer to how something--a great variety of somethings, obviously--are distributed, <u>within</u> the system.

Wallace: I see, okay.

Bredemeier: And then there is a logical breakdown that says: If you're concerned with distribution, then you deal with two possible situations; there's no variance or there's variance. And if there's variance, there are two possibilities: it's explained or it's not explained.

Wallace: Oh, I see.

Bredemeier: And if it's explained, there are two kinds of categories when you're dealing with the realm of equity in terms of which it can be explained: Variables that your equity theory tells you are good variables--in the Protestant ethic those are effort, ability, self-sacrifice, self-discipline, you know, that sort of thing--and those which are no good, tabooed--Ben initially called them the no-no variables, race, sex, age and so on. And they have various combinations and it's those combinations that give rise to these slogan labels. So the point at which to apply logic is on the right-hand side of this, not the left-hand side. The left-hand side is rhetoric. Is that everybody's understanding of this?

Johnson: Couldn't you--this really derives from a question Wally asked--couldn't you expand you very first category; it seems to me there's somehow more than one...

Bredemeier: You mean distribution?

Johnson: Well, equity equals equality, that there's really more than one dimension here, that if equity always refers to some form of legitimacy, and then that legitimacy can be defined in terms of equality or inequality...wait a minute, I'm not sure that's what's meant...

Bredemeier: I think really we ought not to pay attention to the words on the left-hand side of this page. Really, those are just rhetorical labels.

Johnson: OK, but let's say no variance...I see, the two major categories are system state and distribution.

Bredemeier: Right.

Johnson: So that efficiency is not necessarily inequality, a justified inequality; it may be a justified equality.

Bredemeier: Maybe, but the question there would be: what contributes to efficiency?

Johnson: Yeah, I was reading it wrong in terms of the left...I thought there was equality and then everything else involved in equality, but it doesn't necessarily...

Bredemeier: Not when you go down to Roman II. Roman II is a philosophical conceptualization that says: Let's don't concern ourselves with distribution; when we talk about equity let's don't concern ourselves with that. That distribution is most equitable--whether it's equal, unequal, explained this way, explained that way, unexplained--which leads to the maximization or the minimization of something.

Johnson: Okay.

Wallace: Let me see, I guess the notion of equity always implies two things; that is to say, a relationship between two things, at least two things. So, Roman II seems to me to suggest equity between systems.

Bredemeier: That's right. A system...whatever you do is equitable if it makes... system A is...

Wallace: If it makes capitalism win out over communism.

Bredemeier: Or if it increases GNP.

Wallace: Well, yes, but relative to the GNP of the Soviet Union.

Bredemeier: Yeah, whichever is the mightiest...or of course, getting first to the moon, or building more pyramids, more churches...

Johnson: What about just the idea of maximizing social welfare or happiness? Is this always have to be relative to some other system?

Bredemeier: That's why I put maximizing happiness and stability is of course a maximizing thing which happens, in the brave new world illustration of it, to include a great deal of inequality but the rulers of brave new world say that's an inequality which is very equitable because everybody's happy with his or her position and the place is stable.

Johnson: Isn't there a notion of optimizing something simply in terms of benefits versus cost that really is not comparative--the comparisons take place within that system in terms of what that system...

Boocock: To that extent you wouldn't be concerned with equity. It would be possible to just worry about just maximizing something without worrying about equity at all.

Bredemeier: About what kind of equity?

Boocock: Well, any kind.

Bredemeier: One or two?

Boocock: You said this can only be understood in some comparative way.

Bredemeier: Yeah, I say any equity.

Boocock: Yeah, and Marilyn said, "Aren't there some situations where you would be just concerned with maximizing everybody's welfare?" And I said it seems to me that would be a case where equity would not enter into it.

Wallace: That's right. That's a concern with progress, I would say, against some absolute standard. But equity always involves some equitable relationship between individuals or groups and I guess I would like to underscore what I said before about the question...the difference between individuals and groups...because I think that number 2 implies but doesn't say explicitly equity between systems, and is willing to sacrifice equity within systems for equity between systems. And number 1 doesn't specify the object within which there is no variance or variants at all. It doesn't say no variance or variants between individuals or between groups or between...

Bredemeier: Right, but it applies to all of them.

Wallace: Well then, that's fine, that's fine. So that means that these are not on the same level of generality at all.

Bredemeier: Precisely. They are different conceptions of equity and the 3rd one is very important to include, that equity doesn't concern an outcome of distribution, which is what this does, doesn't concern any system state. It simply refers to a process. You make the game fair and the outcome--the ecological outcome if you like

in the case of social systems--is equitable by definition if the process is fair.

Wallace: Well...It's hard to make a distinction sometimes between state and process.

Bredemeier: It's not hard to make a distinction between outcome...here we're referring to an end state outcome, and here we're referring to a process.

Wallace: I see. A condition that generates this outcome.

Bredemeier: No. If you--as Milton Friedman would, for example--say equity is just a matter of process, and whatever system state emerges is the equitable one, whatever distribution of anything emerges is the equitable one, by definition of the process having been equitable. Now that is a political, moral, philosophical position ane what we're trying to do is get ourselves on top of all the possible ones, and then here's where we laid out all the possibilities from a research point of view, perhaps, of what it would mean if you're...

[End of side 2]

Wallace: And this could refer to--it distinguishes, it's part of--the distinction between generating conditions and outcomes.

Bredemeier: Right. We could dovetail these things very nicely that way.

Smith: Why don't we just specify the unit when you're specifying whatever it is there is in equity in respect to?

Wallace: I agree, but I think there's an advantage of saying that there are different kinds of units because--you know it can be applied. Say, take this general question, you know it can be applied to individuals and systems of individuals, and you know it can be applied to generating conditions, and to outcomes. But it seems to me useful to say that you are aware that it is applicable to equity between individuals and also that it is applicable to conditions versus outcomes. It is redundant--no, I wouldn't say it's redundant--it is specification of what this, Roman I, covers at the most general level.

Smith: What I'm saying makes Roman II also cover the unit so we start out that there's differences in businesses in terms of production.

Wallace: You mean some businesses produce alot and some produce a little?

Smith: Right. And we decided, under that definition, we think that there may be some definition of equity which may describe this difference between organizations or businesses as inequitable. Well, we could get down at this point and say that there's a system state that just says that it's equitable as long as each business maximizes what it's supposed to maximize.

Wallace: Okay, and you'd want to do that for businesses and then do it for schools. You've got a long document there.

Smith: Right. But at any level, for any particular thing that you're looking at in terms of what there's inequity in regard to, I think we could still put it into systems, some sort of system, as long as we don't get all the way up to the largest system because that largest system won't be contained in the system.

Wallace: There's only one, right.

Smith: As long as your unit of analysis is smaller than the largest one you allow, then you could put it in a system of something and look at efficiency or the maximization or minimization of something in that respect, which then puts the whole scheme back to applicable no matter what your unit of analysis, which I think was my reading of what the problem was a little while ago before the colons and the codas and everything.

Bredemeier: I'm lost.

Wallace: So am I. I thought we had solved the problem before the codas and the colons.

Smith: I know, I added my minority view.

Bredemeier: Whenever Randy says something and I don't get it the first time, it turns out if I think about it I get it the third time and then it requires revision. Can you make your point again? I just don't follow it.

Smith: Maybe I miss what you two are discussing, which is a pretty bet, but the thing was that the systems idea for individuals doesn't work too well; you've got a different unit of analysis between Roman numeral I and Roman numeral II.

Wallace: What is the difference?

Smith: Well, that's what I thought you were discussing, maybe I'm wrong.

Wallace: Oh, no, I don't think so. We were saying Roman numeral I covered all possible units of analysis and also covers conditions as well as outcomes. Roman II specifies a basic difference, a distinction between units of analysis, individuals, and systems of individuals. Roman III specifies a difference between generating conditions and product outcomes.

Smith: I think the problem is, then, that this classification system is not exhaustive if you start tossing around different units of analysis.

Wallace: Which classification system, Roman I?

Smith: The entire thing.

Wallace: It is not exhaustive? Explicate that, I don't see how it is not.

Bredemeier: What Wally was really trying to do was to make it totally exhaustive by incorporating everything under Roman I.

Smith: Yeah.

Wallace: Do you regard this as logically exhaustive?

Smith: No, because it reduces the sort of a "che sera, sera" view of equity, especially in terms of maximization or minimization of something; whatever maximizes productivity of individuals is equitable.

Wallace: Where does that say that, in Roman I?

Smith: No, it doesn't say that in Roman I.

Wallace: Does it say it in Roman II?

Smith: That's my reading of Roman II, that it's equitable as long as it produces efficiency in something.

Bredemeier: But we have got (inaudible) than thinking about collections of individuals here. (or we have not been thinking exclusively about collections of individuals here.)

Wallace: Oh no, I think what we did first was, we made a grand distinction between progress and equity, that progress is not necessarily a question of comparing two or more individuals or systems; it is a question of comparing any single given system to some absolute abstract criterion.

Smith: All right.

(Two voices speaking together)

Bredemeier: ...because Wally was taking us back puristically and correctly to the etomology of equity. When we're talking about equity let's be reasonable and recognize that it only involves comparisons. So that he's saying our II as formulated here isn't even in the ballpark of equity.. It may be a value which supercedes equity in some philosophical sense.

Wallace: Yeah, right, exactly.

Bredemeier: ...so that one says: Never mind how things are distributed inside the family, even, it's the total property holdings of the family that we're concerned with. That's not a question of equity, Wally is reminding us, that's a question of subordinating equity to some other value.

Wallace: Yes, correct.

Smith: Then we can't have a definition of equity that says it's equitable as long as each person gets the most out of whatever, rises to the maximum amount of his ability. Doesn't that not allow such a thing like that?

Wallace: That's right, I would say that's progress. But if you modify that just a little bit--and if you say that it is equitable if no person gets any more than any other person or that each person gets the same as any other person, then that's equity because it is comparative between persons.

Smith: Well, each person gets to his maximum potential.

Wallace: I see what you mean. At that logical extreme it becomes the same. Equity and progress becomes the same at the logical maximization extreme, but anywhere short of that they are different.

Smith: But if we define equity as saying anything that allows individuals to get to that point--or something that we've got this ideal out there--we have a system...

Wallace: To get to which point?

Smith: The maximization of their own abilities.

Wallace: Of their own abilities, okay, that's progress, yeah.

Smith: And we just get it to that point where progress and equity sort of converge.

Wallace: Yes, right.

Smith: That definition of equity isn't covered in Roman numeral I.

Wallace: The convergence point of equity is not covered.

Bredemeier: Yes, it is, there's no variance in the degree to which people have achieved the maximum (inaudible)

Various: Yeah. Okay. That's it? Yeah. Whew!

Bredemeier: Aren't you going to put a colon instead of a period?

Sachs: What I feel has gotten lost in the discussion here is that there's two individuals; it's the third thing to which these two individuals and their relative position vis-a-vis each other must be compared which was the notion of fairness or legitimacy. You started by saying that equity was equivalent to fairness, different from equality--maybe we're talking more in terms of equality here--and it's always relative to some standard of legitimacy. In other words, I don't see any concern for equity or any point in discussing it at length unless there is this concern for the extent to which it is approximating legitimacy or fairness. So the question of outcomes and factory one factories producing alot or a little may or not be a question of equity unless you introduce the notion of fairness or legitimacy.

Wallace: Yes, we're taking that for granted in order...I think you're absolutely right.

Sachs: This was just getting lost for me in the discussion.

Smith: It's built in...

Bredemeier: It's built in because we're saying one conception of legitimacy is that there's no variance; another conception of legitimacy is that there's variance and it's accounted for by variables X, Y, and Z; and another conception of legitimacy is that there is variance and it cannot be accounted for by anything, for example, a lottery.

Sachs: Right.

Bredemeier: Then there's another conception of legitimacy which says: if the rules are legitimate by moral or political fiats, then whatever outcome there is--variance; no variance, correlations, no correlations--is legitimate.

Sachs: Okay.

Bredemeier: We're sayng: the outcome of the pennant race every year is the way it should be; regardless of whether the Yankees always win it or the team with the most money wins it, or the team with the three best pitchers wins it...You can account for the variance or you can't account for it, but it's legitimate, anyway.

Wallace: And if it is accounted for. Now let me ask you what you mean by "accounted for?" (inaudible comment by Bredemeier) When you say variance explained, are you

speaking statistically?

Bredemeier: Yes, ultimately.

Johnson: Harry, you earlier said there'd be no variance with respect to maximizing ability.

Bredemeier: I said if there were, if there was equality, if everyone maximized his or her ability, maximized the realization of his or her potentials, that's encompassed in no variance.

Johnson: Okay, that's what I wanted to ask about. Why wouldn't you say it is equitable inequality by prescribed but not by tabooed in that there's a correlation between ability and achievement or...

Bredemeier: Because the dependent variable is not achievement.

Smith: We define our way out of that by saying we're interested in relationship between maximum potential and realized potential and if there's no variance in that difference across all individuals, then we have no variance...

Johnson: Oh, so realized potential is not the...

Bredemeier: It's a percentage, everybody realize (inaudible)

Wallace: No, realized percentage is not what is concerned. What is...

Bredemeier: It's the ratio.

Wallace: I guess it is. It's the maximization of potential; whatever the potential is. If everybody maximizes anything, there's no variance with regard to meximization. There may be variance with regard to what is maximized but there's no variance with regard to maximization.

Johnson: Okay.

Wallace: Did you say what I thought you were going to say, that the idea of legitimacy is built into the prescribed and tabooed thing?

Bredemeier: Or the non-explained thing.

Wallace: Well, I think it's also built into the explainable.

Bredemeier: I only wanted to encourage that. Lottery is regarded as legitimate.

Wallace: Well, maybe.

Bredemeier: There is a philosophical position which says some guys go to Vietnam and some guys don't and if the lottery wasn't rigged, that's okay.

Johnson: Is there a distinction to be made here between equity and justice? It just strikes me that historically most of the writers who talk about Roman numeral II, more like they link it to conceptions of justice, the just society.

Bredemeier: Roman II now, Wally has scratched, right? It's not in the ballpark of

equity.

Wallace: No, I think I changed it.

Bredemeier: Well, yes, but I mean we can't say equity concerns this, I think you're right.

Wallace: Right, right.

Johnson: If we were to retain the term equity to refer exclusively to distributive features of society, we're still talking about certain kinds of rewards, arrangements, processes that do not refer to the distributive features and I think sometimes in reality those other schema get termed equity, that there's sometimes a confusion.

Smith: In the social psychology literature, equity, fairness, distributive justice, almost all get thrown together.

Johnson: Well, I was thinking of something like the scheme in Plato's Republic. I'd have to go back and review this, but in my memory Plato, in talking about a just society, is not really talking about the distributive features of that society. That's not the essential thing he ends up with. Do I remember wrongly?

Wallace: Well, he is talking about the distributive features in society.

Kenyon: I think he's also talking about a process. If you have certain things that are in the society, then you've got a just society. That was another way to talk about justice, too.

Johnson: Sort of things working the way they were meant to work, people doing what they're best suited to do, I guess then it becomes by definition no variance with respect to...

Wallace: Maximization.

Johnson: ...the way things work, working in terms of some abstract idea.

Wallace: Hot off the press!

Boocock: We've run out of both our tapes and we're not supposed to produce more than two tapes worth of ideas. (laughter)

A few relevant comments made during the informal discussion ending this session:

Kenyon: I wonder if sociologists can say what a valid definition of equity or equality is. I think that sociologists tend to either impose that definition on the situation, or go out and take somebody else's and work with that. Question is, what can sociologists do if they can't tell the policy makers what equality is? Thinking along those lines, I read Weber's "Sociology as a Vocation." Weber talks about the 3 things sociologists can do to help people in their political struggles and he talks about their methods, ways of thinking, and their ability to clarify the situation for policy makers. In other words, given a certain understanding of equity and policy makers struggling in the real world with that understanding, then sociologists can go in and say: OK, there are a number of different things you can do if you want, for instance, equity in financial resources. You have to choose between different alternatives with these consequences. It seems to me that the ability of sociologists

to clarify the real political situation in which policy makers struggle with equity and which Weber says sociologists can do, we haven't addressed.

Johnson: (partly in response to above). Perhaps we're too modest as sociologists. If we don't tell them what equity is, someone else will, and why are so many less qualified than anybody else?

Bredemeier: (responding to both Kenyon and Johnson): One of the alleged strengths of sociologists, and maybe all social scientists, is their ability to point out unanticipated consequences of taking a given step toward any given conception of equity. We haven't done that, but I don't think we could have before we satisfied ourselves about what sorts of steps might conceivably be contemplated--and I seriously think that it's a good legitimate foundation for another year's seminar.

There's another thing this session today has put on the agenda in my own mind. I'd like sometime to consider the relationship between Wally's conceptualization as presented today and the conceptualization I presented in terms of power variables and decision variables (his 2nd, agenda paper)--I think I see connections, but I think they need to be articulated.